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ABSTRACT
Arirang People:
A Study of Koreans in Transnational Diasporas of the Russian Far East and Manchuria,
1895-1920
by
Hye Ok Park
Claremont Graduate University: 2019
Much attention, scholarly and popular, has been given to the Japanese deployment of Koreans in
their war efforts during the Pacific War from the 1930s to 1945. Much less attention, however,
has been given to the subject of the pre-Colonial period prior to 1910. The main objectives of
this dissertation are to: 1) present the evidences which reveal the presence of Korean nationals in
the Japanese military during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, years before the formal
annexation of Korea by Japan and decades earlier than the historiography has established, 2)
analyze the new evidences of the presence of Koreans not only on the Japanese but also on the
Russian side of the war, and 3) investigate why and how these Koreans came to settle as
transnational diasporas in the Russian Far East and Manchuria at the end of the Yi Dynasty of
Korea at the turn of the twentieth century, resulting in their involvement in the Japanese and the
Russian military forces.
From a geopolitical and multicultural perspective, this is a study of transnational
diasporic communities of Koreans in Russia and Manchuria, formed by their desire for better
lives and their struggle for survival during a time of conflicts and dissatisfaction in their
homeland. The Yi Dynasty was about to collapse in its attempts to secure sovereignty as well as
achieve modernity and westernization in the geopolitical environment of turn-of-the twentieth
century Asia. This dissertation will focus on the period from 1895, when Korea was declared
independent from its tributary relationship from China, to 1920, after Korea was formally

annexed by Japan, to understand the context behind the presence of Koreans in someone else’s
countries and wars.
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Conventions
Romanization and Translation
Finding consistent rules and practices of romanization and use of diacritical characters has
been one of the most challenging tasks in writing this dissertation. Even the same names or
words in the Korean language have been Romanized differently as the rules have changed in the
past several decades. Therefore, I have chosen to transcribe names and words as they are
pronounced in an everyday Korean language. For the names and words that can be presented in
Chinese characters, which are used commonly in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages, I
have provided the Chinese renditions in parentheses: yangban (
used Gojong (高

), for example. I have also

) to refer to King Gojong until 1897 and Emperor Gojong (高

)

afterward when he enthroned himself as the monarch of the Great Taehan Empire.
For place names in the Korean peninsula, I have used Korean pronunciation with
traditional Chinese characters in parentheses as much as possible: for example, Hamgyongdo
( 鏡道) and Baik-du-san ( 頭

) in their first occurences. Place names that are more

recognized by English readers, such as “Yalu River (

江),” I have preferred to use them

consistently rather than their variant Korean pronunciations of “Aprok-gang” or “Amnog-gang.”
For quotations of primary source materials, such as Yijo and Gojong Sillok, newspaper
articles, other documents in Korean, Classical Chinese, or Japanese, I have quoted them in their
original languages, followed by English as translated by me. For all other languages such as
Russian and French, I have transcribed them in their original characters.
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INTRODUCTION
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
My love, you are leaving me behind,
Your feet will get sore before you reach ten li.
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
As many as are the stars in the sky,
So are the many dreams in my heart.
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
Over yonder is Baik-du-san Mountain,
Full of blossoms in wintry cold December.
“It’s an ancient Korean song of the Exiles,” said Bruce Albert Wilder Taylor, the chief
engineer and manager of the Unsan Gold Mines in Hamgyong Province, Korea to his newly-wed
English wife Mary Linley, when someone outside their window was heard humming the song of
Arirang one night in Unsan.1 “It always reminds me of the Volga Boat Song. No matter what
words they put to it, and they have dozens of interpretations, the tune itself has a political
meaning. It’s a sort of pass-word,” explained Bruce to Mary in 1917.2
Arirang is a folk song of Korean people, so popular that it is almost better known than the
national anthem of Korea and was inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage of Humanity by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) in 2012. Believed to have originated from the town of Jeongsun in Kangwon
Province, thus called Jeongseon Arirang by some, the song has been estimated to have 3,600

1
2

Mary Linley Taylor, Chain of Amber (Sussex, England: The Book Guild, 1991), 147.
Taylor, Chain of Amber, 147.

1

variations of 60 different versions, such as Jindo Arirang and Miryang Arirang.3 As Bruce told
Mary, Arirang was used by Koreans to pass secret codes to each other during the Russo-Japanese
War and became a resistance anthem of Korea during the Japanese colonial occupation period.
Arirang was indeed the most favored folk song of Korean people at home and in exile.
During the hard times, as there were many, in the history of Korea, the song has sustained the
Korean people in a shared, collective spirit throughout their lives in transnational diasporas in the
Russian Far East, Manchuria, and Japan as well as in Korea. Therefore, it seems appropriate that
the song with its four verses is used to demarcate the chapters of this dissertation: Chapter I:
Koreans in the Russian Far East and Manchuria, Chapter II: Koreans in the Russo-Japanese War
in 1904-1905, Chapter III: Korean Transnationals as Stateless People, 1906-1920, and the
conclusion.
The first verse of the Song of Arirang expresses the sadness and apprehension of being
separated from loved ones—be it a lover, family, neighbors, or country. In a similar way,
Chapter I discusses the destitute peasants who packed up and crossed the borders to get away
from hunger, disease, and abuse from the upper class in the Korean society and the corrupt
government. The second verse portrays their new lives in strange lands, struggling to make it
work as another hardship is dealt them in the form of the Russo-Japanese War, examined in
Chapter II. Korean transnational migrants had to choose whether to continue to live in secluded
exile or engage themselves as spies or soldiers on either side of the belligerent nations, Russia or
Japan. Also studied will be the circumstances behind their deployment, whether voluntary,
coerced, or forced, and what would have motived them to participate on either side of the war as

3

“Arirang, Lyrical Folk Song in the Republic of Korea, Inscribd in 2012 on the Representative List of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage of Humanity,” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2012.

2

transnational people of Korean diasporas in the Russian Far East and Manchuria. Their longing
for loved ones back home continued in their wish to join their gazes up in the sky, counting
many stars and dreams, together in spirit.
The third verse expresses the sorrowful grief of Korean transnationals as they became
stateless or inferior subjects of the colonizer, Japan. In Chapter III, their lives became more
difficult and complicated as their newly-adopted countries went through their own revolutions,
regime changes, and financial difficulties. The final verse of lamenting the river of no returns by
these transnationals, long lost without a homeland to return to. These groups were forced to
continue to migrate from one place to another not knowing what lay ahead but still determined to
work hard and survive in their given situation. The Conclusion discusses Korean transnationals
as they continue on their journeys in the Russian Far East and Manchuria after 1920.
Much attention, scholarly and popular, has been given to the Japanese deployment of
Koreans in their war efforts during the Pacific War from the 1930s to 1945. Historiography has
already established that the Japanese military forces started deploying Koreans who supposedly
volunteered to serve in Japanese Army in 1938 before the system of conscription began in 1944
and 1945. With more than 214,000 Koreans serving in the Japanese Army and Navy in 1938 plus
150,000 Korean civilians deployed in Japanese Imperial Forces from 1938 to 1945, Korea
proved itself to be “Japan’s largest formal colony and by far the most significant
nonmetropolitan source of civilian and military labor.”4 During the five year period between
1938 and 1943, approximately 800,000 Koreans were deployed under the special volunteer

4

Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Koreans during World War II
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 18.

3

system for the Japanese Army Special Volunteer System ( 軍

渡) even before the

conscription system began in 1944.5
Much less attention, however, has been given to the subject of Koreans in the Japanese
military in the pre-Colonial period prior to 1920. This dissertation aims to push back the dates of
the Japanese engagement of Korean nationals in their imperial projects, military and commercial,
to the pre-annexation days of early 1900s—decades before the 1930s. Results of historical
research on whether, why, and how these Koreans became involved in the Japanese military
forces in the pre-colonial times will be presented.
The main objectives of this dissertation are to: 1) present the evidences which reveal the
presence of Korean nationals in the Japanese military during the Russo-Japanese War, 19041905, years before the formal annexation of Korea by Japan and decades earlier than the
historiography has established, 2) analyze the new evidences of the presence of Koreans not only
on the Japanese but also on the Russian side of the war, and 3) investigate why and how these
Koreans came to settle in the Russian Far East and Manchuria as transnational diasporas at the
end of the Yi Dynasty of Korea, resulting in their involvement in the Japanese and the Russian
military forces due to their lives in transnational diasporas.
Although this dissertation will focus primarily on Korean involvement in the RussoJapanese War of 1904-1905, it will span three chronological periods: 1) between the 1860s to the
early 1900s for the migration and settlement of Korean transnationals in the Russian Far East and
Manchuria in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War which ended at Japan’s victory in 1895, 2)

5

Cho Gun, “Production of ‘Moving Tale During the War’ of Japanese Forces and Mobilization of Soldiers from
Joseon in Late Japanese Imperial Rule,” The Journal of Korean-Japanese National Studies, Vol. 31 (December
2016), 53.
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the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905, and 3) the beginning of Japanese colonial rule of
Korea between 1906 and 1920.
The geopolitical environment of the turn-of-the twentieth century Asia was ripe with
Japan’s imperialistic aggression toward Korea to publicly deny control of Korea by China,
Russia, or any other powers of the world. Just as aggressive were the capitalistic exploitations by
western powers, such as England, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States, for the rich
natural resources of Korea—hitherto untapped. And the Yi Dynasty of Korea (1392-1910) was
about to collapse in its futile attempts to secure sovereignty, as well as achieve modernity and
westernization, largely due to internal factionalism and a weak government.
Both the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were fought on Korean soil and
won by Japan, leading to utter devastation of farm lands and inundation of cities of Korea by
troops, army followers, and early migrant settlers of Japan. Successful removal of all foreign
super powers from the Korean peninsula, engineered by Japanese political machines and strong
military forces by 1905, contributed to the success of Japan’s imperialism and the collapse of
Korea’s independent monarchy. The poor and powerless of Korea were left to their own devices
to survive in this tumultuous era of their country’s history.
This is a study of transnational diasporic communities of Koreans in Russia and
Manchuria, formed by their desire for better lives and struggle for survival during a time of
conflicts and dissatisfaction. I define transnationalism as a phenomenon in which subjects of one
nation cross over political boundaries into another. While they have left their homeland and work
to adapt in their new homeland, transnationals remain committed to their original homeland and
continue to be involved in the affairs of their homeland from overseas or across borders.
Members of transnational diasporas can maintain emotional and social ties with members of the

5

old homeland as well as take active roles in the social/personal networks in socio-economic and
political connections across borders while living and engaging themselves as members of their
new homeland. In the case of these Koreans, their main motive in crossing the borders initially
was the desire for better work and living conditions which could not be met in their home
country. Once they crossed over, they struggled in the hard work of farming or laboring in the
vast uncultivated lands of the Russian Far East (RFE) and Manchuria. They also constructed
homes in the old Korean style, forming villages of families and fellow migrants into a diaspora.
Diaspora, as defined by scholars such as Rogers Brubaker, is formed by members of an
ethnic group who originated from the same place but dispersed due to traumatic conditions. The
Korean migrants who formed diasporas in the RFE and Manchuria met three classic aspects of
diaspora: 1) “dispersion in space” by crossing over state borders, 2) “orientation to a homeland”
maintaining their “collective memory” of their homeland to which they or their descendants long
to return, and 3) boundary maintenance by “preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the
host society” by maintaining their Korean customs and cultures as well as languages.6
Some of these Korean transnationals who gained financial stability and citizenship in
their adopted homelands became involved in the affairs of their old homeland from across the
borders. Some took part in the Righteous Armies on the Manchurian and Russian sides and
frequently crossed the borders down to Korea to fight the Japanese army and police after the War
was over and Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905. When Koreans in the RFE and
Manchuria became more “collectively committed to the restoration of the homeland and to its
safety and prosperity” after the Russo-Japanese War, these groups became a truly transnational
diaspora, even more so than at the beginning.7 I define a transnational diaspora as a population of

6
7

Rogers Brubaker, Grounds for Difference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 122.
Brubaker, Grounds, 122.
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migrants with a diasporic identity of exile as well as multiple commitments, allegiances,
engagements, and loyalties with the land of origin and new host countries.
What would have pushed the people of Korea—despite their long history as a nation—to
cross the northern borders over the rivers and mountain ranges with their possessions on their
backs in the late nineteenth century? Who were these people? How did they maintain their
national identity in their new lives in the transnational diasporas with a new set of challenges?
How did they perceive and deal with the boundaries of their new lives—geographical and
cultural, “permeable or soft in certain respects and rigid” in others— in their practices of
“language, eating habits, and marriage taboos.”8 These are the questions of main focus in this
dissertation.
Research findings in the following primary sources of multilingual and multinational
documents will furnish pieces of evidences to support the thesis of this dissertation: Yijo Sillok,
錄)” also known as “Veritable Royal

“The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty (

Records”—daily recordings of the royal courts in each of the Korean kings’ reign, compiled
posthumously upon their deaths, and The National Institute of Korean History Archives; the
National Archives of Japan at Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), and Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Documents (Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [

交

]),

Records of Japanese Consulate in Korea (Chukan Nihon Koshikan Kiroku (CNKK) =
公
(國

管 記錄); The Archives of Korean History at National Institute of Korean History
), and Korean newspapers, such as The Independence, Hwangsung Sinmum

and Taehan Maeil Sinbo, published in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century; the

8

Prasenjit Duara, “Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900-1911,”
Chapter One in Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, ed. Aihwa Ong
and Donald Macon Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), 29.

7

Archive of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Diplomatic Dispatches; the Horace
Allen Archives at the New York Public Library; the Patricia D. Klingenstein Archive of the New
York Historical Societies; and the Jack London Archives at the Huntington Library in San
Marino, California. In-depth research was also conducted in relevant contemporary Westerners’
travel logs, memoirs, and newspaper reports. Findings of many historians in the past two
centuries have also been researched to uncover the historical and political circumstances
surrounding Korea as a nation and Korean people’s involvement in Japanese endeavors of
empire-building and colonization, be it as transnational emigrants to Russia and Manchuria in the
pre-colonial period or as soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.
Historiography on Relevant Topics
a. Historiography on Transnationalism, Diaspora, and Diaspora Studies
What is transnationalism? What is a diaspora? A Boolean search of combined keywords for
“transnationalism and diaspora” performed in the WorldCat retrieves 5,295 results in 2019.9
When limited to works in history and auxiliary sciences, the results are narrowed down to 220
entries. Still, it shows the prolific nature of studies on transnationalism and diasporas in the past
few decades, which will be examined in this section.
Moving away from the earlier scholarship of Robert Park (1928) and Oscar Handlin
(1941 and 1973) on the static patterns of immigration, scholars such as Madeline Y. Hsu (2000),
Adam McKeown (2001), and Mae M. Ngai (2004) introduced a shift in the historiography of
migration and immigration to that of transnational migration. Rather than identifying specific
places on a map where immigrants came from and tried to fit in—suggesting uprooting and
assimilation—these scholars of the transnational approach raised a new question: Can migrants
9
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belong to more than one place at any given time? Instead of a melting pot of “unidirectional”
assimilation, the new shift recognized transnational diasporas where “flexible citizenship” and
“continuing loyalty” to the old place are also accepted.10 This pattern of migrants’ forming and
living in transnational diasporas, or even in borderlands, by Koreans in the Russian Far East and
Manchuria will be examined in this dissertation.
Seminal works by scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler (1999 and 2016), Frederick Cooper
(1999 and 2005), and Benedict Anderson (2006) provided foundation studies on nations and
empires. Stoler and Cooper saw that nations and empires were “mutually constitutive” and
“imagined” in “contiguous as well as noncontiguous territory,” as seen in the cases of Great
Britain and the Third Republic of France with colonies in far-away lands. Based on Cooper’s
theory that the world is interconnected and unequal, the unequal relationship between the
colonials and the colonized is seen in the history of slavery and colonial exploitation in Africa.11
In the nation defined as “imagined community” by Anderson, the members will never
meet or hear of each other yet feel such close ties and comradeship with each other. It is because
the nation is imagined, limited, and sovereign as a community. For example, members of the
British Empire feel interconnected by “stretchable nets of kinship and clientship” in which the
relationship between England, Ireland, and Scotland is one of imagination.12 In such an imagined
environment, members feel bound or connected by a sense of fraternity and solidarity toward
their nation through “horizontal comradeship.”13
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13
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Cooper and Stoler professed that “nation building” and “empire building” were projects
of mutual constitution, albeit in relationship of problematic and contested on the question of
extending citizenship to the colonized. One case in point was, despite France’s rhetoric of
assimilation, the colonized population were extended citizenship not to France as a nation but to
the empire of Union Française.14 In the case of Korea, Koreans after the Japanese colonization
were considered Japanese subjects but without the full rights and privileges, such as voting or
owning lands, and treated as second-class citizens.
On the studies of transnationalism as economic, political, and cultural processes that
extend beyond the boundaries of nation-states, weakening the state’s control over its borders,
inhabitants, and territory, scholars have contributed many books and journal articles published
and listed in the WorldCat database over the past several decades. Randolph S. Bourne (1916)
planted the seed with his 1916 article, “The Jews and Trans-national America,” regarding the
American nationalism after the World War I. In contrast to nationalism as “a strong belief among
people who share a common language, history, and culture,” Bourne called for a new way of
thinking about relationship between cultures through the notion of transnationalism: “give us a
new vision and a new orientation of the American mind in the world.”15
In subsequent decades, immigrant groups were expected to lose their ethnic identity and
assimilate into the local norms. In the 1970s, the concept of diaspora, recognized by Michel
Bruneau and Judith T. Shuval, emerged progressively to describe migrant groups maintaining
their ethnic tradition with a strong sense of collectiveness. In the 1980s and 1990s, dispersion of
population that originated from one nation-state into new host countries became more prevalent,
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calling for academic theoretization to define and establish criteria for diasporas. Several types of
diasporas were named by scholars: entrepreuneurial (Chinese), religious (Jews), and political
(Palestinians) diasporas as defined by Michel Bruneau (1995). This was followed by Robin
Cohen (1997) who defined diasporas into five types: labor diasporas (Indians), imperial
diasporas (British), trade diasporas (Chinese), cultural diasporas (Caribbeans), and hybridity of
mixed culture, as seen in Paul Gilroy’s Black diaspora debate of “travelling culture” between a
nation-state of their dwelling through assimilation and diasporas of “astral or spiritual” sense.16
It was in the 1990s when the understanding and theorization of transnationalism and
transnational diaspora matured by the scholarship of Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton Blanc
(1994). Their collaborative work of Nations Unbound introduced the concept of transnational
diasporas as those who live dispersed physically but remain connected culturally, socially,
economically, and politically as part of the nation-states in a “nation unbound” of their original
homeland of their ancestors.17 Their transnational ethnographic studies focused on transmigrants
from the West Indies, Haiti, and the Philippines. Robert Anthony Orsi’s The Madonna of 115th
Street (1985), Khachig Tölöyan’s article (1996), “Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the
Transnational Moment,” Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity at Large (1997), and Aihwa Ong’s
Flexible Citizenship (1999), for example, brought transnationalism into the foreground of
scholarly discourse on the migration of peoples across borders in the twentieth century.
Aihwa Ong defined transnationality as a phenomenon of people “moving through space
or across lines” as a “condition of cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space”
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whereby political borders and nation-states lose significance “over the affiliations and behavior
of its subjects.”18 Ong’s definition of transnationalism reflected the “multiplicity of the uses and
conceptions of ‘culture’” with tension over family, state, and economic ventures that shaped
border crossings and transnational relationship. More specifically, the multiple passport holders
of Hong Kong felt both the willingness to work with the Communist China while looking for a
way out for the security of their family and business investment at the time of Hong Kong’s
return from Britain to China in 1997.19
These earlier works on transnationalism were followed and revamped by Adam
McKeown on Chinese migrant networks (2001), Rogers Brubaker (2005 and 2015), and Akira
Iriye (2013) who provided historiography of the global and transnational history of the past,
present, and future. McKeown’s theoretical framework to recast Chinese migration from a
passive diaspora to transnational diaspora in his 2001 work, Chinese Migrant Networks and
Cultural Change: Peru, Chicao, Hawaii, 1900-1936, presented a global perspective. Brubaker’s
definition of the modern use of the term diaspora in the humanities and social sciences in his
2005 article, “Diaspora’ Diaspora,” was instrumental in broadening the scope of studies of
transnationalism with diaspora studies, which expanded from the Jewish, Armenian and Greek
diasporas to Albanians, Basque, Hindu Indians, Irish, Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans since the
1990s.20
Stéphane Dufoix and Brubaker pointed out that the word, diaspora, was first derived from
the Septuagint—the first Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible—on the Babylonian Exile of
Jews. Dufoix demonstrated that the word “morphed from a religious to a secular word, from a
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negative to a positive inflection,” according to Robin Cohen and Carolin Fischer.21 Cohen and
Fischer noted the “social constructivism in diaspora studies” emerging with questions on: “how
are diasporas made, who makes claims to be part of a diaspora, and what claims are made on
behalf of a diaspora?” bringing more complexity in the present day.22
As discussed earlier, Brubaker’s definition of diaspora in 2005 included three elements:
dispersion in space, orientation to a homeland, and boundary maintenance. Dispersion, being the
“most widely accepted criterion of diaspora,” denotes forced and traumatic crossing of state
borders of people to live “outside of the homeland.”23 Those people with a “homeland
orientation” for a real or imagined homeland maintain “a collective memory or myth about
homeland” regarding their ancestral state “as their true, ideal home and as the place to which
they or their descendants would or should eventually return.”24 They are also “collectively
committed to the restoration of the homeland and to its safety and prosperity.”25 The third
element of diaspora, according to Brubaker, was boundary maintenance of preserving “a
distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society” which he viewed as indispensable.26 These are the
elements represented in the Korean transnational’s experience of forming and maintaining their
diasporas.
Revisiting his initial definition of a diaspora in 2005, Brubaker offered in 2015 an
expanded viewpoint of diaspora studies which have evolved and increased in the intervening ten
years from “the age of the nation-state” to the “age of diaspora” in the 1990s.27 The field of
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diaspora studies since 2005 has proliferated and reached “a kind of saturation point,” as
Brubaker acknowledged in his 2015 article, “Revisiting diaspora’ diaspora,” since new regions
of disciplinary and conceptual space helped bring together topics of nation, nation-state, empire,
and colonialism with globalization as new phenomenon affecting diaspora studies in the
twentieth century.28
Earlier works by Elaine Kim (1982) on Asian Americans or Korean Americans in the
U.S., Aiwha Ong (1999) and Mia Tuan (1999) on the Hmong experiences laid the foundation of
diaspora studies to be expanded to ethnic diaspora studies by Monica Yang’s anthology (2013),
Kou Yang’s comprehensive historiographical reviews on Hmong accumulation (2013), and Mark
Edward Pfeiffer (2013) on the subjects of diversity, flexible citizenship, and crossing over
territorial boundaries in transnational diasporas in the twenty-first century. Other scholars such
as Appadurai’s work on the cultural dimensions of globalization (2008), Dufoix’s work on the
semantic history of African diaspora (2012), Brubaker and Jaeun Kim’s co-authored work (2011
and 2016) on the states’ effort to recreate ties with their transborder populations in Germany (in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and Korea (in Japan and China) also told new
stories on the language of diaspora which expanded by the globalization in the twenty-first
century.29
In summary, based on such a rich historiography on diaspora studies which matured over
the past few decades, the subjects of this dissertation—the Korean transnationals in the Russian
and Manchuria—fit all three elements of diasporic communities, as identified by Brubaker and
other scholars. These Koreans in their transnational diasporas 1) had been forced to leave their
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homeland across national borders by dispersion due to natural disasters and lack of upward
mobility in Korean society, 2) maintained their homeward orientation with collective memory
and preservation of their customs and cultures with the hope of returning someday, and 3)
maintained their distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society. The Korean transnationals’
migration and living in diasporas—the Arirang diasporas—will be examined in depth as the
main subject of this dissertation.
In the next section the historiography on the history of Korea in the late nineteenth to the
early twentieth century will be presented to set the stage on the subject of this dissertation and
provide background on the monumental contributions made by historians and other scholars as
well as Western observers of Korea.
b. Historiography on the History of Korea in the Early Twentieth Century
Nearly a century and a half has elapsed since the opening of Korea to the world in 1876 and
one hundred and fifteen years since the start of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Many historians
writing in English have provided the chronicles of what, why and how things happened to force
open Korea, hitherto known as The Land of the Morning Calm (Chosun,

). Also known as

The Hermit Kingdom in the late nineteenth century, Korea is a small peninsula, occupying
approximately 84,616 square miles of land—North and South Korea combined— wedged in
between China and Japan and Russia, in Far East Asia.
Koreans have historically been known as a people who possessed a strong sense of
national spirit (

) as a homogeneous race (tan’il minjok, 單

) and endured many

foreign invasions throughout their thousands of years of written history.30 Historical evidence of
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Korea’s origins date back to the Paleolithic Age, as archaeological sites with specimens of tools
for hunting and fishing in the Old Stone Age were unearthed by a historian Son Pow-key in the
southern region, Kongju (公

) of Choongchung Province, in the 1960s.31

The first set of foreign accounts came in the form of travelogues, memoirs, diplomatic
correspondences, war correspondents’ reports, letters to friends and families, newspaper articles,
as well as official reports and archival documents of governments such as China, Japan, Russia,
the United States, and others in the 1880s-1900s. Isabella Bird Bishop’s eye-opening travelogues
(1898) of newly-opened Korea in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War were followed by the
reports of the Russo-Japanese War correspondents, Jack London (1904) and Frederick A.
McKenzie (1905).
Next came the early historiography by scholars who witnessed and shared their accounts
on the opening of Korea, such as B. L. Putnam Weale (1903), H. J. Whigham (1904), K.
Asakawa (1904), and Charles Oscar Paullin (1910). These narratives were followed by the early
historical interpretations on both sides of U.S.-Asia relations by Tyler Dennett (1925), Joseph
Barnes (1934), and Yoshi S. Kuno (1937), offering critical assessments of the Open Door Policy
of the United States. In the 1950s and later came the monumental contributions made by Hilary
Conroy (1960) and Fred Harvey Harrington (1966) with detailed accounts of the commercial
imperialism and exploitation of Korea employed by the superpowers of the world. Donald G.
Tewksbury provided a bibliographical compilation of source materials in 1950.
Early works written in English by Korean historians include C. I. Eugene Kim and Hankyo Kim (1967), Dae-Sook Suh (1967), and Young Ick Lew (1977) who were able to access and
interpret multi-lingual primary sources in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and English languages to
31
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shed lights onto what had happened in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.
Historians Kim and Kim, for example, were able to access official documents of the Chemulpo
Treaty of 1882 first-hand and reveal discrepancies between versions as signed by national
representatives of the U.S., China, and Korea. The American draft had “no reference to China’s
claim to suzerainty over Korea” but included “a ban on opium trade” at Commodore Shufeldt’s
insistence,32 whereas the Chinese version, which Li handed to Shufeldt as the “Korean draft” to
be passed onto King Gojong for his signature, clearly mentioned that “Korea is a vassal state of
China, but has always enjoyed autonomy in both its internal and external affairs” in Article I.33
The Chinese intention to maintain its superior position in the tributary relationship with Korea
while appearing to stay out of Korean affairs became apparent.
Dae-Sook Suh’s scholarly insights on the lives of Koreans in the Russian Far East and
Manchuria were equally pioneering and revealing of the effects, positive and negative, of
communism on the region as shared in titles including, The Koreans in the Soviet Union (1987),
The Koreans in China (1990), The Korean Communist Movement (1967), and Documents of
Korean Communism: 1918-1948 (1970). Suh’s description of the impact of communism shown
by the Lenin’s leadership with a promise of support for independence endeavors of China and
Korea against Japanese imperialism portrayed the standoff-ish stance of the United States and
the American President Woodrow Wilson in stark contrast with the Russian’s in the 1920s.
Traditionalist, conservative historical accounts of Korean King Gojong’s modernization
reform plans, political factionalism in the court, and the Tonghak Uprisings of the poor peasants
of Korea were given in Korean or English languages by Korean scholars, Han Woo-keun (1970),
Ki-baek Lee (1984), and Young Ick Lew (1998) in the late twentieth century. In the 1980s-
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1990s, works by U.S. historians such as Emily Rosenberg (1982), James Scarth Gale (1983),
Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie jointly (1984), and W.G. Beaseley (1987) were published to
shed renewed insights into the role of missionaries in U.S. relations with the Far East Asia at the
turn of the twentieth century. These works were followed by the 1990 collaborative work of
Carter Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, and Michael Robinson on the history of Korea,
expanding on the Korean language version of Ki-baik Lee’s 1984 book, which laid a foundation
of Korean history as told by a Korean historian. The 1990 publication incorporated up-to-date
archaeological discoveries of the pre-historical period of Korea by Lee as well as new analysis of
new materials on the period of 1864-1910 by Lew, and chapters on Japanese colonial period by
Robinson and post-liberation Korea by Eckert, yielding a work of scholarly collaboration.
Martina Deuchler (1992 and 2015), Akira Iriye (1992), John J. Stephan (1994), Peter
Duus (1995 and 1996), and Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (1999) presented
comprehensive studies of what had happened nearly a century ago, seen through the lens of NeoConfucianism, colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, and racism. Deuchler’s contribution to the
study of Neo-Confucian influence on Korean society came under multiple titles over the decades,
as were Duus’s scholarship on the Japanese economic imperialism toward Korea. Shin and
Robinson defined the term modernity as a Western phenomenon associated with Enlightenment,
industrialism, nationalism, and the nation-state, giving birth to East Asian modernity. Iriye and
Stephan brought transnationalism into the scholarship of global Korean communities in their
understanding of what had happened over a century ago.
As the twenty-first century dawned, renewed interests on the affairs of Korea, China, and
Japan in regard to the globalization and transnationalism began to be expressed through
historical works by another group of historians: Hyung Il Pai (2000), Jongsuk Chay (2002),
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Hyun Ok Park (2005), Evegeny Sergeev (2007), Alyssa Park (2009 and 2019), Takashi Fujitani
(2011), Jun Uchida (2011), Henry Em (2013), Yumi Moon (2013), and Albert Park (2015).
These scholars presented revisionist interpretations on wide-ranging issues from national
sovereignty, Korea’s entry into modernity, and the identity and reactions of Koreans in the new
geopolitical environment under Japanese colonial occupation of Korea which began in 1905 and
lasted for forty years. The movement of peoples from China, Japan, and Korea across national
borders—whether voluntary, coerced, or in desperate attempt for survival and expansion— and
the formation of transnational diasporas across the region were documented and debated by these
scholars through the lens of imperialism, racism, nationalism, and transnationalism.
Historian Alyssa Park (2009) took the notion of living in transnational diasporas a step
further and introduced borderland living by Korean migrants and “the attempts of multiple states
to govern Korean migrants” in the borderland of Tumen Valley (2019).34 A nation (kukka=國家)
constituted “not just the royal family or government, but a collective entity of people, land, and
government (kunmin ilch’ae (君

)”—at least in theory.35 This way of thinking explains

how the transnational migrants who left Korea in hardship to settle down abroad in diasporas still
adhered to the Korean customs and lifestyles and were eager to come together in defense of
Korea as a sovereign nation. Equally importantly, the King of Korea lamented the unfortunate
situations of his former subjects and attempted to help out long after they left the realm of his
protection.
Entering into the new millennium, the earlier historical accounts written in English were
complemented by the contributions made by Korean historians Pak Hwan (1995), Park Chong
34
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Hyo (1997-2018), Kim Yong-p’il (2013), Kim Kyung-Il (2014), Sung Hee Lee (2004-2017), Sun
Young Park (2006), Young-Jun Cho (2016), and others from the nationalist standpoint,
expressed in the Korean language. Their contributions uncovered many primary sources hitherto
ignored or buried in the deep archives of various governments, such as Japan, Russia, and Korea.
Most importantly, scholarly works by Russian-Korean historians such as Igor Saveliev
(2004), Igor Ermachenko (2005), Evgeny Sergeev (2007), Sergei Kurbanov (2016), Jon K.
Chang (2016), and Park Chong Hyo (2018) enriched the historiography by presenting Russian
archival materials in English or Korean language. These scholars gave insights into the lives of
Koreans in the Russian diaspora, trying to become good Tsarist subjects while maintaining their
allegiance to their old country and fighting against the Japanese imperialism, as treated by the
Russian news media and official government documents.
This dissertation takes advantage of all of these historical findings and interpretations on
Koreans in the Russian Far Eat and Manchuria available in English, Japanese, Chinese, Korean,
French, and Russian languages.
c. Historiography on the Opening of Korea and Modernization Efforts
A corpus of historical writings exists on this period of Korea where tensions escalated among
the world’s superpowers, each maneuvering for hegemony around the Korean peninsula: China,
Japan, Russia, European countries, and America over the banking, trading, gold-mining,
railways, and other enterprising capitalistic interests. In his 1934 book, Empire in the East, a
collection of essays written by experts and scholars, historian Tyler Dennett discussed American
involvement in the situation of the Far East. As Dennett wrote, “No realistic statement of the
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processes by which the West sought to ‘civilize’ the East could be complete without an appraisal
of the part played by the Far Eastern [Open Door] policy of the United States.”36
Historian W.G. Beaseley echoed and pushed Dennett’s appraisal further by characterizing
Western imperialism as ‘economic imperialism,’ following the argument raised by J. A. Hobson
in his 1902 book, Imperialism: a study.37 Hobson had identified overproduction as the “root
cause” of modern imperialism as seen in the development of American imperialism, which he
saw as “the natural product of the economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which
could not find occupation at home and needed foreign markets for goods and for investments.”38
Duus noted a similar impetus among the European powers in search for new global markets as
well as new sources of raw materials which intensified during the pan-European great depression
in the 1870s through the 1890s, “more or less coinciding with the era of new imperialism.”39
The key to this new modern imperialism of the nineteenth century was the
industrialization which extended the reach of Western political powers as well as enabled
domination of the new global market through aggressive export policies, protective tariffs, and
colonial expansion. Conveniently sanctioned by unequal treaties with the Other nations of
“backward or uncivilized peoples” who were deemed to have “no sovereign rights over the
territories they inhabited” but rather in need of protection, these new imperialistic nations pushed
on in their quest of new markets.40
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In this regard, Duus deduced: “It is possible to imagine an industrialized Japan that was
not imperialist, but it is difficult to imagine an imperialist Japan that had not been
industrialized.”41 The Meiji Restoration was a reform movement “intended to remake Japan as
recognizably similar to the Western powers” which swept through Japan in 1868 to 1912 upon
the forcible opening of Japan by the United States Commodore Mathew Perry in 1868.42
Japanese leaders felt not only compelled but empowered to imperialize Korea, after having
achieved industrialization through the Meiji Restoration.
The opening of Korea took a series of events from July 29, 1866, when an American
schooner, General Sherman, got stuck on a high tide and destroyed by a fire, alledgedly caused
by Koreans, to May 1871, when the U.S. responded by sending an American Asiatic Expedition
to force open Korea. The Expedition comprising five steamships—HSS Alaska, Colorado,
Monocacy, Benecia, and Taloo—came armed with 85 guns and 1,230 men and docked along the
Sallé-River (Han River of Seoul), resulting in mass killing and wounding of 350 Koreans.
This incident was called Shinmiyangyo (

) or “the 1871 American Incursion”—the

first American military action in Korea taken by Commanders John Rodgers and Frederick
Low.43 On July 3, the Navy Department cautioned Low against any further attempt for “the
conquest of Korea” as the expedition was deemed insufficiently manned and the force
inadequately equipped “to make its way to Seoul” and ordered it to return to the U.S.44

41

Duus, The Abacus, 24.
Henry Em, The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2013), 30.
43
Felice Beato, [Album of photographs made during the expedition of the American Asiatic fleet into Korea, May
and June, 1871], 1871 May – 1871 June, housed in New York Historical Society Patricia D. Klingenstein Library
Print Room PR-002-406, 25.
44
Asiatic Squadron Letter for 1871, quoted in Charles Oscar Paullin, “The Opening of Korea by Commodore
Shufeldt,” Politicl Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sept., 1910), 476.
42

22

(Figure 1. “Corea. Ports and Batteries.”)45

(Figure 2. Rodgers and Low, and two Chinese)

(Figure 3: Korean casualties on Kangwha, 1871)46 (Figure 4: Officers on board the HSS
Monocacy, 1871)47
This incident, Shinmiyangyo, although it was stopped short of opening Korea, served as a
precursor to the Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 when Korea was opened by Japan. After the failed
attempts by America to open Korea through the General Sherman and Shinmiyangyo Incidents,
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the Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876, established between Korea and Japan, finally opened Korea to
the world. This Treaty, signed on February 22, 1876, was “Korea’s first modern treaty” of
coming out of a long seclusion into the international stage.48 Engineered by Japan to seize the
opportunity to open Pusan and two other ports for trading, the treaty gave exclusive privileges to
Japanese merchants.
Commercial development of Korea began with the opening of ports of Gensan
[Wonsan]49 and Fusan [Busan] to trade only with Japan, as stipulated by the Treaty of Chemulpo
of 1876 and followed by the additional openings of Chemulpo, Gunsan, Chinnampo, Mokpo,
Masanpo, and Song Chin. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor report of
“Commercial Korea in 1904,” the imports of $800,000 in 1884 grew to $7,000,000 in 1902, and
exports of $475,000 to $4,200,000 in respective years. The same report documented the imports
of cotton goods, kerosene oil, mining supplies, railway construction materials, tobacco and silk
goods, while the exports of “greatest importance” were rice, beans, ginseng, and hides in 1902,
with rice topping at a million dollars.50
Angus Hamilton, an English war correspondent for the Pall Mall Gazette of London and
author of Korea in 1904, was quoted for his first-hand description of the port of Chemulpo, only
thirty-five miles away from Seoul. Hamilton depicted it as “an important distribution center” of
foreign trade with 5,973 dealers and administrative officers of various concessions of America,
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Japan, France, and Britain by 1904 in the above report.51 In another book of memoirs which he
co-authored with Major Herbert H. Austin and Viscount Masatake Terauchi, the Imperial
Japanese Resident-General, in 1904 and republished in 1910, entitled Korea: Its History, Its
People, and Its Commerce, Hamilton described how Koreans, originally an agricultural people,
engaged themselves in farming and were subsidized by their wives who produced cotton, silk,
linen, and grass-cloth in their spare time.
With the opening of Korea in 1876 flocked the foreign gold-diggers, since the “presence
of gold has been known from the earliest times” throughout the country—"gold, silver, lead,
copper, iron, coal—but that which yields the richest harvest is gold,” as Hamilton affirmed.52
Thus began the Western war of concessions in Korea which Japan had already claimed as “an
indispensable market for the growth of Japanese capitalism.”53 Western industrialized powers
collided against each other with mutually-conflicting interests and the Japanese imperial
ambitions over the rich natural resources of Korea, hitherto untapped due to lack of
industrialization. The pre-Modern, pre-industrialized Korea seemed to be standing, conveniently
or inconveniently, in the gateway to China and the Asian continent.
In this geo-economic and political atmosphere at the turn of the twentieth century the
successful removal of all foreign superpowers from the Korean peninsula, engineered by wellrun political machines and facilitated by strong military forces of Japan, would guarantee the
success of Japan’s imperialism. And Korea would serve Japan as a convenient bridge to China
and the continent of Asia, except for one obstacle standing in the way—China.
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It was imperative for Japan to remove China from its centuries-long, if not longer,
relationship of suzerainty over Korea as the self-proclaimed “Big Brother” with a political
influence which “reached its zenith in the years 1885-1894.”54 China’s share in Korea’s import
trade rose from 19 to 45 percent, while that of Japan declined from 81 to 55 percent from 1885 to
1892.55 Sino-Japanese rivalry in the trade war escalated into a diplomatic tug-of-war with Ito
Hirobumi at the helm in Japan.
The long-standing “Korea problem” (Chosen Mondai=

) in Japanese foreign

relations regarding the Korean court’s refusal to acknowledge the Japanese ruler’s superiority
over the Korean monarch had been at the center of Japanese political debates since the Meiji
Restoration of 1868. This dispute over the Korea problem—to subdue Korea or not—expressed
as Seikan Ron (

), was modeled after the gunboat diplomacy of the West and caused a

“great divide” in Meiji political history over the years.56 The Korea problem emerged again at
this time of trade wars as a matter of “national insult” in the face of Japan’s “aggressive foreign
policy,” split between the pro-conquest party led by Mutsu Munemitsu and the anti-conquest
party led by Okubo Toshimichi.57
A pro-conquest loyalist Sada Hakubo, who considered Korea as Japan’s vasal state, wrote
“Those who are early control others; those who are late are controlled [by others]….If Imperial
Japan passes this great opportunity to the foreigners, we will lose our lips [i.e., Korea] as a
consequence, and one day our teeth will surely suffer from the cold….Korea is a gold mine, and
rice and wheat are abundant.”58 Such powerful rhetoric on the importance of Korea with rich
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resources as the stepping stone to the continent was exactly what Japanese politicians needed to
justify their plan of aggression to remove China from Korea.
As debates on the Korea problem reemerged in Japan, King Gojong (高

) made a bold

announcement of Oath of Independence from China and a Declaration of Reforms with fourteen
articles, also known as the Kabo Reforms on January 8, 1895. The King declared his resolve to
bring his country into modernity by adopting the ways of other more-advanced countries,
whether European or Japanese:
If the (foreign) doctrine is to be regarded as a doctrine of lechery and sensuality, then it
can be kept at a distance; if a foreign mechanism is advantageous, then we can reap
advantage from it and use it to increase our wealth. Why fear, instead of having recourse
to, such things as agriculture, sericulture, medical science, medicines, military weapons,
ships and carriages? Let us repel their doctrines, but learn to use or imitate their
machinery….59
The King acknowledged the weakness of Korea and pledged to strengthen the country by
learning from the more advanced nations for their advanced systems. This statement was
followed by the King’s Oath of Independence from China. With the fourteen-article Oath, the
King declared the severing of tributary relationship and subjection to China by establishing
Korea’s independence— chaju tongnip [

獨 ].

The new set of modernization plans of 1895, after the failed Kapsin Reform of 1884,
outlined a plan of reforms, ranging from tax, land tax, discrimination, finances, military system,
to equal rights of employment regardless of their origin. As historian Martina Deuchler pointed
out, the “truly revolutionary” Kabo Reform set out to dismantle the elite-centered social system
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that had dictated the Korean society for two millennia.60 These terms of social reform were
much-needed and would have been welcome by the Korean people, had the reforms been
implemented successfully and continuously without the Japanese interference of colonial scheme
in the coming years.
However, such a grand plan failed largely due to the fierce factionalism among the three
leading groups in the new cabinet: The “Chinese party” or “the old group” headed by Prime
Minister Kim Hong-jip, the progressive “Japan Party” headed by Home Minister Pak Young-hyo
and So Kwang-pom, and the “American Party” represented by Yi Wan-yong, Chung Kyungwon, and Yi Cha-yun.61 A political storm split the government between the old group, led by
T’aewongun, and the young group of Pak Yong-hyo backed by the King and the Queen. The
Kabo Reforms also failed to provide a sense of protection and stability to the Korean people,
leading to unrest among the populace and the Tonghak movement.62
The Tonghaks, generally referred to as Tonghak Movement (東
Revolution (東

動) or Tonghak

), rose sporadically at first in the southern part of the country, namely

Gobu in Cholla province on January 11, 1894. This group of peasants was led by Ch’oe Che-u
(

), the first leader, who was not eligible to sit for the civil service examination due to his

questionable parental background of scholarly yangban status and joined forces with other
scholars of the choong-in status in pursuing the Tonghak movement. By the 1890s Tonghaks
were 300,000 member strong with 339 regional organizations and gained strength steadily to
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enjoy their first victory at Hwangto-hyun on April 6.63 After occupying the city of Jeonju on
April 27 and securing the Treaty of Jeonju on May 8, the Tonghak movement was recognized as
an uprising to be reckoned with by the government. It was under the leadership of Chon Pongjun (

, 1854-1895), an “impoverished local scholar-farmer who owned and tilled three

majigi (ca. 800 square yards) of land for a family of six” and “upright Confucianist” with a
military experience in Cholla Province, the Tonghaks became organized into a rebellious
uprising against the Min oligarchy in 1894.64 The unrest led by the Tonghaks prompted Queen
Min and her faction to enlist China’s help in suppressing the revolts on June 1, 1894.
The Chinese government promptly responded by sending in 1,500 soldiers and two
warships on June 8. Within two days 400 Japanese marines arrived in Seoul, reinforced by 4,000
additional soldiers who were assembled in the Seoul-Inchon area.65 Alarmed by such a quick
assemblage of foreign troops on demand within a few days and the overnight subjugation of the
Tonghak rebels upon the arrival of Japanese and Chinese troops, the Korean government
announced the situation was promptly resolved and requested all foreign troops to withdraw,
wanting to back out of the chaos of having two foreign troops at hand.
While Li Hongzhang of China was willing to remove his soldiers, Tokyo was not. Japan
had long been anxious to push forward with an aggressive foreign policy to make Korea “a part
of the Japanese map.”66 Japan was not about to stop short of reaching its goal of removing China
from Korea now that the sword was out of the sheath. Military hostilities commenced upon
Japan’s declaration of war with China over Korea in the last week of July 1894. The Imperial
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Rescript was issued as “Japan’s Declaration of War Against China” on August 1. Within two
months of the beginning of hostilities with China on Korean soil Japan claimed a swift and
decisive victory over China and secured control of Korea from the royal palace to much of the
government operation by September 16, 1894.
Upon the signing of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty by Envoy Li Hongzhang on April 17,
1895, China officially conceded to Japan’s victory and recognized Korea’s independence from
Q’ing China. China agreed to pay an indemnity of 200 million taels, as well as cede Taiwan, the
Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. Six days later, however, Russia,
Germany, and France raised a red flag, referred to as Triple Intervention, on April 23, 1895, as
they were not ready to give up on their commercial opportunities. This Triple Intervention was a
show of “multilateral imperialism” arranged by Russia to press upon Japan to relinquish Port
Arthur of the Liaodong Peninsula with a penalty payment, sowing a seed for further turmoil that
would result in the Russo-Japanese War within a decade.67
Japan’s victory over China in 1895 secured Korea as Japan’s sole prey politically with
greater access to the Chinese market commercially as well as 364,510,000 Yen as the Chinese
indemnity, which amounted to “nearly one third of the national GNP” of Japan—“a healthy
profit” as Duus called it.68 Although the Tonghak movement of 1894 as a political protest against
foreign evils of the Korean society failed, it “served as a catalyst” for the Sino-Japanese War, a
war of foreign-armed interventions.69
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Overall, scholars have studied the opening of Korea and its attempts to enter into
modernity from a variety of perspectives. In general, the world’s superpowers interacted with
this region through imperialism and nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century, resulting in
the collapse of the 500-year-old Yi Dynasty. This chaotic situation of international intrigues and
exploitation of resources contributed to the struggles of the Korea’s common people, who got
pushed further out into the periphery of the national borders in search of a better future.
Historical Contexts of Korean Migration
This dissertation identifies three main factors as responsible for the Korean migrations to the
Russian Far East and Manchuria in the late nineteenth century: 1) the extreme case of repeated
flood and famine, known as ‘The Great Famine’ of 1869, further aggravated by the burden of
taxation, called skeleton levies (packkol chingp’o = 骨

), on poor farmers, 2) the

intensified struggles of the lower-class populace in yangban society and the corrupt local
government in the Hamgyong Province ( 鏡道) which was far removed from the central
government of Korea, and 3) the devasting effects of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 on the
livelihood of the Korea’s poor, as the country was being pushed into another foreigners’ war, the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.70
All of these natural, societal, and human-induced disasters placed extreme burdens on the
peasant farmers of Korea, pushing them to seek their lives elsewhere across national borders in
the immediate north into Russia and Manchuria, as well as to the other parts of the world such as
Hawaii, California, Mexico, and the South America.71 This dissertation will focus on those who
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walked northward to Russia and Manchuria and eventually participated in direct military and/or
reconnaissance activities during the Russo-Japanese War on both sides.
A map of Korea, shown below in Figure 5, is provided to delineate geographical
divisions of the country at the time of this study, 1895-1920. The eight provinces of the Korean
government such as Hamgyongdo, Pyongando, Choongchungdo, and Chollado are indicated by
different colors; some of the major cities such as Seoul, Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Busan, that are
mentioned in this dissertation are represented by red dots. Two rivers, Yalu and Tumen, are
indicated on the borders which separate Korea from Manchuria and the RFE in the very north of
Korean Peninsula.

(Figure 5: Map of Korea, circa. 1900, by the Author)
32

In order to understand what went on in Chosun in its final years of sovereignty, one needs
to understand the Neo-Confucian influence on Korean society that permeated into every level
and every fiber of Korean people’s existence. Historians Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, and
Young Ick Lee have traced the first transmission of Confucianism from China to Korea as early
as in 372 A.D. During the Three Kingdoms period, a Confucian academy was founded by King
Sosurim (371-384) in Koguryŏ, the northern kingdom, followed by the opening of others in the
southern kingdoms of Paekche and Silla in 682 A.D.72 Confucianism contributed to the scholarly
advancement of knowledge and culture in Korean society through the Koryŏ Dynasty. Its
founder, Wang Kŏn (877-943), adopted Confucianism as “the ideology of a centrally organized
state.”73 Government-sponsored as well as many private schools were established based on the
Confucian ideology to educate upper-class students and aspiring government officials. Such
influence reached further into the Chosun Dynasty when Neo-Confucianism was introduced by
scholars such as Yi Che-hyŏn and his disciple, Yi Saek. Yi Saek studied overseas in China and
revived the Confucian Academy in the early to mid-fourteenth century. This Neo-Confucianism
greatly influenced the Korean society with its pragmatic teachings and widely-used study
materials, such as the Classic of Filial Piety and Four Books.74
Although the Confucianization of Korean society was basically an upper-class
phenomenon, the ideology of three cardinal human relationships (Samgang= 綱) and five
moral imperatives (Oryun=

) had a far-reaching and comprehensive influence into the very

fabric of Korean society at every level. Samgang dictated the hierarchical relationships between
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ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife, while Oryun reinforced the interpersonal
virtues:
Righteousness (ŭi= ) between sovereign and subject, proper rapport (ch’in= ) between
father and son, separation of functions (pyŏl= ) between husband and wife, proper order
of birth (sŏ= ) between elder and younger brothers, and faithfulness (sin= ) between
friends.75
In other words, these five virtues of oryun were to be adhered to not only in everyday lives of
people but also in performing the four rites (

)—"capping, wedding, mourning, and ancestor

worship”— “tied together by a three-fold mechanism of samgang” ( 綱).76 Consequently, this
notion of samgang oryun was mandated at every level of the interpersonal relationships in the
social organization of Korea. Both domestic and public spheres existed ultimately under the
sovereign’s spheres.
The traditional society of pre-modern day Korea, more specifically of Chosun during the
Yi dynasty, was built on a rigid, caste-like structure determined at birth. There were four
hierarchical classes: 1) yangban [

], a scholarly upper class from a clear, distinguished “line

of descent” of ancestry and members of “two orders of officialdom” in civil or military capacity;
2) chungin [
sangin [

], the so-called 'middle people' class who performed clerical and civil duties; 3)
] or commoner class, also known as yangmin [

] (good people) who were

farmers, fishermen, merchants and craftsmen; and lastly 4) chŏnmin [

], meaning 'low-born'

or 'inferior people' who worked in grave-digging, tanning and butchery.77 Shamans, exorcists,
entertainers and the female kisaeng [妓

], the Korean equivalent of the Japanese geisha girls,
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were classed in the same status as slaves until 1650 when government slavery was technically
abolished.78
Learning was only allowed for and afforded by people born into the upper yangban class
and, extremely rarely by chungin. The “sole duty of the yangban was to devote themselves
exclusively to the study and self-cultivation” and their “sole profession” was to hold nontechnical public offices, while the chungin class served in routine, technical positions in fields
such as medicine, accounting, law, scribing, and art.79 Commoners, or chungin, were expected
and required to bear “the burden of taxation” and military service without any upper-class
privileges and benefits in the hierarchical, unequal society of traditional Korea. The most visible
distinguishing factors determining yangbans from commoners were in ways the latter group
dressed and lived “by their simpler mode of life.”80
Social differences could be easily identified by dress styles and bright colors worn by
upper-class men and women who were clad in silks, whereas lower-class populace could only
wear white or gray dresses made with plain fabric woven from hemp or cotton in later years. The
bright red color was worn exclusively by privileged yangban women or high-class female
entertainers. Korean headdresses worn by men and women, in general, served a dual purpose—to
“protect and decorate the head, while indicating the wearer’s rank and the formality of
ceremonial occasions.”81 These dresses and headgears of plain white cotton wrapped around
their heads will be seen in the photographs of Korean transnationals in the RFE and Manchuria,
presented in later sections of this dissertation.
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a. Sharecropping and Burdens of Taxation on the Poor
In such a rigidly-structured yangban society of Korea, the bureaucratic and excessive
taxation system forced upon commoners, peasants, and farmers of the Yi Dynasty was the main
factor for the massive exodus to the RFE and Manchuria in the 1860s and 1870s. The
“ownership of all the nation’s land formally resided in the king” who alone held the right to
allocate the use of land by rank to yangban bureaucrats who, in return, enjoyed the right to
collect the rent from the land, but not to own or pass it down hereditarily.82 However, in
practice, private ownership of public land continued for generations by many yangbans who held
large estates of land to be cultivated either by slaves or by tenant farmers. The practice of “a half
and half crop sharing arrangement normally prevailed between owner and cultivator” involved
the owner paying ten percent rent to the state out of his share.83
In this type of sharecropping arrangement, the peasant farmers who were the tillers of the
land became experts on how to cultivate the earth, fertilize for better crops, and improve the
seedlings for increased harvests. These sharecroppers eventually improved their own relatively
independent status as freeborn commoners in the society in comparison to the lowborn or slaves.
On the other hand, the peasant farmers were required to pay a land tax, set at one-tenth of the
harvest under the Rank Land Law until the Tribute Tax Law was enforced by King Sejong in
1444, lowering the tax to one-twentieth.84 These yangban-tenant relationships became more
prevalent as agricultural slaves were increasingly replaced by rent-paying commoners and slave
tenants in the late eighteenth century. Even poor scholars who owned very little, except for a few
slaves, could manage by letting their slaves work in someone else’s fields as tenants.85 Tenancy
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in some areas in Chŏlla Province accounted for 70 percent of all forms of agricultural
cultivation.86
These arrangements might have worked with everyone’s expectations set and understood
in peacetime. However, during the Imjin Waeran (
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (

亂) of 1592, the Japanese army led by

吉) invaded Korea from the southern shores. Japanese troops

marched up all the way to Seoul and took the royal court in hostage for several years. The
country’s farmlands lay fallow for years while farmers were deployed in battles. To make
matters worse, land registers got destroyed in the war, increasing the number of “hidden fields”
which became untraceable due to missing records and reducing the tax revenue from 1,700,000
kyôl (Korean unit of measuring farmlands) down to 540,000.87 This amount was less than a third
of previous years during the reign of Kwanghaegun (光

君, 1608-1623) immediately following

the Imjin War.
In 1608, a new law called the Uniform Land Tax Law (Taedongpŏp=大同

) was

enacted to alleviate financial difficulties in the government due to the dwindling tax revenue.
This new law yielded one percent of the rice harvested—about twelve tu (斗) of rice from each
kyôl (結) of land—payable in cotton cloth (taedongp’o) or in coins (taedongjôn).88 A new agency
called Sônhyech’ông (

), literally meaning “Agency to Bestow Blessings,” was also

established.89
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This new law had unintended ramifications, some positive but others devastatingly
negative, with lasting effects on Korean society. While the tax burden of the commoner peasants
was lightened by shifting the tax base to the land, the peasants could not hold onto their tillable
lands which were becoming scarce. On the other hand, this new arrangement helped the
government-appointed agents, called “tribute men” (公 ), to act abusively as “purchasing
agents.”90 These men got wealthy with commercial capital gains while the peasants became
poorer with no land to till, often leading to nonpayment of taxes.
In the system of “skeleton levies” of “keeping the names of dead men on the tax rosters”
when a peasant fled to avoid paying taxes, his unpaid taxes could be collected from his family
members or even his neighbors.91 This practice of corporate punishment by taxing, which could
be traced as far back to 1665 in the reign of King Hyunjong, explains why entire villages, not
just individual families, moved together to find new opportunities elsewhere.92 A similar practice
of obligating military service to families and neighbors when one fled can also be seen in a 1507
proceeding in Yijo Sillok.93
Prime Minister Song Joon-gil was recorded on November 29, 1665 to have reported to
King Hyunjong a story about a woman whose husband had died three years earlier. Still being
assessed for and paying the taxes which her husband owed, she was found weeping
uncontrollably at his gravesite. She was giving a final farewell at the end of the traditional three-
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year mourning period to her deceased husband with two little children on her back, as she had no
other choice but to move away.94
Minister Song implored the King for his leniency and solution to such a problem.
아, 오늘날 백성들의 고달픈 일이 진실로 한두 가지가 아니지만, 그 가운데 가장
극심한 것을 뽑아서 말한다면 신역 (
)에 대한 징포 (
)와 조적 (
)에 대한
포흠 (
) 이 두 가지에 불과합니다. 몇명의 식구가 단촐하게 사는 백성의 집에서
경작하는 전지 (
)가 얼마나 되겠습니까. 일년 내내 부지런히 힘써서 풍년을
만나더라도 빚을 갚고 부세를 내고 나면 곡식은 벌써 바닥이 나기 때문에 부득불
다시 宅을 팔아서
를 바치고 있습니다….처자식을 이끌고 울부짖으면서
떠돌게 되는데도 친척은 감히 만류하지 못하고 이웃도 머물러 살게 할 수가 없게
됩니다.95
Ah… among the many hardships the poor people of the kingdom have to endure these
days, the most severe are the skeleton levies. How much farm lands would a small family
of poor peasants have to work with? They have to work hard all year around only to have
nothing left to feed themselves after paying taxes and other debts even in years of good
harvests…. So, they are taking their wives and children on the road, crying out loud in
sorrow, while their relatives and neighbors look on helplessly or join them on their ways.
(Author’s translation)
The terrible problems of heavy taxation and physical labor that poor farmers and peasants had to
endure, even during the good-crop years, left them penniless and pushed them to wander away
with wives and children from their homes while weeping in tears. Their relatives and neighbors
had no way to help out, as they were not doing any better. Instead, they joined them on their
journeys in many cases, as the minister Song Joon-gil reported to the King in the above quote.
Finding numerous records regarding the same problem of skeleton levies dating from 1665 to
1875 across seven Kings’ chronicles, it seems that a solution was never found nor implemented
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in the history of the Yi Dynasty. Desperate farmers crossed the border although it was “against
Korean law for peasants to leave” and “punishable by death” as traitors.96
Upon hearing of the mass migrations from six villages in Hamgyongdo Province, Korea,
by way of a Japanese official, Miyamoto Shoichi (宮

), King Gojong convened a meeting

of his chief ministers and demanded an explanation on July 13, 1876:
함경도 ( 鏡道) 6 진 ( )의 백성들이 국경을 몰래 넘어가는 폐단이 갈수록 더욱
심해지니 심지어 이번에 일본의 이사관 (
官) 미야모토 쇼이치 (宮
)의
말까지 있었다. 이것은 무슨 까닭에서 그런 것인가? 필시 도신이나 수재 (
)들이
잘 살피지 않아서 이렇게 되었을 것이니 잘 상의하여 조처하지 않을 수 없다.
그래서 경들을 부른 것이다.97
I have heard through a Japanese official, Miyamoto Shoiichi, that people from six
counties in Hamgyongdo are crossing the borders secretly. Why are they doing that? Is it
happening because the local magistrates are not taking care of their people’s needs
properly? If so, they should. And that is why I have called this meeting with you
ministers to urge you to find a solution. (Author’s translation)
Various ministers reported and confirmed that people had been packing up and leaving from
Hamgyong and other northern provinces, such as Pyongan, Hwanghae, and Kangwon during the
past ten or so years due to repeated famines and that “nine out of ten houses had been vacated”
with no way of collecting unpaid taxes.98 The King spoke in sympathy of the people:
백성들이 국경을 넘어가는 것이 어찌 즐거워서 그러겠는가? 친척이 있는 고향을
떠나고 부모의 나라를 버리면서까지 법을 어기고 몰래 달아나는 것은 상정으로
헤아려보면 이치에 맞지 않는다. 허지만 백성들이 가지고 있는 억울함과 괴로움을
호소할 곳이 없어서 그랬을 것이다.99
Why and how would anyone enjoy crossing the borders? It does not make sense for
anyone to leave their home town, where their parents have lived happily, and abandon
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their loved ones secretly overnight. They must have had serious chagrins for unfair
treatment with no one to resolve for them. (Author’s translation)
The King expressed his understanding of his poor people not wishing to leave their homeland
illegally unless they were in extremely dire situations with no one to appeal to and urged his
ministers to provide solutions for the situation.
One of the ministers, Yi Yoo-won, replied:
어리석은 백성들의 심정으로는 조그마한 이익이라도 보이면 범법 (
) 이라는
사실은 깨닫지 못하고 점차 국경을 몰래 넘는데, 한 번 넘어가면 그의 친척들이
그가 떠난 것을 보고는 뒤따라 또 떠나서 돌아오지 않게 때문에 이처럼 많아진
것입니다.100
These foolish peasants must have left without fully understanding the consequences of
their illegal border crossings when they saw the opportunities for small gains. But once
they leave, their relatives follow them never to return, making the situation so grave and
much worse. (Author’s translation)
All the ministers agreed that the problem was worse in remote villages in Hamgyong Province
due to their distant locations, thousands of li removed from Seoul as well as from the capital city
of the Province, Hamheung, making it difficult to manage centrally. The local magistrates in
Hamheung were only anxious to surve out their terms of appointment and eager to return home
rather than extend King’s benevolence to the locals, as quoted below:
함경도 수령들은 임기가 차기 만을 학수고대하다가 임기가 차면 즉시 교대하고
오기 때문에 임금의 교화를 선포하는 데에는 뜻이 없다.101
Local magistrates in Hamgyongdo are only anxious for their terms to end so that they
could return to Seoul and are not interested in spreading the benevolence of the King to
their people. (Author’s translation)
The King was distraught to hear there was nothing he could do to help his people in their times
of great difficulty and asked his ministers to continue to monitor the situation. Governor Yi Hoe-
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) of Hamgyong Province reported that towns, such as Buryung ( 寧) and six other

jung (

villages, had been flooded out and none of the migrants had returned, leaving no way to collect
past taxes.
King Gojong was extremely disturbed about the economic difficulties his people were
facing and asked his ministers to be lenient toward their people. In 1869, the King even ordered
to transport 10,000 sacks of rice, harvested in the southern province of Youngnam (

南), to the

north to feed the starving people in Hamgyong Province.102 The King also instructed the
ministers to punish the corrupt magistrates firmly and repair the damages as soon as possible.
The King’s heartfelt concerns and instructions to help his people of Hamgyongdo, as recorded 14
times in Gojong’s reign alone, were not necessarily followed through due to the factionalism
among his ministers and the bureaucratic incompetence of his own court. These economic
hardships felt by the Korean people further contributed to dissatisfaction with their lives in Korea
and pushed them on their exodus in subsequent years.
b. Corruption in the Yangban Society of Korea
Another problem that plagued the Korean peasants was the administrative abuses by the local
magistrates who customarily pocketed 70 percent of any income the peasants earned. As seen in
the above report by Prime Minister (

) Yi Choe-eung (

), many of the local

magistrates and yangbans were committing terribly abusive acts of retribution instead of
understanding and trying to improve the situation for the poor people. The dysfunctional Korean
yangban society yielded to the increasing abuses by local magistrates who acted as state
representatives.
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The social inequality based on the family background (
entitlement” of “the landed sajok” (

=munbol) and the “ancestral

=sajok) intensified in the eighteenth century, contributing

to social unrest among the oppressed populace.103 Secondary sons (

=chaja or

=sŏja)

were second sons or sons born to second wives or concubines other than the “primary wife
(ch’ŏ= ) capable of conferring bona fide elite status upon her offspring.”104 Secondary sons
were discriminated against and ineligible to even sit for the royal examinations in aspiration for
an office or a career.
For an instance, Choe Che-u, born in 1824 and executed in 1864, was the founder of
Tonghaks and leader of the populace uprising. He was ineligible to take the civil service exams.
Even though he was born to a father who was a Confucian scholar of yangban class, he could not
secure a government position because his mother had been widowed from her previous marriage.
Due to this situation, Choe was considered illegitimate and had no way of advancing himself in
the Korean society.105 As the government was “monopolized by the aristocracy, the yangban
elite,” the common people had “no understanding” of how politics worked nor could they be
involved.106 The practice of “placing officials above the people (官

) was so prevalent and

so intense” that “toadyism” or “worship of the powerful” became the main characteristics of the
Koreans’ social and political lives.107
Accounts on such abusive practices of putting government, central or local, officials
above orginary people were shared by Lady Bishop—an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Scottish
Geographical Society who traveled extensively in Asia in 1894-1897— and American novelist
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Jack London—who was commissioned to cover the Russo-Japanese War as war correspondent
by the San Francisco Examiner in 1904— in their travel reports of Korea. During her four visits
to Korea from 1894 to 1897, Lady Bishop acquired a deep understanding of the country and its
people’s characteristics. She enjoyed the “confidence and friendship” of King Gojong and Queen
Min as no other foreign traveler had.108 A female of independent wealth with upper-class
standing, Lady Bishop was accepted more readily by Queen Min than any other male foreign
travelers or wives of missionaries or diplomats. Lady Bishop observed, “The Korean official is
the vampire which sucks the life-blood of the people,” having seen the effects of such abuses
during her travels in many parts of Korea, as will be presented further in later sections of this
dissertation.109
On one occasion in 1904, Jack London, who was a card-carrying socialist from California
and known for his strong affinity to poor laborers as he had been one in his youth, had a face-toface encounter with a local magistrate, called Pak Choon-Song, a yangban nobleman, whom
London’s horse-groomer and guide, Manyong-i, called the “Number One Man.”110 London gave
a detailed description of his debate with Pak on his practice of making “a squeeze of seventy per
cent” from the poor peasants in Kunsan.
Pak-Choon-Song was very sorry for the poor people. I asked for some more substantial
expression of his sorrow than mere words….I hastened to cut off Pak-Choon-Song’s
retreat. I looked very severe, and Pak-Choon-Song looked at me, while I explained very
minutely every detail of the process of giving back to the people the seventy-per-cent
squeeze. He said he understood, and he promised faithfully that every cent of it would be
returned….The mission was accomplished….But so far as concerned the return of the
seventy-per-cent squeeze, I knew, and Manyoungi knew, and Pak-Choon-Song knew and
we all knew one another knew, that Pak-Choon-Song intended nothing of the sort.111
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London’s confrontation with Pak showed his strong affinity with the working people’s pain and
the unfair treatment they received with no prospect of deliverance but empty promises, as he had
seen among the poor people in Oakland, California, and the East End district in London.112 Deep
in his heart, London, who was at the prime of his highly successful and visible career as an
American novelist, journalist and social activist, may have thought he could make some
fundamental changes in the way the local customs work in Korea. But, as he admitted, London
knew things would remain unchanged and the unfair squeezing would continue long after he left
Park’s home.
Bishop’s account of her encounter with a local magistrate was very much similar but
showed even more visible social hierarchical stress between the classes of yangban elites and
local magistrates.
We were told that there are many “high yang-bans” in Yö Ju, and it seemed natural that
the magistrate of a town of only 700 houses should not be a man of high rank. The story
goes that when he came they used “low talk” to him and ordered him about as their
inferior. So he lives chiefly in Seoul, and the man who sat in sordid state amidst the ruins
of the spacious and elaborately-decorated yamen does his work and divides the spoils,
and the yangbans are left to whatever their devices may be. But this is not an isolated
case. Nearly all the river magistrates are mainly absentees, and spend their time, salaries,
and squeezings in the capital. I had similar interviews with three other magistrates.113
This statement exemplifies the existence of layers of classes within the upper class, causing
further stratification and abuses that would have intensified the pains suffered by the populace at
the bottom of the hierarchical rung in the society.
Homer B. Hulbert, the American editor of The Korea Review, a monthly journal
published on general news and affairs of Korea from 1901 to 1906 by the Methodist Publishing
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House in Seoul, described these local officials as Ajuns (

) in 1904.114 Ajun, Hulbert wrote,

was “one of the most important social and governmental factors in Korea. He is the man who
brings the administration of the Government into direct contact with the populace, the individual,
the political unit.”115 However, Ajun “failed to acquire the dignity of an official rank of p’yu-sal”
(벼슬=rank) when the yangban structure came into place around 1392 A.D.116 Therefore, an
Ajun was conducting Government business without an official rank as a native of the prefecture
where his clan resided for generations. Not having a secure footing in the upper class, the Ajun
“dared not oppress the people beyond a ‘reasonable’ limit” but tried to “squeeze them to the limit
of their endurance.”117 Even the customary cut of 70 percent these ajuns squeezed out of poor
people was too much and resented by the squeezed.
Yun Chi-ho (1864-1945), born a yangban and educated at Vanderbilt and Emory
Universities in the United States, was active in the progressive and independence movements
before turning to pro-Japanese stance of pan-Asianism. He kept a daily journal in English from
1883 to 1906. On May 7, 1902, Yun wrote in his diary, “A-juns in Korea are notorious for their
unscrupulous corruption…servile as dogs to superiors but as ravenous as wolves and cunning as
foxes toward the people…As a class they are detestable,” expressing his condemnation of
beaurocratic abuses from top to bottom in Korea.118In summary, the poor peasants of Korea were
the objects of deep-seated discrimination and maltreatment by the many layers of government
beaurocracy as well as the unjust laws from which they could not escape except to pack up and
leave by the night.
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c. Devastating Effects of the Sino-Japanese War on the Poor
Another factor that pushed Koreans to leave their homeland was the damaging effects of the
Sino-Japanese War which was fanned by the unrests of the Tonghak Peasants Uprisings against
the wrong-doings of the upper class of Korea. This war was fought entirely on Korean soil and
ended in Japan’s victory in 1895. Arthur Judson Brown, a missionary who toured Korea in 1901,
wrote: “The war of 1894 between China and Japan powerfully influenced the work. Korea
became the battle-ground of the contending forces. Soon it became evident that the decisive
battle of the war would be fought in the vicinity of Pengyang…. In the crash Korean property
was destroyed, fields were ravaged, and many of the unhappy people, caught between the upper
and nether millstones, suffered from wounds as well as fear.”119 This statement painted a tragic
picture of the country being ravaged in a war of foreign nations, which affected the lives of the
poor who were already caught between abuse from magistrates and yangbans, as well as poverty.
Brown continued, “The poverty of the people was bitter, and the introduction of foreign
goods made it worse for a time…. Concessions for the mines and forests were granted by the old
Emperor to foreign companies, and the price of the concession was squandered by corrupt
officials, so that the people derived no benefit. Thus Korea was drained of her money. It was all
outgo and no income.”120 Robert Speer, an American missionary, provided a similar description
of the widespread “dissatisfaction with the old life, its failures, miseries, disaffection” among the
Korean people in his reports to the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. in 1897.121
Historian Peter Duus stated:
During the Sino-Japanese War some venturesome small merchants began to move into
the interior. The presence of the Japanese military forces made travel safer than it
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normally was. As a result of the fighting in P’yongyang, for example, much of the city
had been vacated by its inhabitants, and a number of Japanese traders simply moved into
empty houses to set up shop selling sake, tobacco, sugar, and other goods to the Japanese
soldiers. When the Koreans returned to find Japanese occupying their homes, nasty
confrontations occurred, but even after the war ended the Japanese managed to maintain a
foothold in the city.122
These effects of the Sino-Japanese War on the trade between Korea and Japan as well as on the
everyday lives of Koreans, as described by Duus and other historians, were felt in the most
devastating degree by all—yangbans or commoners.
With these factors working against the poor peasants of Korea there was no other way for
them to cope with their problems but to find new homes on the other side of the borders. The
poor of Korea chose to leave their homeland as their government could not provide them with
the “freedom from want” for the basic necessities of life.123 This dissertation will follow their
footsteps as they found new homes in transnational diasporas, following the structure described
in the next section of chapter summaries.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter I will present the Korean transnational migration across the northern borders to
the Russian Far East in the northeast and Manchuria in the northwest in the late 1860s. The
patterns of Korean migration and formation of transnational diasporas in these two regions, as
well as the treatment and reception of their arrivals by the two nations, the Russian Empire and
the Qing China—with commonalities and differences—will be discussed.
Chapter II will describe how Koreans, either at home or in their new transnational
diasporas, responded to the threat of losing their homeland to the hands of Russian or Japanese
imperialism. The chapter will also examine how Koreans fared in the Russo-Japanese War as it
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erupted in 1904 and ended in 1905 by the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. The splitting
allegiance of transnational Koreans, which manifested into a division between the anti-Japanese
patriots and pro-Russian nationalists in one camp and the pro-Japanese colonial collaborators in
the other, will be investigated. The involvement of Koreans in reconnaissance and militant
activities through the Russian Shanghai Service and the anti-Japanese Righteous Armies clashing
against the pro-Japanese Ilchinhoe will also be discussed.
Chapter III will focus on the tenuous positioning of Korean transnationals as the
colonized and stateless with the establishment of the Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty of 1905,
followed by the 1910 Treaty of Annexation, which made Korea Japan’s first colony and to serve
as a bridge to China and the continent beyond. After Japanese annexation of Korea was firmly
instituted by 1910, the migration of Koreans over the northern borders escalated for a number of
reasons, which will be examined in this final chapter: some in their desperate move to escape
Japanese colonialization, others to strengthen the independence movements by joining forces
with the militants in the Righteous Armies in Manchuria and the Russian Far East. Korean
peoples’ desperate plight to organize the independence movements nationwide and abroad,
culminating in the March 1, 1919 Declaration of Independence, caused the colonial grip of Japan
to tighten further. The transnational migration of Koreans, which started for economic reasons in
the 1860s, became one of political nature, pushing more intellectuals and yangbans to flee north
into Manchuria and Russia in this period.
The Conclusion will take a glimpse at the continuing developments and the fate of
Korean transnational migrants as the Qing Dynasty of China collapsed into the People’s
Republic of China in 1912 and the Russian Empire under the last Tsar, Nicholas II, gave way to
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the Soviet Union in 1917. The legacy of Korean migrants on their journey to the Arirang
diasporas and their long-term consequences will also be discussed in Conclusion.
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CHAPTER I. KOREANS IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST AND MANCHURIA
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
My love, you are leaving me behind, and
Your feet will get sore before you reach ten li.
This first stanza of the song Arirang expresses the tender sadness one feels to see a loved one
go away, being left behind and wishing he or she would not get too far. As thousands of Korean
peasants packed up and crossed over the northern hills and rivers in search of better lives,
thousands stayed behind in tearful sorrow, wishing them good journeys. Many heartaches and
struggles awaited the poor folks of Korea when they made their way to the other side in the
Russian Far East (RFE) and Manchuria—they did get sore feet.
In this first chapter, commonalities and differences of these migrations, taken on parallel
tracks, will be analyzed in the way the migrants settled in their new homes and were treated by
the respective governments of Russia and China in the course of the late nineteenth to the early
twentieth centuries, leading up to the Russo-Japanese War. The formation of Korean
transnational diasporas in the Russian Far East and Manchuria began almost simultaneously and
evolved synchronously in the final decades of Yi Dynasty of Korea, more specifically from the
1860s to the early 1900s. Korean transnational migrants sought a new home away from home
and a better life while maintaining aspects of their Korean identities and allegiance to Korea.
Early Korean migrants to both the RFE and Manchuria began with farming by daily
commute ( 耕

歸)—leaving at sunrise and coming home by sunset. Also known as seasonal

farming ( 耕

歸), this practice meant farming in the spring and harvesting and home-coming
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in the fall. Such temporary migration occurred more for economic than political reasons.124 As
the seasonal farming by Koreans with excellent wet rice-growing skills yielded great harvests
from the wild, abandoned, weed-infested lands of the Russian Far East and Manchuria, some
started to form and settle in clusters of transnational communities. Thus began Korean
migrations to the Russian Far East and Manchuria simultaneously by starving farmers and
peasants in 1869-1870. The former crossed the Tumen River (豆
while the latter went over the Yalu River (

江) toward the northeast

江) to the northwest.

Koreans tended to migrate in large groups—many with families, friends, and entire
villages—primarily to avoid the assessment of skeleton levies, as discussed in Introduction.
These individuals took huge risks as migration was prohibited and punishable by death if caught,
according to Korean law. The earliest account of such a law being enforced appears in Yijo
Sillok, the Annals of the Yi Dynasty, on February 1, 1395, during the fourth year of King Taejo,
the first king of Yi Dynasty. On this date, seven men were publicly executed for having crossed
the border.125
국경을 넘어간 서북면의 깁법화 등 7 인을 저자에서 목베다.
서북면 (
) 사람 김법화 (金
)와 정대 ( 大) 등 7 인을
기시(棄 )하였으니, 모두 국법을 어기고 국경을 넘어간 사람들이었다.
Seven men including Kim Bup-wha and Cheong Dae from Suhbook-myon who crossed
the border against the nation’s law were executed by decapitation in a public
marketplace. (Author’s translation)
This reference demonstrates the Korean practice of migrating in groups as these seven men were
all from one town.
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The Yijo Sillok shows how both Chinese and Korean governments enforced restrictions
on border/river crossings in the mid-sixteenth century. One such record mentioned that Chinese
people had a habit of crossing the river and farming on the Chosun’s side during the reign of
King Choongjong (

) in 1542, as well as Koreans being caught doing the same on the

Chinese side, violating the restrictive ordinances on border crossings of either country.126 The
Chinese policy was called bong-gum policy ( 禁
( 禁

), similar to the Korean byun-gum policy

). Both were designed to enforce restrictions on border crossings from either side.
Those who crossed the borders formed new diasporas in Korean-style with the usual

amenities as little, or much, as they could afford. They built homes of Korean-style huts with
thatched or tiled roofs and ondol—the Korean way of heating the floors of living quarters with
flues running underneath from the kitchen to the bedrooms. They cooked and ate Korean foods,
dressed in the traditional Korean way of white cotton, and educated their children in the Korean
way while adopting the new. They also observed Korean customs for milestones of births and
deaths, as well as marriages and holidays.
This chapter describes the painful journeys taken, the physical and mental toils endured,
and the efforts made by these Korean migrants to fit into their new surroundings as Tsarist or
Manchurian/Chinese subjects while their homeland was rapidly declining into the hands of the
colonial regime of Japan. However, these transnational migrants kept up their sense of loyalty
towards Korea. The Korean monarch, King Gojong, later called Emperor Gojong (高

)

after 1897, also continued to express his benevolent affections and sympathy towards his former
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subjects, whom he called na ui baiksung (my subjects), even through his final days and months
as a powerless figurehead under Japanese imperial aggression in 1905.
The pattern of Korean migration to the RFE will be examined first in this chapter, broken
down by the period of their initial migration: early arrivals in 1863, later arrivals from 1884 on,
and the three categories by which the Russian government classified the Korean migrants in
terms of their periods of arrival, which in effect worked as a quota system of exclusion rather
than of inclusion. The second part of this chapter will discuss Korean migration to Manchuria,
prefaced by the description of the region which was already occupied by various transnational
ethnicities and also broken down by the period of their initial migration: early arrivals in the
1860s followed by later arrivals in the 1890s.
Koreans as Tsarist Subjects in the Russian Far East
a. Early Arrivals of Migrants from Korea, 1863The Russian Far East, the largest of Russia’s eight administrative federal districts occupying
approximately 40 percent of the national territory, shares borders with China and Korea by land
and with Japan by sea.127 The District constituted a large empty stretch of “arable and
uncontaminated land, huge reserves of clean water, and biological resources in the forests and
seas—assets in short supply among the RFE’s Asian neighbors” even in the late nineteenth
century standards.128 This vast, vacant region seemed beckoning to poor Korean farmers as a
haven to escape starvation and heavy taxation in their own home country in the 1860s.
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(Figure 6. Map of Russia with Russian Far East marked in red, courtesy of Far Eastern Federal
District of Russia)

Novgorod

(Figure 7. Russian Far East, adjoining China and Korea by land, and Japan by sea)
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(Figure 8: Map of the border region with demarcation by rivers by John Stephan. Author’s
highlighting of the Yalu, Tumen, Sungari, Amur, and Heilung Rivers)129
Although some Russian Korean historians, such as Svetlana G. Nam and Boris D. Pak,
have dated the first arrival of Koreans in the RFE to 1849 or 1857, well before the Peking Treaty
was established in 1860, the year of 1863 has been accepted and celebrated officially as the first
year of Korean migration.130 The Peking Treaty, also known as the Convention of Peking,
comprised three distinct treaties which Qing China signed with Britain on October 18,
immediately followed by others with France and Russia which were signed separately on
October 24, 1860. It was by this Treaty Hong Kong was ceded to Britain. Also ceded to Russia
by this Treaty were parts of Manchuria—Ussuri krai of Primory, east of Ussuri River, where
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many Koreans migrated to and settled in the coming decades. In other words, the areas where
Koreans settled in the RFE used to belong to Manchuria until 1860.
While thousands of Koreans facing devastating natural disasters and unfair taxation
duties in Korea crossed the border, the Russian government also attempted to populate the vast,
deserted land in the Amour and Primorski regions which came into Russia’s possession by the
Peking Treaty. Emperor Alexandre II of Russia promulgated a new Immigration Law—“On the
Administration of Russian and Foreign Settlement in the Amur and Primorski Oblasts of Eastern
Siberia”—which offered incentives to migrants as of April 27, 1861.131 Based on this law, new
immigrants with emigration certificates from their home countries were permitted to settle down
and own 100 desiatina (approximately 270 acres) of lands per household, exempted from
taxation and military duties for ten years and even received travel and food expenses, as well as
initial seedlings and farming tools.132 Since this was before the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Korea and Russia, however, Koreans were not able or required to show
emigration certificates. Consequently, many Koreans simply crossed the borders to conduct
business, such as transporting and selling cows illegally. During the winter months when the
Tumen River and Posiet sounds froze solidly enough to be crossed on foot, some Koreans
walked or swam into the RFE over water, bypassing the border sentry station at Novgorod (See
Figure 7).133
It was in the winter of 1863, following the 1861 promulgation of the aforementioned law
by Alexander II, that the entire villages, thirteen families in total, of Pegan and Samdonsa in the
Province of Hamgyongdo ( 鏡道) at the northern tip of the Korean peninsula packed up and
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crossed the border over the Tumen River in search of new lives in Russia. A report about these
Koreans, having formed the village of Tizinhe with “little or no changes in lifestyle and farming
techniques," was submitted by an officer named Razianov (Ряэанов) in charge of the border
patrol station in Novgorod in 1863.134
In Report No. 205 Razianov wrote to P. K. Kazakevich, the Military Governor of the
Primore Region, about the Koreans who had built traditional Korean houses of thatched roofs,
making pleas to be allowed to live in the area and be protected from the Chinese majokdan
(

團=horseback bandits) or huntsus ( 巾

) on November 30, 1863.135 As historian Owen

Lattimore wrote later in 1932, “The soldier, like the bandit, is a professional. The bandit wants to
take villages and loot them; the soldier waits for his chance in a civil war to take towns and get
either loot or promotion and power.”136 Such a comment reveals the contemporary environment
of abuses and threats which the poor Korean migrants were subjected to either by the rampant
bandits or soldiers alike.
Razianov’s letter was received on February 8, 1864, by Kazakevich who responded
positively on May 4 with an instruction to provide not only security protection for the Koreans
but also financial assistance to help them settle in the area. Kazakevich considered Koreans
“excellent farmers” who will become “economically worthy colonizing element within two years
of their arrival” to produce food supplies, such as corn, grains, and cereals for the Russian
army.137 Razianov’s report was also forwarded to Russian Emperor Alexandre II by Governor
General M. C. Korsakov.138
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Governor Kazakevich stressed the importance of Koreans with their potential to become
“economically worthy colonizing element within two years of arrival” in his report to Captain
E.F. Cherkavskii in 1865:
Bearing in mind that there are no treaties with the Korean government and becoming a
Russian subject is independent of any government [except Russia’s], it would be
advantageous, in view of the large barriers that were required for the emigrating Koreans
without blaming the Korean or Chinese governments, to add them to our [list] of state
peasants [foregoing the subject of citizenship until a later time].139
The above statement indicates Russia’s need to accept hardworking immigrants who would till
their difficult soils and produce grains and cattle meats for Russian population and army in a
short time frame. But the Russian government was also reluctant and mindful not to ruffle the
feathers of China and Japan in the contemporary geopolitical atmosphere of the region. This
report by Kazakevich was the first officially-recorded evidence of the Korean emigration to the
RFE.140 Many other reports regarding Korean migrant settlements in the context of Russia’s
military and political relations with China and Japan have been found in the Russian National
Archives and reported by historian Chong-Hyo Park.141
Devastated by years of repeated famines and bad crops, another 500 came from other
towns in Hamgyongdo on the same trail in 1867.142 The route was so desolate and lawless that
many of these migrants arrived in Russia "with just the clothes on their backs," having been
robbed by "bandits and various border guards" and women sexually assaulted on their way,
making them even poorer and more miserable with nothing but their bare hands.143 This sense of
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dilemma can be detected in reports exchanged between the officials of Russia, Governor of
Eastern Siberia M.C. Korsakov and Asian Director of Foreign Ministry P.S. Stremoukov, on
January 9, 1870, as well as Colonel Dyachenko in charge of the border security in Novgorod in
the same year.144

(Figure 9: Korean migrants, adults and children, roaming the streets of Vladivostok,18691870)145
Such a trail of migrants increased exponentially in 1869—the year of “Great Disasters”
(大

) or “Great Famine”— due to the disastrous flooding that wiped out the crops and

farmlands in Hamgyongdo— with over 6,500 people crossing the northern borders between July
and December.146 Count Trubetskoi, a temporary border commissar of the South Ussuri district,
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was reported to have written that the Russian government must “put a stop to this evil.”147 As
captured in the photo above in Figure 9, many of the Korean migrants and their families were
seen roaming the streets of Vladivostok looking for work and food, with some dying of
starvation after crossing the borders empty-handed in the freezing winter of December 1869.148
Historian Hyun Gwi Park wrote that the Koreans who formed their own villages near the
Tumen River were treated as “krestiianskoe obshchestvo (peasant society)” and were issued
identity documents called, Russkii bilet, which allowed them to live on the Russian soil.149 To
Koreans who converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity, the status of “poddanstvo (subjecthood)” was granted instead of “grazhdanstvo (citizenship)” in the late 1860s.150
In the meantime, 140 Koreans settled in the area by 1864, built their homes, and started
farming, selling “grains, cereals and millets” and raising cattle stocks shortly after that.151 Seven
additional villages in the area of Posiet Bay—Tizinhe, Yanchihe, Sidimi, Adimi, Chapigoi,
Krabbe, and Fudubai—were formed by the migrant Koreans, three of whom were baptized in
Russian Orthodox Church in January of 1865.152 Five hundred Korean families who relocated
from Posyet to Priamur in 1871 and to Blagovenshchensk in Amur Oblast, forming a village
called Blagoslovenie, meaning “Blessed” in Russian, received 100 desiatinas per household and
were “treated equally as Russian subjects.”153
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(Figure 10: Korean village with thatched-roof huts (Figure 11: “Some of our outfit” by JL) 154
in Ussuri area, circa. 1867)155
In their new diaspora, most Koreans were living and farming in typical Korean fashion,
as seen in the above Figure 10 on the left. The villages they formed were filled with thatched
roof houses (chogajip) with mud walls, which was the way Korean peasants’ domiciles were
built until at a later time when they could afford to build more sturdy structures with tiled roofs
(kiwajip). Compared side by side with the photograph on the right, taken by Jack London as he
traveled in Korea in 1904, the two villages look very similar in their formation with the same
type of huts clustered together in valleys surrounded by the farmlands.
Korean farmers also used ox-pulled carts to irrigate the fields as they did in Korea
(Figure 12). They wore Korean outfits of bulky white shirts and pants even while they worked in
the fields. In the photograph on the right (Figure 13), Korean farmers in 1920s Manchuria
engaged in wet-rice farming, the typical method used by Korean farmers at home, squatting
down in a row in knee-deep water-filled rows of rice paddy. By then, the farmers seemed to have
shed their Korean outfits which were not practical for working in the fields, and wore western
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work clothes. However, they farmed using the same Korean methods and working in groups in
their transnational diasporas in the RFE and Manchuria as they did in Korea.

(Figure 12: Korean farmer, tilling the land by. (Figure 13: Korean farmers in wet-rice farming,
ox-pulled methods in the RFE)156
The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)
Between 1890 and 1900, Chinese and Korean workforces were in higher demand due to
Russia’s new plan to construct railways and vitalize the economy in the Russian Far East, in
spite of the frequent eruption of violence due to xenophobia among the Russian residents.157 The
worse incident of violence took place in July 1900 when the city of Blagoveshchensk was
bombarded on the Chinese side, and the local Russian authorities rounded up 3,500 Chinese
including men, women, and children and “drove them into the river” at which less than 100
reached the Manchurian shore alive.158
On the other hand, the first stream of early Russian settlers came from Odessa, Ukraine,
in 1883 and “travelled more than half the globe for forty-six days—through the Black Sea,
Constantinople, Suez Canal, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, South Seas, Singapore, Nagasaki, and
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finally Vladivostok,” according to a letter written by a Russian who made the journey.159 Based
on the 1882 South Ussuri Resettlement Law, these settlers received land allotments of 100
desiatina per household, tax exemption, 18 months’ worth of food supplies, and free
transportation for the long journey offered twice per year. During the next fifteen years, only
31,217 were settled in Ussuri region.160 These settlers who came to the RFE at the promise of
large land tracts, “twenty to thirty times bigger than allotments in western Russia,” complained
about the lack of usable lands after they arrived. “They promised 100 desiatinas of plains, but
have given us rocks, hills, which don’t amount to 10 desiatinas of sensible land.”161 The Russian
government attempted to relocate 6,266 Russian farmers to the Ussury region between 1863 and
1870.
However, the Russian native farmers—the "Cossacks, Estonians, Finns, Old Believers,
and Molokans”— failed to make it work in the damp climate with heavy fog of the Russian Far
East and returned home, only 632 remaining by 1871-1882.162 In contrast, Koreans succeeded to
yield good harvests through hard work and excellent farming skills. The Russian migrants who
stayed resorted to hiring or leasing the land to Korean and Chinese farmers to till their lands as
their source of income.163 Therefore, the Ussuri local government had no other choice but to
welcome destitute Koreans who were seeking shelter and new life to work as productive farmers,
of which the Russian government was in great need, and encouraged their migration by
supplying them with land and food.

159

Alyssa Park, Borderland Beyond, 64.
C. H. Park, [Rosia Yonbang], 72; Alyssa Park, Borderland Beyond, 65.
161
Alyssa Park, Borderland Beyond, 72.
162
C. H. Park, [Rosia Yonbang], 34.
163
Alyssa Park, Borderland Beyond, 73.
160

64

As of January of 1871, 3,750 Korean refugees were forcibly resettled in Southern Ussuri
region—1,200 in Rezanovo, 1,200 in Suyfun River area, and 1,350 in other areas.164 Despite
these circumstances, poor Korean peasants who had escaped brutal discrimination of the feudal
yangban society were determined to endure the hardship in their new-found home of the RFE,
engaging themselves in hard labor in the construction of roads and bridges. During this period of
resettlement and persecution, over 4,000 Koreans, many of whom had been resettled in 1871,
plus newcomers from Korea, had no other choice but to go back to Korea or leave for Manchuria
in 1874. About 400 of them died of starvation and illness on the way.165 The Russian government
provided no relief assistance towards these Koreans except for rotten, moldy bread, if that.166
The reluctant but cautious acquiescence of the Russian central government in accepting
Korean migrants for fear of ruffling the feathers of Japan and other nations, and possibly
jeopardizing Russia’s commercial opportunities in Korea, was referenced in over 100 official
reports between 1860s and 1910, specifically regarding commercial rights, open ports with
extraterritorial rights, concessions of trading, mining, and railways, etc., exchanged between the
Minister Serge Witte in St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister K. I. Waeber in Seoul, and the RFE
Governor M. C. Korsakov in Ussuri, as referenced by Chong Hyo Pak.167
In this type of natural and political environment, Korean peasants continued to migrate
and settled in the RFE in the coming years, which coincided with the migration of white
Russians into the same area, facilitated by the Russian government’s desire to populate the
region with Russians. Ramifications of such an infusion of migrants brought more difficulties to
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the Korean migrants who had to prove their worthiness to become Russian subjects with legal
rights as well as duties to the Russian Empire, which will be examined in the next section.
b. Later Arrivals of Migrants from Korea, 1884This is the curious fact that for the past thirty years a respectable Korean population,
scattered here and there, has been thriving so exceedingly by all manner of farming that
more Korean immigrants are constantly arriving. — B.L. Putnam Weale168
With such a favorable and welcome treatment of Korean migrants by the Russian
government, the number of peasant migrations from Korea kept growing as Sakhalin Islands
became “a territory of imprisonment and exile—Russia’s Australia” which brought more mouths
of prisoners, guards, and troops to be fed in the region.169 At the same time the increase of
migrants from the Russian part of Europe continued to grow by ten-fold after the sea route
between Odessa and Vladivostok opened in 1880 until the Trans-Siberian Railway was
completed in 1903.170 Not only were these migrants granted their own large pieces of land with
transportation expenses covered but also were exempted from taxes in their newly-found homes
in the Russian Far East, as Russia needed farmers to feed the growing population and workers
for the construction of railways in the region.171
Over 16,000 Koreans were living in 30 village communities they had formed in Maritime
and Amur Provinces by 1884 when the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed and
ratified between Korea and Russia.172 Koreans who had migrated before the 1884 Treaty were
given "the right to acquire Russian citizenship and own fifteen-desiatina (forty-acres) parcels of
land” by the supplementary treaty of 1888, as was the practice by the Russian government to
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attract immigrants into the area.173 Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, a French writer who traveled in the
region and provided eyewitness accounts in 1900, observed the surge of Koreans who settled in
Russia since the Sino-Japanese War ended in 1895.174
This was a period when waves of transnational migration started to ripple across the
region, if not globally, as seen in the historiography. The Japanese population in Korea grew by
ten-fold between 1880 (835) and 1890 (7,245) and doubled by 1900 (15,829).175 Over 63,000
people arrived in Siberia across the Urals in 1894, and 17,000 of these European-migrants
continued onto the Amur region.176 Korean migration to Manchuria, as will be more closely
investigated in the next section, also reached 200,000 after the Sino-Japanese War ended in
Japan’s victory.177
The population of Vladivostok in 1895, as noted by Leroy-Beaulieu, substantiated the
claim of more Chinese laborers (5,580 men, 58 women, 5,638 total) living in the city of
Vladivostok than Koreans (642 men, 177 women, 819 total) who lived and farmed in the
outskirts of the city.178 The low rate (1 percent) of women being in the Chinese group, compared
to the high count of Korean women who represented 27 percent, was also captured by Adam
McKeown in the cases of Chinese migration to Hawaii, the United States, and Peru.179 This
pattern of Koreans migrating with wives and families might have played a role in the
preservation of Korean customs and lifestyle wherever they settled and put their roots down.
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As Bertram Lenox Simpson, a British author who wrote extensively about the Far East
under the pen name of B. L. Putnam Weale noted in 1901, “Their womenfolk, too, are on
excellent terms with the Russian peasant women,” the women’s touch in forming the
communities of transnational diaspora could have made a difference.180 On the other hand, this
phenomenon may be attributed to the Korean men relying on their wives to share the burden of
pioneering lifestyle of hard work in addition to cooking and washing their soiled clothes.
In the pattern of seasonal or circular migration noted by historians such as Alyssa Park
and Dae-Sook Suh, Korean migrants tended to enter by land and settle in nearby farming areas,
hoping to cultivate and acquire lands which they could not own in Korea.181 A series of reports,
petitions, and memoranda exchanged between Korean migrants and officials of the Russian
government in 1897-1898 exhibit the anxiousness of Koreans who formed farming villages in
the Ussuri-Kazak region and wished to be allowed to stay and continue to farm.182
Also seen are the positive responses from the Kazak commanding officers regarding the
Korean migrants’ petition to continue to farm on the lands they had acquired, to protect their
Korean-style homes from demolition, to have their military obligations waved for 15 years, as
well as to invite their relatives from Korea.183 On June 12, 1898, a response came from the
Ussuri-Kazak Commander’s Office to Kozrovskii Kazak Commander who granted permission
for the 70 Korean families to stay and apply for Russian citizenship. Their only requirement was
to submit necessary paperwork, documenting their dates of initial entry, names, religion,
occupation, financial statement, identification papers (if no papers available, the reasons to be
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specified), and preferred location of residency excluding the border towns, which the Russian
government wanted to keep in tight control and disperse the population to other areas.184
By the 1902 calculations, there were 15,000 Chinese, 2,400 Japanese, 2,300 Koreans,
living in Vladivostok along with 11,500 Russians and “a garrison of 13,000 men.”185 As
historian Walter Kolarz quoted a German reporter who wrote, “When entering the waiting room
of the Vladivostok railway station, one notices at once that one is in the East. One even thinks
one is in China—so many Chinese! Yes, Vladivostok is very largely a Chinese city….”186 While
the city of Vladivostok had a prominent presence of Chinese labor population, Russian and
Cossack farms in the vicinity of Vladivostok were highly dependent on Korean farmers and "the
whole of Poset district” seemed to be cultivated by Koreans.187 An explorer, named V. D.
Pesotskii, observed that the "southern Maritime Province" was being fed "almost entirely by the
hands of Korean foreigners…their role is enormous."188 Korean laborers also played a critical
part in other industries, such as “gold and coal mining, lumberjacking, and fishing” and formed
independent union-type groups, called “artels of brothers (hyongnim=big brother)” that served as
support organizations to supply workers as well as control them to stay within the boundaries of
the societies as legal subjects of Russia while remaining Korean in their hearts.189
By 1900, Vladivostok was “the center of Russian influence” with the prospect of serving
as the southeastern terminus of Trans-Siberian Railway.190 With its two deep bays and a
peninsula twelve miles long, Vladivostok could provide shelter for the Russian fleet, whereas its
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counterpart in the Western shore, Port Arthur, provided an ice-free port year around. LeroyBeaulieu wrote: “The streets are crowded with pigtailed Chinese in blue, with Koreans in white,
and Japanese in their national costumes. Among these Asiatics move soldiers and sailors….”191
Such a description of the city in 1900 presented Vladivostok as bustling with a Russian civilian
population of a few thousand, 10,087 soldiers and families, living side by side with 5,638
Chinese, 1,232 Japanese, and 819 Koreans.192
The Chinese were “engaged as workmen, domestic servants, boatmen, etc.” and the
Japanese “in petty trade… not a few of them are spies,” wrote Leroy-Beaulieu.193 As for the
Koreans, he described, “being very strong, they are better adapted for hard work, and have
supplied a number of hands on the railway… highly appreciated by their employers, the
administration affording them small allotments on account of their industrious and peaceful
habits.”194 These Koreans were desperate to prove themselves worthy subjects of the Russian
Empire as their counterparts who migrated to Manchuria were just as eager to prove themselves
as respectable Chinese subjects.
By 1902, according to Yun Chi-ho’s Diary of May 7, Korean migrants were coming not
only from the remote northern parts of Korea but also from the other central and southern
provinces including Kyonggi Province near Kyungsung (京

, currently Seoul). “Owing to last

year’s drought, eight of the thirteen provinces have been suffering dreadfully from famine. In
many districts of Kyong Kui or Choong Chong Provinces, whole villages have disappeared
either by death or by emigration or both,” Yun recorded in his diary.195 The same pattern of mass
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migration by villages, as previously examined in the introduction, to avoid corporate punishment
) was still happening in 1902.196

by “skeleton levies” (packkol chingp’o = 骨

At the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, over 30,000 Koreans—more specifically,
32,410 in 1902 and 34,399 in 1906—were recorded as living in the RFE according to the report
of the expedition sent by Russian Imperial Order to the Amur Region on “Chinese, Koreans and
Japanese in the Amur Region.”197 A legitimate and sizable Korean diaspora had formed in the
RFE by the Russo-Japanese War with a majority of the residents engaged in agriculture,
recognized as subjects of the Russian Tsar, and some settled in Shinhanchon (

=New

Korean village) in Vladivostok.198
Approximately 5,000 Koreans were reported to be working in gold mines, “one-third of
the total mining force” in the RFE in 1906-1907.199 “Many mines could not do without them.
The hard labor of the winter does not smile at Russian workers…. Only Korean travel to such
work; and [because they endure] the opening of deep peats, work in dens of gold, [and] labor in
damp, swampy places, they have no rivals in the mines of the Russian Far East.”200 Such a
positive reputation that Koreans had earned by then speaks of their determination to make it
work in their new-found homelands as they saw no way to return to Korea without having to deal
with heavy taxation and bureaucratic nightmare. Their struggles were compounded by the
looming threat of a war between Japan and Russia and the Japanese colonial aggression.
In his 1906 eyewitness travelog account of Koreans in Vladivostok, Bertram Weale
referred to the large number of Koreans who migrated into the vicinity of Nicolsk, initially in
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seasonal migration to work during the harvest season but later settled down to engage in farming
and cattle-raising in the southern region of the Russian Far East.201 However, Weale noted “Here
the Koreans are almost wealthy, and so different and so much more manly in general appearance
than their stay-at-home brothers…They are also possessed of a confidence and a good
humour…. Their womenfolk, too, are on excellent terms with the Russian peasant women.”202
Scottish Lady Isabella Bird Bishop during her visit to the RFE in 1897 shared similar perceptions
of Koreans in Russia, quite different from the Koreans she had seen down south, which will be
reviewed in a later section of this chapter. What Weale and Bishop witnessed was the remarkable
change in the people’s confident dispositions and positive outlooks when they were no longer
abused by the systemic problems of the yangban society, even though they were engaged in hard
work a long way from home.
On the taxation issue, Chinese and Korean laborers in Khabarovsk were taxed at half the
rate of a tsarist subject. They were considered “half-persons” based on the assumption of their
annual earnings of 425 rubles, rather than the Russian’s earnings of 850 rubles, due to their
seasonal work.203 Most Asians in the region from Siberia to the RFE were “nomadic or
seminomadic” and assessed tribute taxes, called iasak, as second-class citizens under the tsarism,
but they did not quite fit the “tsarist models” being “diaspora nationalities” and were considered
a “problematic and threatening” group.204 Deprived of equal status, even as inorodtsy (alien), to
their white counterparts, Koreans remained “illegals or stateless squatters” with no prospects to
own land, pay taxes, and become legitimate.205
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c. Three Categories of Korean Migrants in the RFE
The Treaty of Saint Petersburg had been established between Russia and Japan on May 7,
1875, fifteen years after the Primorsky Krai region was ceded by China to Russia in 1860.
Through this 1875 Treaty Russia gained control of the Sakhalin region and ceded Kuril Islands
with all the residents of Ainu tribe going to Japan. This agreement helped to settle the disputes
over the islands and borders between the two countries until the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was
signed at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.206
With the intention of recruiting productive Koreans to cultivate the barren lands and
become tax-paying citizens, the first Governor-General of Amur Region Andrey Nikolayevich
Baron von Korf (1884-1893) acknowledged the immigrants from China and Korea as being
“indispensable” in the Russian economy in the region.207 Korf established a progressive policy
on the legal status of Koreans in RFE in 1890 and directed General Paul (Pavel) Fridrikhovich
Unterberger on July 21, 1891 to draw up specific regulations to be implemented.208 Hence the
RFE immigration policy which categorized Koreans in three groups was instituted and adhered
to by the next Governor S. M. Dukhovskoi (1893-1898). The three categories were as follow:
first-category was for those who arrived and settled before June 25, 1884, the second- and thirdcategories were for the post-1884 arrivals.
The next Governor, S. M. Dukhovskoi who succeeded Andrey Korf allowed Koreans
even in the second and third categories to become Russian subjects in 1891 until his progressive
policy of accommodation was abandoned by P. F. Unterberger when he came into office after
Dukhovskoi as Governor-General in 1906.209 Consequently, the 1884 Treaty between the Korean
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and Russian governments became an impediment to “restrict Korean immigration” as a quota
system with “cutoff dates” by their original entry rather than a vehicle to accept them for their
“skills or capital.”210
Koreans in the first category were immediately “eligible for land grants of 15 desiatinas
as Russian subjects”—albeit only fifteen percent of the 100 desiatinas granted to the
Cossacks.211 Those in the second and third categories were treated as “guest workers without the
right to citizenship” until the 1890s.212 The second category applied to Koreans who entered
Russia after 1884 and were given five years' temporary residency as guest workers (serfs). They
were also required to pay five rubles for annual processing of temporary work visas. The lands
they had acquired during their stay were forfeited by the government when their visas expired. If
they stayed on beyond their two-year period of allowance, they were responsible for land-use tax
but exempt from military service. The third category applied to the wage-earning Korean
workers who entered Russia after 1884 and were assigned to use the land as tenants with taxation
duties.213
From 1892-1893 some Koreans in the second and third categories were again evicted
from their villages in Primorsk and Sinellikovo and started to depart the region, either headed
back home to Korea or migrated to Manchuria, although the exact numbers could not be
ascertained. As tabulated and presented later in Figure 21, the numbers of migrants in the RFE as
well as in Manchuria continued to increase despite the many returnees in the 1930s.
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d. Korea-Russian Relations and Rusification of Korean Transnationals
In 1885, the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed and ratified between Korea and
Russia, fashioned after the Korean Treaties with England and Germany, as reported by George
C. Foulk to the Secretary of State Thomas A. Bayard.214 Upon his arrival, Serge Waeber, the first
minister of Russia to Korea, in Seoul on October 14, 1885, proposed a treaty of “overland trade
for Russia with Corea, to effect which the opening for trade with Russia of a trading post on the
northeast border of Corea” on the Tumen River, “to be equivalent of the trading post of China
and Corea at Ichow (Oichu, in Corean), on the Yalu River” was requested.215
The trading post on the Chinese/Korean border in question was opened in May 1884 by
the Treaty signed between China and Korea to lift border restrictions, as will be referenced in a
section that follows on the Korean migrants in Manchuria.216 The proposed placement of a
trading post “a little to the southward of the mouth of the Tumen River, the nearest one to
Possiette, the southernmost Russian town of Eastern Siberia” with a claim by Russia that “the
boundary maintained by China is too far to the eastward” indicates the border disputes brewing
between Russia and China in connection to Korea for trading purposes.217 A week later, Foulk
reported to Bayard that the request for a trading-post has been postponed to a later date.218
For the time-being, however, the Russian government’s interest toward Korea and
Koreans in the RFE turned favorable. Koreans who had migrated before the 1884 Treaty were
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given "the right to acquire Russian citizenship and own fifteen-desiatina (forty-acres) parcels of
land” by the supplementary treaty of 1888, as was the practice by the Russian government to
attract immigrants into the area.219 A total of 12,857 Korean farmers were reported to have
resided in Ussuri region and eligible to apply for citizenship in 1891 with many more who
became eligible to acquire Russian citizenship between 1893 and 1899. While 1,300 households
of Koreans in Yanyanchi Volostov area wanted to acquire citizenship, however, 100 other
households refused to apply, constituting about 700 households without Russian citizenships—
either by choice or ineligibility.220 It could not be ascertained as to why these 100 families
refused to apply for citizenship, other than, perhaps, by their wish to remain as Koreans and
return home someday in the future.
Outreach efforts in response to the Korean people’s desire for education were made by
government officials in the RFE, such as Governor of Eastern Siberia M.C. Korsakov (18611870) who ordered two schools to be established for Korean children in the Ussury region and
allocated 150 rubles each for construction expenses in 1870.221 More schools were opened in the
Korean community of Blagoslovennoe in 1872.
By 1889, many Koreans who were in the second category—post-1884 entry with 5 years
of temporary residency— became eligible to be granted naturalization and received land
allocations of fifteen desiatina as well as equal rights as Russian peasants. Some of them became
wealthy and were referred to as “wonhoin (‘settler Koreans/Koreans with Russian subjecthood’)” or “starozhil” in Russian, while those who came later when the naturalization became
more difficult were called “yeohoin” or “novosel” and were accepted as “batraki (‘farmhands’)
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or tenant farmers for Russian or naturalized Korean peasant.”222 These early settlers were
extremely motivated to educate their children and sent them to Russian schools.
Parents who were interested in “Russification and ‘passing’ as Russian” of their children
so that they could be considered “assimilable Russian subjects” sent their children to colleges of
technical education as well as into Russian Orthodox schools away from home.223 However,
living among the many white Russians who had come from Latvia, Estonia, and Armenia, Jews,
and Baltic Germans who could easily assimilate, Koreans “did not have this luxury of blending
in” due to their Asian features—yellow skin, dark hair, and narrow eyes.224 Such features of
physiognomy could only be altered or erased by the mixing of blood, as much as they tried to
Russify by education and productivity.
The growing nationalism of “Slavophils, the Pan-Slavs” further demoted the status of
Koreans as “yellow labor” under the administration of Governor Unterberger who strongly
believed in “Russia and Russian industry for Russians,” supported by his ethnographer Vladimir
V. Grave.225 Grave argued that Russians must fight against Chinese and Koreans laborers who
were gaining influence in trade and industry in the region and strengthening their economic reins
“while belittling the Russian authorities.”226 Lieutenant General Sergey Mikhailovich
Dukhovskoy (1893-1898) showed a favorable policy toward Korean immigrants and supported
their bids for citizenship when he took office in 1893. Dukhovskoy approved citizenship
applications not only from the Koreans of the first category but also of the second category,
recognizing Russia’s needs to be more accommodating of productive foreigners.227
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The transnational migrant Koreans pushed on to have their off-spring become Russified
as quickly as possible by education and strong initiative. Ko Young-Jun (Kogai Evegenyi), for
example, was sent as far as to St. Petersburg for Russian language education in 1866 and
returned in 1871 to serve as an interpreter for the Southern Ussury Border Administration.228
Some of these Russified descendants of the early Korean migrants were to serve in the Russian
military and intelligence activities during the Russo-Japanese War, as will be further investigated
in Chapter II.
Lady Isabella Bird Bishop, a Scottish who visited Vladivostok in the Possiet Bay and
Nowo Kiewsk areas in 1897, shared her observation of the lives of Koreans in their transnational
diaspora in Russia. Having traveled extensively in the United States in the 1850s and Hawaii,
India, China, as well as in the mainland Korea since 1875, Bird was known for her travelogues
which were considered “progressive…by rejecting motherhood and domesticity” in the days of
the Victorian society and not aligned to “advocate any special rites of dogmas” of any particular
religious organizations despite her own “deep religious conviction and practice.”229

228

C. H. Park, [Rosia Yonbang], 59.
Anna M. Stoddart, The Life of Isabella Bird (Mrs. Bishop) Hon. Member of the Oriental Society of Pekin
(London: John Murray, 1908), vi.; Precious McKenzie, The Right Sort of Woman: Victorian Travel Writers and the
Fitness of an Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), 31.
229

78

(Figure 14: Korean school children with Russian Orthodox Priests and teachers)230
During her four visits to Korea from 1894 to 1897, Lady Bishop acquired a good
understanding of the country and its people’s characters, traveling through the Korean peninsula
on horseback and along the rivers in a houseboat she procured, since there were no lodging
accommodations available to lone female travelers at the time. She was accompanied only by a
Chinese cook, an interpreter, and other guides. Her first trip to Korea in 1894 was interrupted as
she was “suddenly deported…ahead of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.”231 It was during
her subsequent trip in 1897 that Bishop made her way to Vladivostok via Mukden, Manchuria to
see Korea in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War but prior to the Russo-Japanese War. It was
there she witnessed “by personal investigation the vexed question of the condition of those
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Koreans who have found shelter under the Russian flag, a number estimated in Seoul at
20,000.”232
Upon her disembarking in Vladivostok after a pleasant voyage from Nagasaki aboard
Higo maru, Bishop was met “by a number of laughing, shouting, dirty Korean youths” soliciting
her to hotels nearby, the situation of which she described as “an unspeakable Babel” as she heard
shouts in many different languages, Russian, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and English.233 Once
welcomed by the Governor of Primorsk, General Unterberger and his wife, both of whom spoke
English fluently, Bishop was cordially escorted outside of Vladivostok city into the Posiet Bay
where large settlements of Koreans existed near a military post of Nowo Kiewsk with “1000
civilians, chiefly Koreans and Chinese,” populating the area.234
Bishop's description presented Korean villages near a large military complex of barracks
and storehouses in a prosperous condition:
growing rich as contractors for the supply of meat and grain to the Russian forces. At this
they have beaten their Chinese neighbours, and they actually go into Chinese Manchuria,
buy up lean cattle, and fatten them for beef. To those who have only seen the Koreans in
Korea, such as statement will be hardly credible…. I have it on the best authority that the
Korean settlers near Khabaroffka have competed so successfully with the Chinese in
market gardening that the supplying that city with vegetables is now entirely in their
hands!235
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(Figure 15: Korean Settler’s House near Vladivostok by Lady Bishop)236
As shown in the above drawing of a substantial Korean settler's house by Bishop, the traditional
Korean-style farmhouse of five or six rooms with thatched roof appears to be well built and
neatly maintained by a household of family members and farm hands or tenants. Bishop found
the “Korean hamlets with houses of a very superior class to those in Korea” scattered all over the
countryside in RFE.237
Even the farmers themselves exuded “an air of frankness and manly independence”
instead of the “timid, suspicious, or cringing manner” which was typically found in their
counterparts in Korea.238 Knowing that these farmers had fled to escape the famine and
bureaucratic abuse of the officials in Korea just a decade or so earlier, Bishop saw the possibility
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of the Koreans at home to “develop into men,” if they had an “honest administration and
protection for their earnings”—very insightful perception of a sympathetic foreigner who saw the
detrimental effects of a bad government on its populace.239
However, the above picture of a settler’s family shows several people who appear to be
farm hands, tenants, or household help squatting next to a couple, husband and wife, who stood
next to an older man who might have been a male member of the family. In this picture, one can
see a pattern of a traditional Korean household comprising an extended family, living together
and assisted by others who may be hired helpers or slaves, just like a household of a yangban
society in Korea.
The Korean villages Bishop visited were within three to four miles apart from each other,
“of which prosperity in greater or less degree is a characteristic” in her own words, where the
houses were “large and well built… the people and children are well clothed, and the village
lands carefully cultivated.”240 One of the Korean villages she visited was occupied by “140
families on 750 acres of rich land” living in houses of “strictly Korean architecture” where
"farm-yards were clean and well swept, and the domestic animals were lodged in neat sheds"
with people in their “clothing and dwellings…the same as in Korea, and the ‘top-knot’
flourishes.”241 A ‘top-knot’ (sangtoo) was a long-observed Neo-Confucian-based Korean custom
of preserving what has been given by birth. This practice required men’s hair to be kept long,
tied into a knot at the top of their heads, therefore called a top-knot. Traditionally, Korean men’s
hair was dressed “differently by single and married men,” explained American businessman
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Angus Hamilton who traveled and lived in Korea.242 “If unmarried, they adopt the queue; when
married, they put up their hair and twist it into a conical mass upon their heads, keeping it in
place by a woven horsehair band, which completely encircles the forehead and base of the skull”
and top it off with a “high-crowned hat” with a broad brim in black, called kaht (갓). In other
words, a top-knot was regarded as a sign of manhood, standing for the Korean male adulthood,
even in a transnational diaspora of Koreans in the RFE.243
In addition to the Korean farmers in the area of Possiet Bay, Bishop saw the cattlemen of
“strong, thriving-looking Koreans driving 60 fine fat cattle down to the steamer” bound for
Vladivostok to transport their beef supply.244 The area between Possiet Bay and Nowo Kiewsk
where these Korean villages had formed housed 10,000 infantry and artillery with the soldiers’
families living in “low mud houses of two rooms each, with windows consisting of a single small
pane of glass” next to “an imposing” Greek church.245 In another village of Yantchihe where a
schoolhouse in which Russian and Korean children sat side by side taking lessons, four hundred
Koreans had converted to Christianity with baptism, wishing “more hope for the next
generation.”246
In the above description of Lady Bishop, one can get a glimpse of the living in an
ethnically-mixed community where white Russians and Korean migrant families with their
children sit together, learning in schools and worshipping in churches of Russian Orthodox. In
this picture, moreover, the white Russians living in low mud houses with single-pane windows
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did not seem to be any more affluent than their Korean neighbors. Back in Korea, these Korean
migrants could not have sat and worshipped or learned alongside the upper-class Yangbans and
their families. At last, these Korean migrants in transnational diasporas were able to mix and
mingle between classes and social standings, to a certain degree, in spite of their humble origins
as some of them achieved Russification and economic prosperity of which they could never
dream back in Korea.
As will be seen with the Korean diaspora in Manchuria, the Koreans in the RFE were
wearing traditional Korean outfits, headdresses, and shoes, signifying the transnational lifestyle
they were maintaining more than twenty to thirty years after their move. Such a positive
portrayal of Korean settlers by Bishop confirmed the comfortable new-found life of some of the
Korean transplants in the RFE in the late 1890s before the Russo-Japanese War.
Before leaving Vladivostok, on top of a hill “from which the mountainous frontiers of
Russia, China, and Korea are seen,” Bishop presented “what is geographically and politically a
striking view”— “the whole of the Russo-Korean frontier, 11 miles in length…. On a steep bluff
above the river, a tall granite slab marks the spot where the Russian and Chinese frontiers
meet.”247 This image Bishop left behind is symbolic of the geopolitical environment of three
empires butting heads with the fourth, Japan, ready to erupt at any moment.
By the early 1900s, the Korean migration to the Russian Far East and Manchuria
transformed from economic to political in nature as a large influx of “political exiles” escaped
out of Korea against the increasing Japanese aggression and colonization attempts.248 As the Yi
Dynasty started to collapse fast, the problem of Korean political exiles was compounded into a
complicated question of acknowledging "Russia's sovereignty over Korean nationals fleeing
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from Japan's threat to the crumbling Chosun Kingdom” in the new geopolitical atmosphere in
which Japan emerged as the victor.249 While many of the newcomers were caught in the conflict
between Russia and Japan, wishing to continue and carry out the anti-Japanese independence
movement which they had started before migrating into the Russian Far East, the old immigrants
with financial means felt ready to be of service to the Russian military as other Russian subjects
did for the Russo-Japanese War.250 Regardless of the difference in push factors which brought
the two groups to the RFE—economic or political—the diverse group of the Korean diasporas
joined their forces together to help Russia fight the war against Japan in 1904. However, the
disparate sense of loyalties the two groups felt, one to Russia as their new sovereignty and the
other to Korea as their old homeland to hopefully return to soon—brought them together in arms
on the face of imperialist aggression by Japan.
The same, if not more complex, question of sovereignty applied to the Koreans in
Manchuria. The next section will focus on the migration of Koreans to Manchuria, a region
already known as a transnational diasporic mix, which occurred in parallel and almost
simultaneously to the Russian track. For the Koreans who migrated to Manchuria, the situation
became much more complicated than in the RFE due to the Japanese imperial ambition to
advance into China. Such moves put Koreans in the middle of the social hierarchy with
ambivalent status as stateless or Japanese subjects in the coming decades.
Koreans in Manchuria: Transnational Sojourners or Patriotic Nationalists in Exile?
a. Koreans in Manchuria—Land of Transnational Diasporic Coexistence
Regarding the first presence of Koreans in Manchuria, historiography abounds with many
answers. One dates as far back to the 37 B.C. when Koguryo of the Three Kingdoms Era of
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Korea was founded by Chumong with his followers from Puyo (or Parhae,

) in a “region

centered in the middle Yalu and the T’ung-chia River basin.”251 By the beginning of the first
century A.D. Koguryo’s King T’aejo (52-146) engaged in a war to expand the territory “toward
the basins of the Liao River to the southwest and the Taedong River to the south, to the Sungari
River basin in the northwest and into the plains along the northeast coast of the Korean
Peninsula.”252
King T’aejo’s ambition was fulfilled by King Kwanggaet’o (391-412 A.D.) who put
“the Liaodong Peninsula and a considerable portion of Manchuria” under Koguryo’s rule during
the kingdom’s peak period.253 This theory of nationalist historians was reinforced by the
discovery of King Kwanggaet’o’s stele, dated 414 A.D. by inscription in Tonggou of current day
Jilin Province by a Japanese lieutenant Sakawa Kageaki in 1883.254 Concomitantly, this
anthropological discovery of the stele was accepted by Japanese nationalist historians, such as
Yoshi S. Kuno, to predate Japan’s “imperial origins” as well as the theory of Koguryo’s rule in
the Manchuria by four centuries.”255 With the fall of Parhae kingdom (698-926 A.D.), which had
been established by people of Koguryo but conquered by the Khitans in 926, Manchuria ceased
to be a part of Korea, either politically or culturally.256
In more recent history, after the Qing invasions of Korea, called Jungmyo Horan
(

亂) in 1627 and Byungja Horan (

亂) in 1636, the Crown Prince Soryun was

taken captive with many nobles and courtesans to Shimyang, Manchuria, during the reign of
King Injo. Over 13,000 Korean soldiers and their families were taken to Manchuria where they
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were enslaved and sold in slave markets. Those who survived remained in Manchuria, married
each other, and formed Korean villages while maintaining their language, diet, living style, and
ceremonies according to the Korean customs.257 This group could be considered the first
transnational diaspora of Koreans in Manchuria.
By the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, a peace settlement was made between Russia and
Qing China for control of Manchuria. The Russians “agreed to withdraw north of the Amur
watershed” and the Manchus “kept well to the south of the Amur” with “a huge, virtually
uninhabited and trackless forested waste” in between, serving to keep the two powers separate in
their empire building in the next two centuries.258 (See Figure 16 and 17) Thereafter, nomadic
tribes who traded scattered around the territories along the Sungari and Amur rivers and sent
their customary tributes, “chiefly in the form of sable pelts,” to Peking as well as to the Russian
Tsar.259
Manchuria, located in the northeastern region of China, remained vacant for centuries
until the nineteenth century when migrants from China and Korea arrived. Occupying 365,000
square miles of area, Manchuria comprised the so-called “Three Eastern Provinces” of
Heilunjiang ( 龍江 ), Jilin (吉

), and Fengtien (

( 吉), and Shenyang (also called Muktien or Bongchun (

), with Harbin ((

), Yanji

) by different people) serving as

regional centers of political and commercial activities at the beginning of the twentieth
century.260
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(Figure 16: Map of Manchuria and Southern RFE: (Figure 17: Yalu River (orange) and Tumen
CIA - The World Factbook)
River (blue) bordering between Korea and
China/Russia, 1860)261
In Figure 17, one can see how the border between Russia and China changed from 1689 with
Nerchensk Treaty to 1860 with the signing of Peking Treaty, yielding a large patch of territory to
Russia after 1860, as a result of which Korea came to join borders with the Russian Far East.
Amur and Sungari Rivers provided a natural separation of the vast region between
Manchuria in the south and Siberia in the north, the Eastern Inner Mongolia in the west, the
Maritime Provinces of Russia in the east, and “Chosen (Korea)” in the southeast of the border,
separated by the Yalu River (
or Dalny=大

江), and the Yellow Sea (

) in the south of Dairen (Dalien

).262 The climate of Manchuria, situated within the parallels of 39° and 53° 30”

north, was subject to extremes of temperature—long, severe winters and hot summers with
monthly temperatures, fluctuating between 24° F. in January to 76° F. in August in Dairen, for
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example, the southern-most city of Manchuria.263 In Harbin, the temperature ranged from zero in
January to 72° F in July.
Manchuria (

) has always been considered a “transnational phenomenon”—never

viewed as an integral part of China as there is “no single Chinese name for Manchuria as a unit”
with a clear distinction from China proper.264 Manchuria has also been recognized for its multiethnic diasporic coexistence of five different ethnicities—Hans ( ), Mans ( ), Mongs ( ),
Japanese ( ), and Koreans ( )—by some historians, while others counted Russians ( ) as the
sixth element of ethnicities in this geopolitical environment.265
Such an assessment gets even more complicated when considering Bishop’s account. On
her way to Vladivostok via Mukden, Bishop found approximately 30,000 Korean families living
in Newchwang, Manchuria amongst “a population of several distinct and mixed races, Manchus
(Tartars), Gilyaks, Tungusi, Solons, Daurs, and Chinese.”266 In this northern province of
Manchuria which Bishop found as “unsettled at all times,” populated by “convicts, fugitive
criminals, soldiers who have left the colours, and gold and ginseng hunters,” and hassled by
“bands of mounted brigades,” many of the Koreans had settled themselves.267
During the reign of Empress Dowager Cixi of Qing China in the 1860s and 1870s much
of government’s powers and responsibilities of taxation, legislation, and military command were
decentralized and left up to provincial governors. While the central government was preoccupied
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with a series of domestic uprisings, such as the Boxers Rebellion and the Taiping War, and
foreign aggression of two Opium Wars, much of the internal affairs were at the discretion of
local governments.268 When China legalized migration to Manchuria by lifting the border
restrictions in 1884, not only Koreans but also many Chinese from Shandong Province migrated.
Local governments in Manchuria lacked government revenue or other income sources.
They consequently started to privatize lands by selling them to the migrants without providing
any security protection for the property owners, leaving it up to them to hire private armies to
guard their estates.269 Yi Pom-yun who had been sent to survey the situation of Korean migrants
in Kando by Emperor Gojong in 1903 came back with a report on the unsafe situation of 13,000
Korean households who were in urgent need of protection from the bandits and the local
officials’ abusive treatment. Kim Kyu-hong, an Uijongbu official, appealed to Gojong to appoint
Yi as the resident inspector in charge of protecting the Koreans in the area. With Gojong’s
approval, Yi was officially designated as Manager of Kando (間島管

) in charge of

safeguarding Korean migrants in the region on August, 11, 1903.270
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(Figure 18: Letter of appointment for Choi Chi-un by Yi Pom-yun with a seal of mapae)
As seen in the above letter of appointment, stamped with a seal of uhsa mapae (

) with

images of horses, the carrier of this royal seal had the authority to procure and enlist all
resources, human or material including horses, as needed to carry out his royal assignment of
inspection and management of any localities within the realm. According to the information
Bishop obtained from the Russian Diplomatic Mission in Peking, these Koreans had left Korea
“since 1868 … in consequences of political disturbance and official exactions,” as observed in
the previous section on the RFE of this chapter.271 The significance of the Korean Emperor
giving such an assignment in protection of his former subjects who had migrated and left the
confines of Korea is remarkable in the sense that not only their past offense, previously
punishable by death, was being pardoned but also the Korean monarch was providing the safety
and protection of the former subjects in their new transnational diasporas overseas.
Newchwang was one of the Treaty Ports opened under the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, which
explains the cosmopolitan nature of the city. People of various ethnic origins coexisted not by
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assimilation (同 ) but in relative harmony (

), concentrated in diasporic communities of

Dairen, Shenyang, and Harbin.272 Harbin was the center of this borderland of the transnational
and multicultural region—a “boom town” as the hub of Chinese Eastern Railway— with 50,000
to 60,000 inhabitants by 1903, growing to 75,000 of which 39,000 were Russians by 1912.273
Harbin provided the “contact zone of imperial encounters” between Chinese, Japanese, and
Russians, as historian Mary Louise Pratt had termed, into which Korean migrants were
thrown.274 Situated close to the Russian border on the Manchurian side, Harbin “occupied a
border position not only because of its ethnic and cultural diversity, but also from a politicaladministrative” standpoint and served as the hub of information, counterintelligence, and
intrigues.275
In his travels and residence in Manchuria for nine months in 1929-1930, funded by a
fellowship from the Social Science Research Council of New York, American historian Owen
Lattimore wrote that he found “an important Korean population” in Eastern Manchuria,
concentrated in the Chientao (Kando=間島) district.276 Kando, incidentally, was a name Koreans
gave to the area they migrated to and settled down to form their own community in Manchuria.
The name Kando was also accepted by the Chinese and later the Japanese. The majority of
Koreans whom Lattimore found in Manchuria, albeit a couple of decades later than the subjects
of this dissertation, were indeed situated in a “cradle of conflict.” Many of the later migrants
were “revolutionary and anti-Japanese, having for that reason migrated from Korea into Chinese
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territory.”277 Nevertheless, the earlier-arrived Korean pioneer farmers constituted more than 90
percent of Korean transnationals in rural villages and still could not be matched for their northern
rice farming techniques by other ethnic groups in Manchuria or in the Russian Far East.278
b. Early Arrivals of Korean Migrants to Manchuria
Around the time when the early migrants of thirteen families from Hamgyong Province
crossed the border at Tumen River or by the coastline to the Russian Far East in 1863, other
Korean families from the same province headed to Manchuria by crossing the border at the Yalu
River region. These illegal crossings continued and escalated when the terrible flood and famine
of 1869 wiped out the source of the main livelihood—the farmland—of many farmers and
peasants in Korea. As many as 100,000 Koreans crossed over and cultivated 576,000 mu of lands
in 1869. Between 1869 and 1894, 34,000 more Korean migrants settled in four districts in
Yenbian alone in Manchuria.279
Earlier than these migrants came the desperately poor Koreans who were engaged in
farming by daily commute or seasonal farming in the mid- to early seventeenth century. Pak
Gae-son ( 凱

) and twenty others crossed over in 1638 and lived in Nahan village, followed

by Yi Man-Ji and nine others who crossed over to gather Ginseng roots and captured by the
Chinese soldiers in 1710.280 At first, they would cross over at dawn, plant the seeds, and tend to
their small patch of farmlands, before returning home at night. Or they would cross over and
plant in the spring and return to harvest in the fall in their desperate plight to survive despite the
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risk of deaths. The early migrants lived in Tonghwa, Jibahn, Jangbaik, Sinbin, Ryongjong, and
Hwaryong between Yalu and Tumen rivers. Reportedly there were 28 clusters of Korean villages
in the Yalu riverbeds in 1870. In 1880, there were over 1,000 households of Korean migrants
living in Jibahn alone and by 1881 Koreans in Yanbian Province exceeded 10,000 in total.281
In the meantime, the Chinese government’s previous policy to curb Korean mass
migration was relaxed to allow naturalization of Koreans in 1865. It seemed meaningless with so
many crossing the border illegally despite the law. It was altogether lifted in 1881 for entry into
the Dunhwa region.282 With the 1883 trade agreement, established between China and Chosun,
border restrictions were removed by both countries to allow Korean migrants to legally cross
over and engage themselves in farming north of the Yalu border in Manchuria.
An official reference to the lifting of Korean restrictions can be found in Gojong Sillok on
May 26, 1884, as part of an announcement of the 1884 Treaty of Commerce & Trade between
Korea and China, more specifically in Jilin (吉 ) Province.283 The Treaty with 16 Articles
specifically mentions the previous tributary relationship between China and Korea being revised
as that of trading partnership with respect for Chosun being no longer regarded as China’s
dependency. Tumen River (豆 江) was to serve as the border between the two countries with all
trading business transactions to be handled in the nearby City of Jilin on the side of China and
Hoeryung ( 寧) in Korea so that merchants with their merchandises can cross the river in the
morning and return in the evening after their transactions were conducted with appropriate taxes
paid.
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By this same Treaty, outposts were established in Hoonchoon (
and Chongsung (

) on the Chinese side

) on the Korean side to facilitate the trading as well. By Article Twelve of

the Treaty, trading of Ginseng (

) for medicinal purposes with 15 percent taxes was specified

while vegetables, ducks, fish, roof tiles, lumber, and other daily consumer products were to be
allowed without taxes imposed. Trading of opiums (

) and arms ( 器) was to be strictly

prohibited. The Treaty was signed by Paeng Gwangye ( 光

) and Uh Yoon-joong (

),

representing the Chinese and Korean governments respectively.284 A report of restrictions on
crossing the rivers being lifted ( 江禁

度

) in 1883 by the same Korean Northwestern

Border official, named above, Uh Yoon Joong (

), was also confirmed by Korean historian

Kyung-Il Kim, based on Japanese sources.285
According to historian Yong-Phil Kim, China’s Qing government made a strategic
decision to welcome Koreans and have them settle in the vast empty land in order to create a
buffer zone to keep the Russians from moving south. This strategy was called imin silbyon
(

)—using migrants to fortify borders. Between 1881 and 1885, 1,133 households of

Korean migrants settled and thrived in Yanbian area, using the Korean wet-rice farming
techniques to cultivate the wasteland of 24,104 hectares which was granted them by the Qing
government.286 Upon the nearly simultaneous lifting of border restrictions on both sides,
migration of Koreans increased in the late-1880s and spread into a wider area far north to Harbin
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in 1892.287 Reports of Chinese officials at Hwa-ryong-nak-wall kanguk [

龍烙

墾局], urging

Koreans to cross over and emigrate in 1890 have been noted as well.288
Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, however, the Qing government toughened its
policy to force Koreans to assimilate and adopt the Chinese way of living and dressing. For those
who had already crossed over but refused to apply for Chinese citizenship, the Chinese
government confiscated their lands and forced them out. If they wanted to stay, they were
mandated to become Chinse subjects, dress in Chinese costumes, and follow the Chinese
customs.289 Some of the oppressive local Chinese government officials closed down Korean
schools and “ordered that all Koreans must go to Chinese schools.”290 Some Koreans were
naturalized as Chinese subjects just as their counterparts were in the Russian Far East, but they
lived among themselves in such a closed community that made them “practically immune to
Chinese [or Russian] linguistic and cultural influences” as well as from discrimination and
persecution as foreign-born migrants.291 In other words, Korean settlers could maintain their own
language and cultural customs in Manchuria more than in RFE, because they lived in tightly-knit
clusters of a community of transnational diasporas.
In 1892 the first sighting of Korean migrants in Harbin was reported in a publication by
the South Manchurian Railway Company.292 By 1894, 20,846 Koreans in 4,308 households
were reported to be living in Yanbian, and 37,000 Korean migrants in 8,700 households were
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found north of Yalu river by 1897.293 When the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed in 1898 after
the Sino-Japanese War ended in Japan’s victory in 1895, China was forced to concede Korea
from their long tributary relationship and to forfeit the Liaodong Peninsula of Manchuria and
Taiwan to Japan along with the privileges of extraterritoriality in China. The Treaty also yielded
foreign rights to navigate the Yangzi and to manufacture in treaty port cities to Japan. For fear of
Japanese interference in further territorial disputes, China’s Qing Government started to pressure
Korean migrants to become naturalized as Chinese citizens and adopt Manchu customs of
clothing in black and hairstyles with long ponytails, known as “hukpok pyonbal” [

]”,

in place of Korean’s traditional attire of white clothes and topknots.294
Nonetheless, Koreans adhered to their traditional customs and lifestyle in the way they
farmed, lived in Korean-style houses—peasant huts built with walls of mud and thatched roofs or
well-built houses with tiled roofs by the more affluent farmers—and celebrated family rituals,
milestones, and holidays as they did in Korea.295 For this reason, many Koreans tended to live in
remote areas of Manchuria where they could avoid the strict oversight of Chinese officials or
Japanese Kempeitai (

隊), for that matter, after 1905. The situation changed drastically after

1905 when Korea became a protectorate of Japan. More on this change will be examined in
Chapter III.
Korean migrants’ strong desire to own land motivated them to seek Chinese citizenship
as they did in the Russian Far East. Their experience with land ownership in Manchuria differed
from that in the Russian Far East because the notion of private property ownership was not
recognized in Manchuria until 1884 when the Qing China lifted bong-gum policy ( 禁
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legalized migration into Manchuria. Once peasant migrants from China and Korea entered
Manchuria legally, their desire to own land seemed to have been answered. Local Chinese
officials with no administrative funding or power from the central government were incentivized
to sell lands as private property as a source of local “government revenue and private income.”296
News about shortage of labor to work with tough terrain of the virgin land, which was
rumored to be plenty but in much need of cultivation, attracted more migrants to cross the
borders. Some Koreans became property owners and others simply wanted to work for a living to
feed their families, neither of which was possible for them in Korea at the time. However, the
local government offices in Manchuria lacked any real power or funding to provide protections
for private property. Therefore, it was up to the property owners or landlords, whether Korean or
Chinese, to protect their own property by hiring “private armies” to keep the bandits away.297
In Kando Koreans constituted over two-thirds of the total population since the 1900s
because they were granted “customary rights to farming and residence” by the Chinese
government in hopes that the Korean diaspora will create “a buffer from the threat of Russian
imperialism.”298 The chief occupation of Koreans in the area was “rice cultivation” to work with
26 percent (151,238 acres) of the land used as wet paddy fields and 74 percent (492,541 acres) as
dry fields.299
As the Japanese imperial ambition in Korea became more pronounced in the early 1900s,
the Qing government was caught in a dilemma between its policy of continuing to utilize the
Korean migrants as rice producers and of preventing Korean migration which was seen as “a
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transnational mode of Japanese empire building.”300 Should they accept and utilize Korean
migrants for their productive assets or reject them as the front guard of Japanese imperialism?
Historian Barbara Brooks pinpointed this dilemma—the “Jiandao problem (Kando mondai)”
(間島

)—as “the most outstanding diplomatic issue between China and Japan” due to

“Korea’s importance as a nonstate actor while under Japanese occupation.”301 The problem of
“recalcitrant Koreans” or “Korean malcontents” who occupied the region “from periphery to
metropole” of Manchuria could not be resolved despite the various Sino-Japanese treaties, as
long as Korea remained stateless and its people, the Koreans, remained loyal to their old country
and difficult to be managed.302
The nationalist government of China enforced restrictions, such as limiting the exchange
of land to its nationals as well as the number of years non-nationals could be employed and the
maximum wages they could be paid. The tug of war over land ownership based on national
membership—citizenship—became the central issue in the “interplay of Japanese colonialism,
Chinese nationalism, and capitalism” as the Japanese grip on Korea’s independence tightened.303
Nation-forming in Manchuria “enabled migrants from North China to become landowners while
preventing their Korean counterparts from doing so” because domestic migration and settlement
of Chinese people to Manchuria was preferred to those by Koreans.304 Indeed, in the vicious
cycle of “migration, cultivation, eviction, and re-emigration” the “rice-farming skills” were the
most important assets of Korean migrants.305
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Chinese farmers were mainly engaged in farming grains and vegetables in dry land
(

) methods, whereas Korean farmers were known to produce rice using wet-rice field (

)

methods with much success. Comparison of rice production by farmers in ethnic groups of
Korea, China, and Japan in 1939 was presented by historian Kim Young, as shown below:
Nationality
Koreans
Chinese
Japanese

Wet-rice Farmland used
(Total square footage)
244,003 (85%)
34,223 (12%)
7,353 (3%)

Rice Produced (Total
number of bushels ( ))
6,752,004
689,231
146,246

Rice Production per
square feet ( )
27.67
20.13
19.88

(Figure 19 : Comparison of rice production by ethnicity in Manchuria, 1939) 306
The Koreans in Manchuria built Korean-style homes like their counterparts in the RFE—
huts with thatched roofs or houses with tile roofs and ondol-heated floors, as soon as they could
afford. Some of the more successful ones with financial means were allowed to purchase and
own pieces of land in their new surroundings as the local Chinese governments needed revenues
from these sales with which to operate. The Koreans dressed in Korean traditional clothing in
white, so much so that the Russian nationalists called them the “white swans,” referring to the
wide bulky white coats and pants Koreans wore.307 They built schools to educate their young and
mold them into Koreans in the exiled community of diaspora in Manchuria, as will be discussed
in the next section.
c. Later Arrivals to Manchuria from Korea, 1899It was on February 18, 1899, when a group of five families of scholarly reputation from
Chongsung in Hamgyong Province, the northern-most province of Korea, decided to make a
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move north to Manchuria.308 They purchased 6,000,000 pyung ( ) of lands, and formed a new
village which they called Jangjae-chon (

) in the district of Myungdong ( 東, Bright

East), approximately 100 li (equivalent to 24.4 miles) away from Hoeryung in Hamgyong
Province in Korea.309
The leader of this community, Kim Yak-yun (金

), was the first-born in a family of

fifteen generations in military service. Due to the discriminatory practice of putting civil service
above the military, coupled with geographic discrimination in Korea, Kim’s ancestors were not
able to advance in Korean society despite their being from the yangban class and their successful
passage in the government examination. Kim, lamenting that the country was riddled with social
injustice and offered no prospect of social mobility to people, even through education in remote
regions such as Hamgyungdo, decided to take his household and emigrate to Kando in search of
a new life. 310
The Kim family of 94 members from two branches, along with the Moon family of 40,
and the Nam family of 7 with guides and interpreters crossed the still-frozen Tumen River on
February 18, 1899.311 The group comprising 142 people of 25 different households formed a
transnational diaspora of Koreans on a significant scale. This community served as one of the
main hubs of Korean education, culture and customs, and military training in Manchuria in the
coming decades throughout the period of Japanese colonial occupation. Out of this community
came one of Korea’s most famous poets, Yoon Dong-Ju, and Christian leader Moon Ik-Hwan,
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among others. Heads of these five families were revered as ‘Five Wise Men (

)’ among the

Koreans in Manchuria.312
Of the massive property, approximately 6,000,000 pyong (2,000 hectars), as shown in
Figure 83 in Conclusion, the five families purchased together at arrival in 1899, one percent was
set aside to build and support a school later, while irrigating and cultivating the rest in
agricultural activities which helped the community prosper rapidly.313 The scale of their property
was equivalent to chun-il-gyung (

耕), i.e. an expanse of farmland that would take one cow

one thousand days to irrigate, in the Korean farmers way of measuring farmlands.314 Since the
majority of the Koreans who migrated to Kando were “landless peasants who wanted to escape
poverty and debt,” such a remarkable piece of land in Myungdong-chon provided a rich base of
agricultural development and welfare of the community.315 Even before the community was able
to build and open a school, called Myungdon Suhsook ( 東

), in 1908, informal classrooms

called sudang ( 堂) were set up to teach the children of the community the Korean and Chinese
languages and classics as early as in 1901.
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(Figure 20: Korean children in Su-dang learning to read, circa 1901. Courtesy of The Memorial
Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)316
In 1901, shortly upon arrival, a traditional Korean school, sudang ( 堂), was opened by
Kim Yak-yun, the patriarch and leader of the group. In figure 20, one sees how children were
taught to read and write, kneeling on their knees, which is the traditional Korean way of sitting
down and showing respect for the elders. There was a teaching scholar in full Korean attire,
headgear of a top knot and a tall black hat. Within two years of his arrival, Kim had a house built
with a tiled roof, not a thatched roof, around which the original five families built their homes
and lived in clusters.317
Kim opened a school, called Kyu-Am Jae (圭
1901, as So-Am Kim Ha-gyu opened So-Am Jae (
Jae ( 龍

) after his own pen name, Kyu-Am, in
) and Nam Wi-un opened Oh-Ryong

).318 Kyu-Am Jae also housed a library of several hundred titles of Chinese classics.

There were 42 students enrolled in the school by the time Kyu-Am Jae changed its name to
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Myungdong-Suhsook in 1908.319 Chapter III will discuss how these Korean-established schools
and their efforts to breathe patriotic nationalism into the younger generation in Manchuria and
the RFE.
The patterns of Koreans transnational migrants to Manchuria changed somewhat from the
earlier period to later. Whereas the early migrants went to Manchuria mainly for economic
reasons—in need of food for their families who were hungry—the later arrivals were motivated
more for social advancement and land ownership at the promise of vast empty lands in need of
cultivation as well as for political reasons. The increasing level of Korean population in
Manchuria, Kando in particular, signaled such a change to come in the political environment in
Korea as the Japanese-Russian relationship worsened.
Conclusion
Although it is extremely challenging to obtain accurate statistical data on the population
of Koreans in the RFE and Manchuria from the 1860s to 1940, a comparative table of the Korean
population in the RFE and Manchuria, has been compiled from a number of sources and
provided in Figure 21 below:
Year
1863
1867
1869
1881/2
1892/4
1897
1904
1906/7
1910
1916/7
1920

Koreans (RFE)
13 (families)
1,801
3,321
10,137
16,564
23,000
32,410
34,399
54,076
81,825
106,000

Koreans (Manchuria)
(100,000?)
10,000
34,000
37,000
78,000
71,000
200,000
337,461
456,983
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1930
1936
1945

150,895
172,000
-

607,119
888,181
1,600,000

(Figure 21: Korean Population in the RFE and Manchuria by Year)320
As will be discussed in Chapter II, rifts of allegiance started to set in between the early
pioneers who achieved financial security after decades of hard work and the new arrivals from a
declining nation of Korea. Regardless of these divides, Koreans, rich or poor, yangban or
sangnom, educated or uneducated, the haves or the have-nots, the subjects of Russia or China or
the stateless, all of whom have taken their difficult journeys from the land of ‘known deaths’ to
the land of ‘unknown deaths’—giji ui saji ro buto miji ui saji ro—were in search of
opportunity.321
As much as they shared commonalities between the Korean migration to Manchuria and
the RFE—in the way they packed up and crossed the borders in large groups—those in
Manchuria showed closer connections to their compatriots back home in Korea. They seemed to
preserve their Koreanness and the Korean ways of living more than their counterparts in the
RFE. Perhaps, it was due to the higher racial tensions felt more in the RFE than in Manchuria.
In the upcoming colonial undertakings of Japanese imperialistic endeavors—the RussoJapanese War and the annexation of Korea—the Korean migrant population in the Russian Far
East and Manchuria felt obligated to choose between the role of opponents and proponents for
their survival as a transnational people. At this juncture, the Korean transnational migration to
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the Russian Far East and Manchuria transformed from economic to political in nature. In the next
chapter, the focus will be placed on the participation of Korean transnationals in the Russian and
the Japanese militaries, either as intelligence and counterintelligence agents or militant guncarrying soldiers on either side of the War.
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CHAPTER II. KOREANS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
As many are the stars in the sky,
So are the many dreams in my heart.
The second stanza of the Song of Arirang continues to express the sorrowful yearning for as
many dreams as there are stars in the sky. Those who left home and found new lands to call
home were filled with many hopes for the future. These members of the diaspora also missed
their loved ones back home. Some hoped to stay connected with them by looking at the same sky
thousands of li apart. As Korean transnationals faced a war of conflicts between their old and
new-found homelands, the Russo-Japanese War, they became torn between many sorrowful
thoughts and hopeful dreams for the future in Korea and abroad.
One key event that led to the Russo-Japanese War involved the Korean Declaration of
Neutrality by Korean Emperor Gojong of Taehan Cheguk (大

國 = Great Korean Empire).

Emperor Gojong’s declaration of the country’s neutrality in foreign relations on January 21,
1904 has not been studied much, as this policy failed to garner recognition by other nations.
However, the document contributed to the eruption of a war between Russia and Japan.322
After discussing this declaration, as well as the buildup to the war on both the Japanese
and Russian sides, this chapter will discuss the hurriedly-established Korea-Japan Protocol by
the Japanese Imperial government in 1904, then Korean involvement on both sides of this
foreign war fought on their homeland. Korean transnationals rose up from their respective
diasporas to guard their old homeland in a number of ways.
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Korean Declaration of Neutrality, 1904
Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, King Gojong had been contemplating
the neutralization of Korea, which may explain the “Otori report of 1894” shown below.

(Figure 22: Telegram by Otori of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated August 16 and
September 2, 1894)323
This exchange of telegrams between Mutsu Munemitsu, Japan’s Foreign Minister, and Japanese
Minister in Seoul Otori Keisuke (大

圭介) starts with the image on the right, dated August 16,

1894.
Telegram Sent No. 591-594 to Britain, America, France through Russia (3) and directly
to “House to Tribune” (3)
A remarkable fact has come to light that on the occasion of Asan engagement a few
Corean soldiers accompanied Japanese troops by special order of the King of Corea.
Some fled but most of them fought with great bravery. [signed by] Mutsu, Aug. 16, 1894.
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This message was a response from Otori Keisuke, signed “大島”, to Mutsu as wired in Seoul at
10:25 p.m. on September 2, 1894 and received in Tokyo at 1:00 p.m. the following day.
Telegram Received No. 723 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.
Fifty? Corean soldiers under the command of 渡
軍
[Watanabe Ryukun Shoja]
started [on September 2] for the north to fight Chinese with
軍
(Lieutenant
General). [signed by] 大島 [Otori]. Received Sept. 3, 1894, 1 p.m.
The telegram on the right, sent by Mutsu to Otori, stated that the Korean soldiers were ordered to
march with the Japanese by King Gojong. The message was wired to the governments of
England, the U.S., France, and Russia in a separate direct transmission.324 The existence of such
documents regarding fifty or so Korean soldiers marching up north with Japanese troops under
the command of a Japanese Lieutenant General Watanabe in the heat of the Sino-Japanese War
in August 1894, ten years earlier than 1904, is quite remarkable in the context of the thesis of this
dissertation—Korean soldiers in the Japanese military prior to World War II.
In the 2000s and the 2010s, historians such as Sang Pil Jin, Peter Duus, and Park Chonghyo shed light on the diplomatic maneuvering by Russia and Japan on the issues of Korea’s
neutrality to secure their commercial interests in Korea and Manchuria respectively.325 This
section will focus on the Declaration’s ramifications on the Japanese deployment of Korean
nationals in the Russo-Japanese War and Japan’s annexation of Korea. Primary sources, such as
Japan Gaiko Bunsho [

交

], the official records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Japan, provide valuable insights on the subject, more specifically in the 37th year of Meiji era in
1904.
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Gojong was well aware that the Korean military force of 25,200 could be of no
comparison to the 180,000-men-strong Japanese army and the Russian army of over one million
men with the navy ranking fourth in total tonnage in the world in 1904.326 And Gojong believed
he might be able to protect his country’s independence by declaring neutrality and staying out of
the military conflicts between Japan, Russia, and the U.S. in their competition over commercial
interests in Manchuria. The development and implementation of Gojong’s neutralization plan
was aided by several of his confidants, of whom an American William F. Sands was selected and
put in charge to push forward.327
Emperor Gojong dispatched a personal letter to Russian Emperor Nikolai II asking for his
consent for neutralization via Colonel Hyun Sang-keun (

建) in November 1903. Colonel

Hyun was given a chance to deliver Gojong’s letter to Nikolai II in person and received the
Tsar’s confirmation of Russia’s support for Korea’s bid for neutralization on the spot.328 Hyun
delivered Nikolai II’s letter of support to Gojong upon his return to Seoul on January 12, 1904.
Nikolai II, under the advisement of his ministers, Sergei Witte, A. I. Pavlov, and Foreign
Minister B. H. Ramzdorf, believed that Korea’s neutralization under the joint guarantee of Japan,
Russia, and the U.S. would help protect Russia’s concessions secured in Korea without military
involvement.
Over 20 memoranda were exchanged between Russia’s Commander-in-Chief General
Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, Minister Pavlov, General Alekseev, Russia’s Minister in Japan
R. R. Rosen, Foreign Minister V. Ramsdorff, and Emperor Nikolai II in 1903-1904, as found in
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Russian National Archive of Military Documents (РГΒИА, No. 165).329 These internal memos
exhibited the serious intentions of Russia to maintain, if not acquire more commercial interests
on railway concessions, forestry rights in the Yalu river region, and military defense capabilities
in the border regions in Korea and Manchuria. The urgency felt by Russia on the situation
brewing on Korean Peninsula was tantamount, as expressed by Commander Alexei Nikolaievich
Kuropatkin who warned of Russia’s defeat and opposed the military option.330 Kuropatkin
shared this recollection in his memoir:
Our final border meets Chosun which has 80,000 square miles of land, populated with 11
million people, of which are 2,000-10,000 Chinese, 45-55,000 Japanese, and 300
Europeans….We (Russia) may not need to absorb Chosun ourselves but must make sure
Chosun remains sovereign and independent of Japan or any other powers.331 (Author’s
translation)
Being well aware of Japan’s military power, however, Kuropatkin had hoped to avoid military
conflicts with Japan over Korea as one of the “nine countries” that shared 11,000 miles of
borders with Russia.
Gojong then reached out to the Russian Minister in Seoul, Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov,
for assistance in finding refuge or exile for himself, if needed.332 However, this plea by Gojong
was simply ignored, as Russia was neither about to give up Manchuria in exchange of Korea—
"Man-Kan kokan” (

交

)—nor willing to repeat the previous incident of offering a refuge

to Gojong in the Russian legation, known as Agwan pachon ( 館

), in 1896-1897.333 This

incident of Agwan pachon had occurred then due to Gojong feeling threatened in his own palace
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where his Queen Min was recently brutally murdered and burnt beyond recognition, suspectedly
by a group of thirty Japanese swordsmen at 3 a.m. on October 8, 1895.334
Queen Min, the “one powerful piece that still remained on the chessboard,” was being
counseled by General Charles Legendre, the Russian Minister Karl Ivanovich Waeber, and Prime
Minister Pak Yông-hyo. She tried to maintain good relationships with Russia and America and
had been seen as threatening to the Japanese monopoly over Korea. Threatened by the Queen’s
move, Japan appointed a new minister, Miura Goro, a hard-liner, who was suspected to have
come on “if not specific orders to get rid of the Queen, a mandate for decisive action” to “deal
with the fox.”335 The fox was the Queen. The controversy over the event continues today for lack
of evidence.
A long chain of Diplomatic Dispatch Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 was
exchanged regarding the death of Queen Min. Horace Allen, Secretary to the U.S. Minister Sill
in Korea made a plea to investigate the matter. The State Department instructed Allen and Sill to
stay out of it. The exchange demonstrated Korea’s importance, or lack-there-of, in the U.S.
foreign relationship with Korea versus Japan at the time.336 While the local officials of foreign
governments felt the urge to help out, the U.S. government was not about to disrupt its
diplomatic relationship with Japan over a controversial death of a queen of an insignificant
nation. The disjointed nature of responses among the U.S. officials in Korea versus the State
Department can be detected from these pieces of communication as well as confirmed in the
execution of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.
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Since all of telegram communication channels in and out of Korea were under Japanese
control and censorship by then, Gojong decided to make the announcement of neutralization by
way of the French Consulate in Shanghai. Minister Pavlov helped by relaying the Declaration
document to G. A. Plençon at the French Consulate in Chefu, China, whereby it was dispatched
to all foreign governments on January 12, 1904. This Franco-Russian cooperation in
disseminating the Declaration with no possibility of military backing by France in counter to the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, secured by British military assistance, was seen as “little more than
words on paper” by historians such as Chong Hyo Park.337
In reaction, the U.S. Minister to Korea Horace Allen conjectured that the U.S. would be
“highly likely” to respond to the proposal “unfavorably” and would choose to adhere to the
Monroe Doctrine of “national autonomy and self-determination of peoples” and maintain
neutrality on the subject.338 Russian Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro instructed
Minister Hayashi Gonsuke in London to “inform British Government under strict confidence” as
to the opinion of Japanese Government that
The neutralization of such a state as Corea which has neither the power for self protection
nor the organization for proper administration[,] cannot be guaranteed without a previous
understanding….339
In the eyes of all parties involved, Korea was seen too powerless to defend itself either militarily
or politically. Such a declaration of neutralization would have little impact or influence on
international relations. Hence, the message was ignored. Only Gojong’s personal letter sent to
the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was responded to favorably on February 28. The Italian
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message came too late. The Japanese Army entered Korea on February 8 and the Korea-Japan
Protocol took effect on February 23, 1904.340
In the announcement of the Declaration of Neutralization, Gojong was recorded to have
declared to “all nations” that Korea will take the position of neutrality in case of war between
Japan and Russia:
각 국에 선언하기를, ‘장차 일본과 러시아가 전쟁을 할 때 우리 나라는 관계하지
않고 중립을 지킨다’고 하였다.341
I hereby declare to all nations that Korea will maintain neutrality in the event of war
between Japan and Russia. (Author’s translation)
This is how Gojong declared the wartime neutrality on January 21, 1904, in Chefoo, China
(current day Yantai), in the name of Yi Jiyong, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea. Japan and
other foreign governments were nearly simultaneously notified—after the fact—by a telegram
which read:
In view of the complications which have sprung up between Russia and Japan and in
view of the difficulties which negotiations seem to encounter in bringing about a pacific
solution, the Corean Govt. by order of H.M. the Emperor, declares that it has taken the
firm resolution of observing the most strict neutrality whatever may be the result of the
pourparlers actually engaged between the two powers.342
This defensive attempt of Emperor Gojong was met with mixed reactions. The Declaration took
Japan by surprise and blindsided, not having been consulted before the announcement was made
by the Korean Emperor Gojong. Japan chose to ignore this message and not respond to it. The
plan was accepted by Russia but refused by Britain, who was Japan’s ally at the time and bound
by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty with reciprocal assistance to be provided in case of military
conflict on either country.343
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The Declaration, however, was entirely ignored by the U.S.—Korea’s ally—despite
being bound by the U.S.-Korean Treaty which also came with a good offices clause to act in case
of foreign invasion on either country.344 The U.S., given the “pro-Japan sentiments” and strong
interest in the Philippines of President Roosevelt, never responded to the Korean neutrality
announcement.345
In the meantime, China declared its neutrality to keep its doors open to the U.S. in the
event of a conflict between Russia and Japan over Korea, as confirmed and accepted by the U.S.:
Mr. Griscom to Baron Komura, Tokyo, March 16, 1904.
Mr. Minister: I have the honor to inform your excellency that Mr. Conger, minister of the
United States at Peking, has informed the Department of State at Washington that the
Chinese Government…is resolved to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality, and that
provocation will not be offered either belligerent. Lloyd Griscom.346
Thereby, Japan became the only other country willing and poised to fight Russia for the control
of Korea. Assurances from China, the United States, and other major powers not to interfere in
the matter also demonstrated the geo-political environment which favored Japan over Korea in
the international arena.
Historian Tyler Bennett argued, “From the outset President Roosevelt’s sympathies were
with Japan” in respecting China’s neutrality to prevent “undue excitement and disturbance of the
Chinese people.”347 By sending copies of Secretary Hay’s memo addressed to “the belligerents
and to China February 20th” on the above point, “the American Government showed its concern
for China and at the same time made no mention of Korea,” wrote Dennett.348
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While other nations looked on, unpredictable but fierce jockeying escalated between
Russia and Japan for hegemony over Korea and Manchuria. With the issues of neutrality out of
the way, Japan proceeded with its preparation for a war with Russia in full speed while the
Korean government was preoccupied with its usual factional chasms. Koreans in the
transnational diasporas were uninformed of the impeding war which was to affect their lives
directly.
Buildup to the Russo-Japanese War
Until 1904, Korea was a distant frontier that had remained mostly invisible to the Russian
public. Known to Russians simply as a “strange country” in the Far Eastern corner, Russia had
“ill-considered and inconsistent relations with the local population” of Korea, meaning Russians
had no particular interest in the small country at the far-east corner of Asia.349
Only in 1900 when the Ministry of Finance published a 1,250-page tome, “Description of
Korea” in three parts, was the distant small country of Korea introduced as “an object of
common interest for the mass reader,” supplemented by sporadic reports in the news media and
travelogues of occasional eyewitnesses.350 Korea emerged as a land of strategic importance for
military operations “from a purely utilitarian perspective” for “troop lodging” and “resource
collecting” at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.351
In fact, before the war Russia was ready to concede Korea in exchange for Manchuria, a
position favored by Russian Foreign Minister Ramzdorf (B. Н. Ламэдорф), as seen in secret
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correspondences from Ramzdorf to the Russian Emperor on January 18, 1904.352 Ramzdorf
maintained the position of keeping “Manchuria in exchange of Korea” repeatedly in his memos
and advocated the neutralization of Korea.353
Earlier in 1900, Russia invaded and forced the Chinese government to lease part of
Liaodong Peninsula so that the new Trans-Siberian Railway could be extended from Harbin
through Mukden to Port Arthur in three northeastern provinces of Manchuria: Heilunjiang
( 龍江 ), Jilin (吉
Shenyang or Muktien (

), and Fengtien (

), with Harbin ((

), Yanji ( 吉), and

) serving as regional centers.354 The Trans-Siberian Railway was

constructed between 1891 and 1903 by Russia.355 Through these railway extensions as illustrated
in Figure 23 (below), Russia came to own the world’s longest railway system connecting St.
Petersburg and Moscow on the western end to Vladivostok on the east end at the Pacific Ocean.
Russia did not want to lose Manchuria in exchange for Korea in 1904. However, Russia lost its
rights over Manchuria to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and Japan swiftly
established the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) Company in 1906.356
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(Figure 23: Map of Trans-Siberian Railway. Courtesy of Frontiers of Travel, 1956)
As discussed in the Introduction, the 1895 Triple Intervention pressed Japan into
relinquishing its claims to the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur to Russia. This event enraged
Japan and provided the foundations for the country to engage in the Russo-Japanese War.357On
February 8, 1904, two weeks after Korea’s Declaration of Neutrality, Japan raised a surprise
attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur (Dalien) without any advance announcement and
declared the Russo-Japanese War belatedly on February 10—two days after the attack. On
February 9, the Japanese Navy won another victory in the harbors of Chemulpo (Incheon) and its
Army marched right into Seoul, prompting the Russian Minister Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov (A.
И. Павлов) to evacuate from Seoul and flee the country in a hurry.358

357

Daniel A. Métraux, The Asian Writings of Jack London: Essays, Letters, Newspaper Dispatches, and Short
Fiction by Jack London (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), 11.
358
심헌용 (Heonyong Sim), 한반도에서 전개된 러일전쟁 연구 [A Study of the Russo-Japanese War on the Korean
Peninsula] (서울: 국방부 군사편찬연구소 [Seoul: Ministry of National Defense], 2011), 74-75.

118

a. War Preparedness
In the courtyard of the palace of Korean Emperor Gojong in the early days of 1904, Yi Yong
Ik, the Supreme Minister of Korea, exclaimed to British journalist Frederick A. McKenzie during
an interview just a few days before the war broke out: “We believe there will be peace….There
will be no war!”359 All the while Japanese ships, loaded fully with armed men, were gathering up
from Tsushima and Russian soldiers were assembled at Port Arthur.
Yi and other Korean ministers trusted Russia would protect Korea and Gojong’s court,
even as the British and American businessmen were fleeing the peninsula and setting up
businesses in Shanghai from 1900 to 1904. Such a misguided belief in their trusted allies to stand
by Korea among the Korean leaders kept the country in the dark until the end and doomed for the
colossal disaster. From top officials to poor commoners, the nation of Korea was utterly
unprepared for the upcoming war, which eventually led to the final collapse of the Yi Dynasty.
The striking differences between the Japanese, the Russians, and the Koreans in their
anticipation and preparation of the upcoming turmoil, or lack-there-of, can be seen in
McKenzie’s report below regarding the Japanese military whom he accompanied as the troops
marched up to the north to face the Russians in May 1904.
The Japanese knew not merely every road, but apparently every person…The Japanese
knew the land. Each officer had in his pouch an accurate and minute map of the part he
was working in. When a battalion marched into a village it found on the borders a clean
hoarding, with a map on it showing every house, every pathway, and bivouacs for all the
soldiers. Doctors went ahead of the troops and tested each well and stream, marking
them…. Even before the landing at Chemulpho, a number of quiet men had gone in
civilian clothes to the villages and taken up their places there. The Japanese living
nearby, dressed as coolies but armed with regulation rifles and bayonets, suddenly
appeared on the streets. Their leader now put on his officer’s war uniform…and took the
possession of a temple or a palace.360
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As McKenzie noted and as seen in the images below, a folded map of the Korean peninsula was
supposedly carried in every officer’s pouch, showing every little town and regional terrain to
guide the Japanese troops. The map, accompanied by A Catalogue of the Romanized
Geographical Names of Korea, had been compiled by Dr. B. Soto and S. Kanazawa, published
by the University of Tokyo in 1903.

(Figure 24. Dr. Koto’s General Map of Korea)361 (Figure 25. The Map, unfolded)
American diplomat C.A.W. Pownall pointed out “the existence of a detailed map
covering the whole region of Korea, Manchuria…with the roads all marked, the contours of the
hills” given to him that “furnishes evidence of the long-cherished design to invade China…a
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deliberate and carefully planned invasion” of Japan.362 This statement reaffirms McKenzie’s
report of “Each officer” carrying “in his pouch an accurate and minute map” of every village,
“showing every house, every pathway, and bivouacs” while the troops advanced to the north in
1904.363 This level of preparedness of Japanese military officers, as noticed by McKenzie and
other western observers, was the result of a Japanese military that had been busily engaged in
researching and producing geological surveys of Korean peninsula in great detail for decades
before the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars.
There had been clandestine Japanese reconnaissance geographic surveys on Korea
performed by members of the General Staff Office (GSO) of the Japanese Army on secret
missions to collect geographic and military information and to infiltrate through the southern
ports of Korea in the 1870s.364One such activity was carried out in September 1872 by members
of diplomat Hanabusa’s entourage, Kitamura and Beppu, as the “first intelligence operation on
record undertaken by the Japanese military in Korea” as cited by historian Young-woo Nam.365
Nam noted of “about ten military officers to Korea for language training as a way of establishing
an intelligence network to collect secret information.”366
Another publication which exemplified copiously-taken research findings and
cartographical studies the Japanese military government had conducted and produced is that of
“

國

圖

[Top Secret Map of Korea 20,000:1]” authorized by the Minister of
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Japanese Army in Meiji 37, 1904.367 According to the archive of the Japan Center for Asian
Historical Records (JACAR), the Ministry of War Kobun Roku (公

錄) contains 40+ official

documents transferred between Dajokan and the Ministry of War between 1872 and 1875,
regarding the subject of dispatching personnel to Korea.368
The role of Koreans in this type of mapping and documenting by reconnaissance and
field work can also be seen in official reports, archived in the National Archives of Japan,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One such report, A01100103500, entitled “Report on former Korean
national Kim Rin-sung (the Japanese pronunciation of 金

) of the ministry on dispatch to

Korea to accompany Minister Resident extraordinary and plenipotentiary Kuroda on trip to
Korea” substantiates this claim.369
Report A01100100700 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows an initial inquiry about
hiring a “Russian national and former Korean national Kim Rin-sung” submitted on July 13,
1875.370 The subsequent report, A01100103500, shows the approval by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to hire Kim In-sung, a native of Hamheung, Hamgyongdo, for three months at “one yen
per day (

金

)” on December 15, 1875. (See Figure 26 below.) Given the fact that this

was shortly before the Kanghwa Treaty was established in 1876, one can see the purpose of
hiring a Korean in preparation of the negotiation. The Kanghwa Treaty was “Korea’s first
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modern treaty” of coming out of long seclusion into the international stage, engineered by Japan
to seize the opportunity to open Pusan and two other ports for trading with exclusive privileges
to Japanese merchants.371

(Figure 26: Inquiry and approval to hire Kim Rin-sung at one yen per day for three months.)
Using Koreans in such a mapping expedition to survey the peninsula and borderland is
significant due to their familiarity in the local geography and customs, as well as in the use of
Korean and Russian languages. Moreover, in the case of Kim In-sung who was born in Korea,
migrated to Russia, and was naturalized as a Russian citizen, he would have met all the
qualifications to pass as a Korean without raising any suspicion of the locals. He was a
transnational who looked like a Korean, understood the local Korean and Russian customs and
lifestyles, and could communicate in both Korean and Russian languages. With Kim’s assistance
and perhaps many others on these mapping expeditions, Japanese military was well-prepared to
fight a war against Russia to claim Japan’s monopoly over the Korean peninsula as it did by the
Sino-Japanese War a decade earlier.

371

Eckhert, et al., Korea Old and New, 200.

123

b. Japanese Interests in the Korean Physique
The Japanese military also spent time researching the physical attributes of Korean men in
the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s—long before the Japanese annexation of Korea—to evaluate the
suitability of deploying Korean men in their military activities. Several such studies have been
quoted and further analyzed by anthropologists, medical professionals, and historians, such as
Gill In-sung in the late 1990s, as well as Soon-yung Park and Cho Young-Jun in the 2010s.372
One of the earlier documented physical examinations was performed by a Japanese
military medical officer, Koike Masanao (
worked in Che-saing Medical Clinic (

), Surgeon General of Japanese Army, who
) in Busan from 1883 to 1885. In his findings

published in a 1887 book titled Gyerim uisa [鷄

], Koike reported that his 75 Korean male

subjects, between the ages of 20 and 60 (average age of 31), were of an average height of
179.947 cm, weight of 60.73 kg, chest girth of 83 cm, lung capacity of 3,373,467, and grasping
power of 170:162 (right:left).373 Another set of measurements of 140 Koreans taken by Japanese
Army surgeons stationed in Korea, Mikita (

軍

) and Ôtska (大

), were

tabulated and presented in their “Summarized Report on the Physical Examination of Koreans
[

格

覽 ]” in 1895 and submitted to Ishiguro Tadanori (

) who served

as Minister of Field Hygiene during the Sino-Japanese War.374 They reported the heights of
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1,645 mm (20-25 years of age), 1,609 mm (26-30), 1,609 mm (31-40), and 1,636 mm (41-55).375
Compared to the relatively small sampling size of 75 and 140 Koreans in reports produced in the
1880s and 1890s, the next set of examinations by Iijima Shigeru ( 島

), who served as

Japanese Army Surgeon General and Director of Army Medical School, in 1901 included
measurements of 3,051 men and 101 women, of which only the attributes of men were
recorded.376
The difference in the scale of sample sizes in the earlier studies prior to 1890, before the
Sino-Japanese War, and the markedly larger scope of studies performed in 1895 and the 1900s,
may be attributed to the presence of Japanese Army surgeons in Korea after the Sino-Japanese
War and the increased interest of the Japanese military in Korean men’s physical fitness. Koike
and Iijima compared the measurements of Koreans with those of Japanese and Westerners and
concluded that the Koreans were taller and stronger than the Japanese due to their carnivorous
Korean diet.377 Concluding that Koreans showed much healthier and stronger physical attributes
than the Japanese men in the “age group of 16 to 60,” Iijima recommended changes in the
Japanese diet.378
The significance of these research findings and observations of the physical and mental
attributes of Korean men for this dissertation lies not in the actual comparative figures or
characteristics resulting from the research but in the Japanese military officials’ motivation to
conduct such studies. Based on the findings and continual research of historians such as YoungJun Cho and Sun Young Pak conducted on the subject, one can safely suspect the Japanese
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interest in Korean men’s physical fitness and abilities to serve as part of the Japanese military
forces, either as reserve or regular soldiers.379
The next section will investigate how effectively Japan utilized these research findings
and geological information to help win the Russo-Japanese War as efficiently as it won the SinoJapanese War ten years earlier. Also examined will be how effectively Japan’s political system
helped to bring Korea into Japan’s imperial sphere of interest through its military success.
How the War Was Won
Ironically, Gojong’s Declaration of Neutrality helped to launch the Russo-Japanese War. The
Japanese military government was ready with meticulously-prepared surveys of Korean lands
and human resources to land and occupy the Korean peninsula swiftly at a moment’s notice. In
fact, Japan had left a few hundred troops to guardthe Japanese legation, which was set on fire
during the Soldier’s Riot of 1882 (Imo Kullan=

軍亂).This

incident erupted from a dispute

over the unpaid salaries and unequal treatment of the old traditional army, supported by the
Regent Taewongun, the father of Emperor Gojong, in favor of the new elite force, favored by
King Gojong.380 An explanation of Taewongun’s role in Emperor’s reign will follow later in the
chapter. Japanese troops were left intact after the riot ended, if not increased in numbers,
throughout the Tonghak uprisings of 1894 and the murder of Queen Min in 1895, and reactivated
as Hangook Chuchagun (

國

軍) in 1904. These soldiers were ready to serve as the

Japanese vehicle for an all-out war against Russia.
In contrast to the determined preparedness of the Japanese Empire and its military
administration, the Russian military and its commanders neither were ready nor knew how to
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utilize their available resources, human or material. The Russian commanders could not
effectively engage in a war with Japan at the time, as admitted by Russia’s Commanding General
Alexei Nikolaievich Kuropatkin in his 1908 memoir on the Russo-Japanese War.381 Although
Emperor Nicolas II wished to avoid a war with Japan, the negotiations involving his Foreign
Minister V.N. Ramsdorf and Russian Ambassador to Japan R. R. Rosen, led by the Far East
Commander Admiral E. I. Alexeieff on the Russian side, and Prime Minister Katsura Taro, elder
statesmen Inoue Kaoru, and Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro on the Japanese side from 1900 to
January 1904, failed to bring a peaceful resolution between the two nations with mutuallyconflicting ambitions.382
The three options on the table for negotiation between Japan and Russia were: 1)
partitioning of the Korean peninsula at the 39° line from Wonsan to Daedong River in
Pyongyang, 2) neutralization of Korea, and 3) “exchange of Manchuria for Korea” (mankan
kokan,

交

).383 Japan had been angered by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in 1900

and demanded Russia to return the region as well as sell the rights for the southern portion of the
Eastern Railway. However, as discussed earlier, Russia was reluctant to give up Manchuria.384
Unable to come to a resolution, the negotiations failed mostly due to the ignorance of Alexeieff
who did not understand how well-prepared Japan was to go to war against Russia.385
On February 8, 1904, one day before the Russian fleet was destroyed and two days before
the Russo-Japanese War was declared, the Japanese Army landed two brigades at Chumulpo and
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entered Seoul. At seven o’clock on February 9, 1904, McKenzie, who was among the few
correspondents who had made their way to Korea, reported that the Japanese Commander Mori
Gitaro had sent as the announcement and declaration of war to the Russian commanders aboard
the Variag (Варяг) and the Korietz (Корейцы=Korean). Within forty minutes, the battle was
over. Variag, a 6,500-ton boat, suffered heavy damage and casualties among the 107 men on
board. The Korietz was blown up by four o’clock in the afternoon.386
One day later, on February 10, 1904, the Japanese Imperial Proclamation of War
(

告) against Russia was issued and transmitted to London, Washington, Bangkok,

Peking, Seoul, and all other consulates with diplomatic relations with Japan. The following
message was sent out from 10:45 p.m. through midnight:
WE, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the
same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make proclamation to all Our loyal and
brave subjects as follows: WE hereby declare war against Russia, and WE command Our
Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and WE
also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their
duties and in accordance with their powers, to attain the national aim with all the means
within the limits of the law of nations….387
This Rescript of 1904 used the same verbiage as was used in the Declaration of War against
China in 1894, only replacing the word ‘China’ with ‘Russia’. The Rescript declared an all-out
total war with a national resolution to fight Russia who allegedly provoked Japan against their
will with open hostilities.
Upon the Japanese announcement of the Declaration of War against Russia, a mixed bag
of reactions came out in publications worldwide.388
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Sidney Low wrote “President Roosevelt Roosevelt’s Opportunities” in Nineteenth
Century and After, in December 1904: “…much more surprising things might happen than that
the foundations should be laid for a League of Peace, based on a genuine and effective AngloSaxon Alliance, before it is time for him [Roosevelt] to quit the Executive Mansion,” urging
Roosevelt to finish the job of expanding into Asia.389
An article in The National Review professed that “America is therefore bound to do
everything in her power to maintain the principles of the integrity of China and the Open Door”
policy of the U.S., and that “These three states are bound together by the force of
circumstances….”390 Although the article seemed to point to China, Japan, and Russia by “These
three states,” there were multiple states’ interests, commercial and political, conflicting with each
other over the fate of one small country—Korea. The stage was all set for Japan’s escalation to
war to accomplish its long ambition to claim Korea as its stepping stone toward China and the
continent of Asia as well as into Russia.
Korea-Japan Protocol [

] and Russia’s Stance on the War with Japan

Invoking Article Four of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904 (quoted below), Japan demanded
the Imperial Government of Korea to “give full facilities to promote the action of the Imperial
Japanese Government” and started to requisition all necessary resources, human or material or
land, as the “circumstances require it… from strategical points of view.”391 To this end, Japan
announced that all railways connecting Seoul to Wonsan, Busan, Incheon, and Pyong-yang were
to be under the military jurisdiction of Hangook Chuchagun and any violators would be executed
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at the discretion of the Japanese Commander.392 Requisitioning of lands started immediately as
well. With the war well underway, the Japanese government took next steps to engineer the
Korea-Japan Protocol and lay the foundation to make Korea its protectorate, a step closer to the
annexation.
By a telegram sent to Durham White Stevens, a former American employee at the
Foreign Ministry of Japan, Japanese Minister Komura made an offer on August 21 which was
accepted by Stevens on August 22, 1904 to serve as a diplomatic adviser for all “matters
affecting foreign relations” in Emperor Gojong’s government.393 The Korean Emperor was to
pay Stevens all expenses including the salary of “800 yen in gold per month” and “a suitable
official residence” or “the sum of 100 yen in gold per month” for housing allowance for “an
indefinite period.”394
Along with Stevens as a diplomatic adviser to Korean Emperor Gojong, the Japanese
government appointed its own people in various advisory roles in Gojong’s court: Megata Jutaro
as police adviser, Kato Masuo an adviser to the Korean court, and Nozu Shigetake military
adviser—all with “powers…quite sweeping” that “widened Japanese influence over the central
government” of Korea long before the Russo-Japanese War ended.395 This way, Japan was deep
in control of Korean affairs in nearly every aspect. Emperor Gojong was reduced to a puppet
monarch five years before the official annexation of his country by Japan in 1910.
Hayashi Gonsuke ( 權

), the Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea under the

direction of Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutaro, took quick action to engineer the Korea-
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Japan Protocol (

, as Japan called it) with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea Yi

Jiyong’s signature on February 23.396 The Protocol with six Articles “looked like a ‘protectorate
treaty’ to Horace N. Allen, Peter Duus, and other scholars.397 The policy was written in such a
way to give Japan “the right to intervene in Korean foreign policy” and the “permission for the
Japanese military to seize Korean land” as deemed strategically necessary with a plan of
sweeping military intrusion and comprehensive control of Korea.398 The text of the Protocol
stated:
Article I. For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan
and Corea and firmly establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of
Corea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the
advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration.
….
Article IV. In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Corea or the territorial integrity
of Corea is endangered by aggression of a third Power or internal disturbances, the
Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as the
circumstances require, and in such cases the Imperial Government of Corea shall give full
facilities to promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government. The Imperial
Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the above-mentioned object, occupy,
when the circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategical
points of view.399
In the name of peace-keeping and friendship between Japan and Korea, the Japanese
Government secured a complete control of the Korean affairs, internal and external, as laid out in
the six articles of this Protocol.
Based on the Guidelines (對

) established by the Japanese Diet in 1904 and based

on the Article IV of the Japan-Korea Treaty quoted above, the Chuchagun occupied major
districts of Seoul, Pyong-yang and Uiju, a total of 9,750,000 pyung ( ) (approximately 800
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acres) of land for their military use.400 The Guidelines also required Emperor Gojong to appoint
high officials to serve on the Welcome Committee ( 待

), as well as in military actions,

intelligence work, and civil matters to assist the Japanese military.
By this Protocol, Gojong not only agreed to let Japan use the peninsula as the battle zone
for the Russo-Japanese War but also inadvertently violated his own declaration of wartime
neutrality which forbid “the use of a neutral state’s territory as a military base for a belligerent—
and thus its neutrality declaration ran aground.”401The Protocol granted the Japanese
Government the right to requisition the use of Korean land, military horses and personnel to
transport army supplies, as well as “engage as many Korean officials and employees as possible”
during the Russo-Japanese War.402 This last clause on the possible engagement of “as many
Korean officials and employees” left it open for the Japanese military to deploy Korean soldiers
as well as laborers in their military activities during the War.403
The Korea-Japan Protocol, a de-facto treaty of annexation, was adopted by the Katsura
cabinet of Japan and formulated into the “Japanese Policy Toward Korea
[對

對

綱

決 件]” by the genro [

]—unofficial but extraconstitutional

council of Japanese elderly statesmen serving as advisors to the Emperor—on May 31, 1904.404
The Policy was declared as the Japanese Empire’s official Guidelines toward Korea—
" 國ﾉ對

綱

”— in the name of peace-keeping in Asia on the pretext that the “security of
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Korea [ 國ﾉ

]” was tantamount to the security of the Japanese Empire and other nations in

the region.405
The Guidelines firmly established Japan’s official policies in six areas: 1) Japanese
military and naval bases to be established in Korea, 2) Japanese Government to oversee all
matters of foreign affairs and 3) government finances of Korea, 4) Japanese control of Korean
railway transportation systems to be completed for the Seoul-Pusan, Seoul-Incheon, SeoulWonsan, and Seoul-Masan lines, 5) as well as the communication systems of telegraph,
telephone, and postal services, and 6) the economic development of agriculture, timber, and
forestry in the Tumen and Yalu River regions of northern Korea. The Guidelines also called for
exploration of high-quality mines and new land for cultivation with rights of Japanese settlers to
own or lease properties, publicly- or privately-held, beyond the treaty zones, as well as take
control over the fishery business, the second largest asset in Korea to farming.406
Based on the 1904 Japan-Korea Protocol, as described above, a second Japan-Korea
Protocol was signed on November 15, 1905, which Japan was accused of having forced on the
Korean Emperor Gojong. This Protocol, referred to by Koreans as Ulsa Nukyak (

,

meaning a Forced Agreement of the Year of Ulsa), was allegedly engineered by “five traitors”
including Yi Wan-yong who gave their consent to the agreement, which gave away Korea as a
protectorate of Japan.407 In such an environment of geopolitical conflicts and national turmoil the
Korean transnationals in the RFE and Manchuria soon had to decide with which nationalist
entities to direct their allegiance when the Russo-Japanese War erupted in 1904. The next few
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sections in this chapter will demonstrate how these transnationals chose their camps and what
they did to direct their loyalties in various roles they played.
Koreans in the Japanese Army—Seen by Western Observers
During his five months’ stay in Korea, American novelist Jack London (1876-1916), who
was dispatched to Korea as a war correspondent by The San Francisco Examiner, left many
intriguing narratives of his time in the northern region of Korea as he accompanied the Japanese
army. London’s newspaper reports, personal letters to Charmian Kittredge, his fiancée at the
time, and other articles, along with hundreds of photographs he personally took during his trip
provided rare glimpses of the scenes and sights of pre-modern Korea and its people as seen
through London’s American eyes.
Through the words of sympathy and disdain sprinkled with humor and wit, London wrote
about the low-class Korean laborers, peasants, and their children whom he met as he traveled
with an entourage of hired hands—the coolies as London called them—and onlookers who
marveled over the first white man seen in remote villages in 1904. Some of the observations
London made regarding the Japanese military soldiers and their war strategies raised poignant
questions on the nature of the Russo-Japanese War being fought in Korea and the identity of
people deployed in the Japanese army.
Firstly, London’s article in the San Francisco Examiner on April 18, 1904, with
headlines of “How the Japanese ‘sore feets’ got along” and “Footsore. Dazed and Frozen. The
Japanese Trudge through Korea” revealed the conditions of the Japanese soldiers, many of whom
were in dire need of medical care for their sore feet. “But the sore feet! Fully 90 per cent of the
cases were of that nature,” wrote London.408 The Japanese army doctors attributed the problem to
408
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the soldiers having had to march in the “harsh leather boot of the West” when they had been used
to the straw-woven sandals all their lives. The doctors told the soldiers: “Before you were merely
a reserve, now you are a soldier.”409 London continued to report, “These men, used to the straw
sandal all their lives, had been summoned to join their colors to incase their feet in the harsh
leather boot of the West.”410 And London noticed, “Many of them discarded the army shoe of
stiff leather and went back to their native gear, the soft straw sandal.”411 These statements
validate that some of these soldiers of reserve status were in fact Koreans, not Japanese.
Japanese people traditionally wore wooden clogs or open-toe sandals called geda, with insoles
made of straw material in some cases. Korean commoners wore straw-woven shoes, called
jipsin.
The use of straw shoes by Koreans was validated by Scottish Lady Isabella Bird Bishop
who wrote about the essential items for her preparation for cross-country travels in Korea, she
listed “[w]arm winter clothing, a Japanese kurumaya’s hat (the best of all travelling hats) and
Korean string shoes completed my outfit and I never needed anything I had not got!”412 Jipsin
was well known even among the Westerners as being one of the most essential items of foot
gears worn by commoners in Korea.
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(Figure 26: Korean straw-woven shoes: jipsin)413

(Figure 27: Lady Bishop’s Traveling Party – Bishop dressed in a Korean outfit with jipsin.)414
Another source of information in support of this argument that Koreans fought in the
Japanese army is the introductory report of Lucius H. Foote. As the first minister of the U.S. to
Korea, Foote compiled a document that he sent to the Secretary of State Department Frederick T.
Frelinghuysen, after his arrival in Korea on August 21, 1883. In his initial report of assessing
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Korea and its people, Foote wrote to Frelinghuysen: “The clothing of the common people is
made invariably of cotton or linen cloth, and in winter is wadded. They wear upon their feet
straw or twine sandals with soles of rawhide, and upon their heads conical-shaped hats made of
horse-hair” called top-knots.415

(Figure 28: A village chief in jipsin)416

(Figure 29: An official in silk/leather shoes)417

Figure 28 shows a photograph of “Chief of the village of Rose Island”—a Korean man with a
top-knot hairdo wearing jipsin on his feet, whereas Figure 29 is a photograph of “Yun-Jung-Yul,
Present Minister of War,” a nobleman in his official Korean court regalia and shoes made of silk
and leather, in Jack London Photograph Albums collection. All these observations regarding
jipsin being worn by soldiers in the Japanese militarydemonstrate the presence of Koreans on the
Japanese side of the war.
415
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Another way London provided clues about Korean involvement on the Japanese side in
the war involved his inscription on a photograph titled “Jap soldiers wrestling.” He wrote “Views
from above of a crowd of Korean soldiers standing in a semicircle watching a wrestling match,”
clearly noting the presence of Korean soldiers amid Japanese troops.418
London’s final set of clues about Korean involvement on the Japanese side of the war
involved his description of the battle of April 29 in Wiju on the southern shore of Yalu River on
the Korean side where he observed direct fighting between the Russian and Japanese armies
across the river.419 According to his article printed in the San Francisco Examiner on Sunday,
June 5, 1904, the Russians, positioned atop and behind Tiger Hill, bombarded with batteries
towards the Japanese who were swarming up the conical hill on the right and left of the
Russians.420 Once the battle was over, after several hours of shelling and bombarding, the
Japanese victoriously claimed the Tiger Hill and the Russians began to withdraw, while the
“Russian dead were being buried in their trenches and in the shell holes made by the Japanese”
on May 1, 1904.421
London questioned “Why did the Japanese make this frontal attack?” in his report from
Antung, Manchuria, next day on the north side of Yalu River.422 This battle cost 1,000 soldiers’
lives on the Japanese side in a massive “slaughter of a needless frontal attack” and left 2,324
soldiers and 73 officers dead with 635 captured on the Russian side.423 It did not make sense to
London for the Japanese Army to have launched such an attack to lose 1,000 men, when they
could have easily “streamed over the hills away from the river” along with the East Division, that
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“effected a lodgement on the Manchurian shore” with no opposition on the night before, April
30, or even earlier at dawn of May 1, as the “Russians were withdrawing” already by then.424
Such loss of lives left London searching for justification “for a white commander to hurl
his troops forward on such a frontal attack” just to “prove themselves fit from the white man’s
point of view by facing white men” and “make Russia ‘lose face’ in the eyes of other Asiatic
peoples.”425 He added, “I am confident that a white commander who did so would not find
justification for the act in the eyes of his people at home,” not understanding why any general
would want to kill so many of his own—if they were his own.426 Were they indeed his own
soldiers, Japanese, or not? As the following sections will show, some of the soldiers were in fact
Korean.

(Figure 30: Han Sung Sin Poh. Feb. 24, 1904. – NYPL Allen Archives)
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Excerpts from other newspaper articles beyond London exhibit the presence or interests
of Koreans in the war. In Figure 30 above: “A telegram from Korean Legation at Tokyo says that
the Korean military cadets in Japan requested for the grant for them to join in the Japanese army
to fight against the Russians.”427 Another article, as recorded in Korean Newspapers
Translations, reported of a telegram from Anju on March 6, 1904 which read:
Korean soldiers of the Militia fought against them and killed more than 30 Russians but
many of the Koreans were also killed. Twenty Korean soldiers…chased after the
Russians and the Korean soldiers to Pakchun district.428
This article reported a fierce fight between Korean militias and Russians with casualties on both
sides. But, did it also report there were Koreans soldiers chasing after Koreans along with the
Russian soldiers? It seems to paint a picture of Koreans on both sides of the battle.
The same journal reported the following incidents of Korean soldiers in the militia,
although it was unclear on which side they were fighting, Japanese or Russian:
March 8, 1904 – Korean soldiers of the militia up there fired at them and drove them off
the district. The men named Nah Yusuk, Wee Hong Suk, and Che Rak Choo were
arrested in the police office and Kil Yung Soo ran away, they are trying very hard to
arrest him.
March 13, 1904 – The three who were arrested as they had things to do in the bomb
incident…Kil Yung Soo and Ye Kun Tak who were much to do in the bomb incident are
now in the Palace and the placement cannot arrest them, although they are ordered to.
March 17, 1904 – Kil Yung Soo and Hien Sang Kun are hiding in the American Legation
and asking… for them to go to America.429
These articles provide important evidence on the presence of Korean militia by specifically
naming the individuals and the types of activities they were engaged in, such as bombing, and
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even hiding in the palace. The case of Korean laborers who were deployed in the Japanese
military forces in a massive scale will be reviewed next.
a. Korean Laborers in the Japanese Army
In 2017, Japanese historian Yuki Fujioka presented his analysis of issues and rules on hiring
military laborers by the Japanese imperial army during the Russo-Japanese War. Fujioka
concluded that three rules were applied: “pursuit of profit, patriotism, and relief of the poor.”430
Since a large number of laborers was needed to be hired urgently at the beginning of the RussoJapanese War in 1904-1905, the previous restriction of military laborers to those with past
experiences as laborers within the age group between 20 and 45 was not enforced to widen the
pool of participants in the Russo-Japanese War.431 While the Japanese government promoted
“foreign emigration” of Japan’s own military laborers to go abroad and settle there, but failed to
solicit enough quickly, the laborers in Korea appeared to have been motivated to volunteer to
earn some money.432 Whether they actually made a profit or not will be examined later.
According to the pay scale chart established by the Defense Ministry of Japan in Meiji
37, 1904, as presented by Fujioka, overseas military laborers in various job categories enjoyed
1.25:1 more than domestic laborers. Metal workers overseas earned per diem 900 vs. 720 yen
earned by domestic workers, railroad workers 1,280 vs. 800, electrical workers 1,440 vs. 900,
and even manual laborers 400 vs. 320 yen. Another document, “Establishing regulations for a
post of employing wartime military worker [

軍

夫

規

の件]” issued by the

Ministry of Defense in March 1904, stipulated specific terms of employing wartime contract
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workers by the length of their past experiences, broken down into various brackets by number of
workers employed, such as 500-1,000, 1,000-3,000, 3,000-4,000, 4,000-5,000, all the way up to
10,000 in each of the companies, as well as their terms of tax payments.433
Despite the higher scale of pay offered to overseas workers by the Japanese government
in 1904, the number of Japanese nationals employed in lower-level manual jobs such as
transportation by foot or by cart and horse grooming, which amounted to 60% of all military
labor, was much lower during the Russo-Japanese War compared to the large-scale employment
during the Sino-Japanese War.434 This low rate of participation by Japanese nationals and their
reluctance to leave home for laboring jobs would have necessitated the Japanese military to hire
locally-available Korean laborers with relative ease, resulting in the abundance of Korean
laborers seen by London and other Western reporters.
Jack London frequently wrote and took many photographs of the “coolies” as he called
the Korean laborers who were hired by the Japanese army to transport military supplies
alongside the troops in their march up north toward the China-Korea border into Manchuria.
London’s piercingly insensitive remarks on the poor peasants of Korea went thus:
Seoul, March 4. —To the Korean the Japanese occupation is a source of ineffable joy.
The first war prices obtained increase day by day and the coolie, Mapu and merchant are
equally busy amassing money which will later be squeezed from them by the master
class, which is the official class. Just now the officials and nobles are anxious and
frightened, while the poor, weak Emperor knows not where to turn.435
London’s critical depiction of the situation correctly pointed to the tragic nature of poor Koreans
grabbing any opportunity to make a living, while the upper-class looked on to profit from their
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customary seventy percent cut. According to this American, the powerless Korean Emperor
dawdled at a loss of what to do.
The image below from the June 19, 1904 issue of The San Francisco Examiner under the
headline of “Japanese Supplies Rushed to the Front by Man and Beast” shows three Korean
laborers transporting a “wounded Japanese soldier” in a photograph taken by London.436

(Figure 31: “Japanese Supplies Rushed to the Front by Man and Beast,” The San
Francisco Examiner, June 19, 1904, JLB48)
In the same article London reported:
Wiju (Korea). April 21. —For days we had forced our horses along a road which
swarmed with white-clad coolies. Their shoulders were stooped forward, their faces bent
toward the ground, their backs burdened with rice and fish, soy and saki, and all the food
supplies of an Oriental army. The villages were deserted. All doors and windows were
missing and the houses appeared blank and sightless, mutely protesting against the
general devastation. Here and there, along the road, old men and women and children
sold food to the toiling coolies; and it was even possible, by proper skirmishing and fair
purchase, to obtain beans for our pack-horses from the secret granaries among the hills.
436
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(Figure 32: “Ever North” by Jack London)437
“White-clad coolies” described by London were Korean laborers in traditional Korean clothes of
white cotton whose bare shoulders were burdened with massive loads of Japanese military food
supplies, as seen in the above photograph.438 London continued to describe the deserted villages
along the way through the northern part of Korea up to Yalu River, showing the utter destruction
of houses, while the remaining poor folks of “old men and women and children” were selling
food for the laborers and horses.439
London also wrote: “On the left cheek of each coolie a scarlet or purple smear of paint
advertised his employ with the Japanese army transport…. Possibly the strangest feature was the
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incongruous white garments worn by these coolies, and, for that matter, by all Koreans. The
effect was like so much ice drifting on the surface of a black river.”440 This notation by London
indicates Koreans were deployed by the Japanese army to transport war supplies. Their faces
were stamped by paint strokes on their cheeks as the mark of employment. Military historian Sim
Heonyong at the Ministry of National Defense of Korea noted that the markings on the cheeks of
Korean laborers indicated to which destinations the military supplies were to be transported.441
According to Sim Hyunyong, those laborers were hardly compensated for their work as
they were considered conscripted, contrary to London’s remarks on the “coolies… busy
amassing money” as mentioned earlier.442 Although they had been recruited by the Japanese
Army to help transport military equipment and supplies as well as wounded soldiers at a much
lower pay than the Japanese laborers, they did not make profit from the hard labor. They did not
receive even what was owed them due to the delays in processing of the military scripts which
never materialized in most cases and the nature of transient laborers who were constantly on the
move during the wartime, reported Hwangsung sinmun on March 22, 1904.443 Such deployment
of Korean laborers on a massive scale by the Japanese military during the Russo-Japanese War
set the stage for Korean soldiers who were involved in military actions of fighting in actual
battles will be examined in the next section.
b. Korean Soldiers in the Japanese Army
Several articles in The Korea Review’s June 1904 issue provided equally-corroborating
accounts of Korean involvement in the war, assisting the Japanese Army. One eyewitness
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account of a “foreigner passing through An-ju a few weeks ago” specifically reported about
Koreans assisting the Japanese troops:
The Battle here two weeks ago must have been very interesting. There were only forty
Japanese here then. The army went over into China long ago and left a few men in each
county-seat to hold the main road. Four hundred Cossaks made a dash behind the lines to
cut the main road and tried to capture An-ju. The forty Japanese were more than ready.
They engaged a lot of Koreans to sit down behind a wall in a safe place and fire guns that
the Japanese furnished them and a lot more were hired to yell whenever the Japanese
yelled….Every time the Japanese fired, the men detailed for that purpose would tell the
Koreans to shoot like blazes and every time the Japanese yelled the Koreans followed
suit, so that although the Russians knew to a dead certainty that there were only forty
Japanese there, they began to doubt whether there were not 4,000.444
This particular article shows Koreans were being orchestrated to follow Japanese military tactics
to scare the Russians by exaggeration as if there were more Japanese soldiers in the attack than
actually were.
The soldiers in question appear in a much more aggressive mode in the next article,
captioned “The Battle of Kang-gye.” This piece reported a battle in the town of Kang-gye
between Russian troops and Korean tiger-hunters a few days after the battle at the Yalu on May
1, 1904:
Some days before this, 400 Russians had crossed the Yalu at Chosen and had marched to
Kang-gye. There they took up their quarters and began to treat the people badly. They
seized their grain and horses, violated women and committed other excesses, until the
people could stand it no longer. So the prefect, Kim Cha-ok, summoned some 200
Korean soldiers enlisted from the tiger-hunters and attacked the Russians. Six Russians
were killed. The people rose in revolt and aided the 200 soldiers and the Russians found
the place too hot for them; so they dropped such part of their booty as they could not
easily carry and decamped.445
The above articles indicate that Koreans, either enlisted or as militia groups, were fighting
against Russians in the camp of Japanese Army. Given these accounts, it is very likely that there
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were many Korean soldiers involved in the aggressive frontal attack to occupy the conical hill in
Wiju on May 1, 1904.
Keeping in mind the question raised by Yumi Moon of what it would have meant for ‘the
colonized’ to be ‘collaborative’ in the colonial period, this section will focus on the political
environment of Korea that would have led some people to participate on the Japanese side of the
Russo-Japanese War.446 The contemporary atmosphere was ripe with tensions and dilemmas
among the Korean people who were divided by loyalty to their sovereign Emperor Gojong,
patriotic nationalism, and colonial collaboration.
Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, a conflict intensified between the proJapanese and pro-Russian factions in the Korean government, centering on the reform plans of
Emperor Gojong and the opposing powers of the Regent Taewongun—Gojong’s father, Yi Haung (

,1821-1898), known as the Heungson Taewongun (

大

君=Prince of the Great

Court). When King Ch’ôljong died without an heir, Gojong was pulled out of obscurity and put
on the reign at the young age of twelve in 1864.
Gojong’s father, Taewongun, appointed himself as the Regent of the young King Gojong
(高

) and hand-picked a young maiden from an obscure yangban family to marry his son King

Gojong as Queen Min, hoping to put a stop to the factional “in-law politics” of the Kims, the
Chos, and others in the royal court.447 This union, however, intensified the existing factionalism
as the young Queen brought more of her own faction of the Min family at every level of the
government and added to the existing problem.
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From King Injo (1623- 1649) to the end of the Yi Dynasty twenty queens came from the
“highest-placed” Noron (

=Old Doctrine) literari faction lines which represented

“distinguished houses” including the Andong Kwon, Andong Kim, Chunju Yi, and a few other
powerful clans.448 Kings became hostages of their powerful royal fathers-in-law who occupied
the highest positions in royal courts. The royal in-laws placed their kin in top central government
offices as well as in lower offices of local government, creating a powerful web of factions at
every level. These practices of factional control, called Sedo politics ( 徒

), became so

widespread and abusive in Korea that the Taewongun tried to pick a queen for his son from
outside of the entrenched power circle.
However, once the queen was chosen out of the Min family, her father, brothers, and
nephews quickly became powerful, and many of her clansmen were put into important
government posts. Some of the Mins were educated in western ways. These men played crucial
roles as young elites in the modernization of the country, such as Min Yŏng-Ik. However, Min
Yŏng-Jun, the chief of the clan, fled to Hong Kong after the first Kabo Reform failed but was
brought back by Queen Min one day before she was murdered. He had allegedly acquired “an
enormous fortune by illicit means” and had “more wealth than the royal family itself.”449 These
abusive practices continued until Yi Dynasty collapsed with Sunjong (

), the son of Gojong,

whose reign as the last king of Korea ended with the Japanese annexation of 1910.
A man of strong personality with chauvinistic convictions, Taewongun was known as a
“great sage…uncompromising, honest, and dedicated” to create a society that “represented all
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the virtues of the Confucian tradition.”450 Taewongun tried to strengthen the dynasty which he
considered was “well on the road to decline and confronted by the twin perils of internal
rebellion and foreign invasion” as seen in China.451 Whereas Regent Taewongun took on policies
of the extreme isolationism from external influences, persecuted and executed French
missionaries and many of their Korean disciples, and rejected overtures of the United States and
Japan by attacking the USS Sherman and the Meiji Japan’s warship Unyo (

), King

Gojong saw the need to modernize his country.
Historian Andre Schmid characterized the conflict as structural dilemmas between
Korean nationalist discourses and reform ideas which promoted “the nation’s progress but
simultaneously legitimized Korea’s subordination to Japan, a country with an advanced
civilization” under the popular banner of “civilization and enlightenment (munmyong
kaehwa=

改

).”452 This phenomenon with Ilchinhoe (

=Advance in Unity Society)

as the driving force for this munmyong kaehwa movement in 1904 has been recognized by many
historians such as Hilary Conroy, Peter Duus, Alexis Dudden, Andre Schmid, and Yumi Moon.
Clandestine and violent activities of the Russian Shanghai Service, the anti-Japanese
Righteous Armies, and other organizations in the independence movement clashed against the
pro-Japanese Ilchinhoe during the Russo-Japanese War. Using the primary source materials and
newspaper reports of the time, answers will be searched as to why and how these two camps of
the same people— tan’il minjok (單

)— came to have split allegiance, resulting in a tragic

situation of Koreans fighting against each other in someone else’s war of hegemony—caught
between the two belligerent nations of Russia and Japan over their homeland of the Korean
450
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peninsula. Korean migrants in their transnational diasporas in the RFE and Manchuria
participated in these efforts, criss-crossing the borders as needed to serve their old homeland as
well as their newly-adopted homeland.Ilchinhoe became very active in assisting the Japanese in
their war efforts to push north in March of 1904. The next section will examine why and how
Ilchinhoe members turned to cooperate with Japan during and after the Russo-Japanese War.
c. Pan-Asianism of ‘Dependence for Independence’ and Ilchinhoe
)or Asianism (

Pan-Asianism (

帶

names: asia yondaeron (
(東

=Theory of Asian Solidarity), tongyang chuui

= Easternism), tongyang pyunghwaron (東

samguk tondmaengsul (

國同

) appeared in Korea under various

=Theory of Eastern Peace), and

= Thesis on Alliance among Three Nations), with

Hwangsung sinmun, a newspaper as the official mouthpiece of Taehan Hyuphoe (the Great
Korea Association).453
Kim Ok-kyun who led the failed Kapsin Coup of 1884 (also known as Three-day Coup or
kapsin jongbyun, 甲

) and was executed in March, 1884, was one of the earliest adopters

of Asianism in Korea. Yun Chi-ho was another influential advocate of the Civilization and
Enlightenment Movement of Asianism, asserting “the common bond among East Asians”—
China, Japan, and Korea—and the “unity against the ‘arrogant’ white race, particularly the
Russians.”454
Yun Ch’iho (1865-1945) was a leader of the Progressive Party’s Independence Club
(獨

) and kept his diary almost every day for 60 years from 1883 to 1943, first in Chinese
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vernacular in 1883 and English thereafter.455 Yun, educated in Japan and the U.S., was known
for his pro-Japanese stance but not a member of Ilchinhoe which appeared in 1904. He served as
a teacher, an interpreter for Commodore Lucius H. Foote, in various positions in the Korean
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1883-1885, 1895-1896, and 1904-1906) and the Methodist Christian
Church, as well as succeeded Soh Jai-pil (Philip Jaison in American name) as the editor of The
Independence newspaper in 1896-1898.
Although he was later engaged in underground patriotic activities and imprisoned on
suspicion of murdering Terauchi Masatake, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea for four
years in 1911-1915, Yun was one of the leading progressive elites who thought the PanAsianism, led by Japan, was the answer to Korea’s problems. As he expressed in his diary on
May 7, 1902:
7th (30th). Wednesday. Damp-cloudy, Tokwon.
The meanest Japanese would be a gentleman and scholar compared to a vodka-drunk,
orthodox Russian. Between a Japanese and a Korean there is community of sentiment and
of interest, based on the identity of race, of religion, and of written characters. Japan,
China, and Korea must have one common aim, one common policy, one common ideal –
to keep the Far East the permanent home of the yellow race, and to make that home as
beautiful and happy as nature has meant it to be.456
This entry of Yun’s diary appears to have been written while he was demoted and sent away to
serve as a magistrate of Tokwon in the remote Wonsan area due to his political activism. Such a
vision of Asian unity, affirming the common bond among the East Asian people during the
Russo-Japanese war against the white race—the Russians in this case—was advocated by many
Japanese, such as Okakura Kakuzo, a moderate, and Miyazaki Toten, an activist. This approach
was also shared by Chinese intellectuals including Liang Qichao who wrote of “uniting yellow
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people” extensively and Sun Yatsen who maintained “close ties with” Japanese Pan-Asianists,
the Pan-Asianism also found “many advocates” in Korea.457
Historian Gi-wook Shin pointed out that Asianism had a divided following among
Korean transnationals during the Russo-Japanese War. The division was between those who
advocated “ radical action” against Japan such as Ahn Chunggeun (
RFE, who assassinated Ito Hirobumi ( 藤

根), a resident in the

), the first Resident-General in Korea, and others

who “accepted and even supported Japanese colonial rule.”458 Yet another, third, group who
“allied with Japanese Asianists to create their own utopian, anti-Western policy called the Koryo
(Gaoli) nation” appeared later in 1920.459 Ahn was actively engaged in the Righteous Army in
the Russian Far East, and the third group was mostly based in the Kando area in Manchuria.
Ilchinhoe (

=Advance in Unity Society) emerged “as a strong political force”

during the Russo-Japanese War to counteract the anti-Japanese guerilla group of the Righteous
Armies, “who opposed Japanese colonization.”460 Upon its announcement on August 18, 1904
(光

8 年, the 8th year in Kwangmu Era of Emperor Gojong) of the group’s establishment by

“Song Byung-joon and many others (

),” Ilchinhoe appointed Yoon Shi-hyung

as interim president and notified the Prime Minister Park Che-soon of Yoon’s appointment as the
leader of Ilchinhoe.
The “Ilchinhoe Manifesto (

)” was declared on August 20, 1904 with a

four-point platform on “people’s democratic rights ( 權= minkwon), such as freedom of speech,
press, and assembly…for a good government” in the discourse of ‘civilization and

457

Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 88.
Shin, “Asianism ,” 619.
459
Shin, “Asianism ,” 628-f4.
460
Moon, Populist Collaborators, 17 and 3.
458

152

開

enlightenment’ (

=munmyong gaewha) on which the group professed to be standing.461

More specifically, the manifesto used the word ‘inmin (

=people)’ repeatedly more than a

dozen times, declaring that people have fundamental rights as well as duties as subjects of a
nation .
夫國家는
으로써
한 이오
은
로써
하는 이라 苟
이
其
에
치 아니하면 國이 能히 國되지 못하고
가團 로
치
아니하면 이 能히 되지 못하나니
의
는
과 納 만 할뿐
아니오 國家의 亂
에 關하야 談 勸告하는
도 擔한 故로
界强國은
히
으로하여곰
과
及結 를
케하나니 大
는
强하는
으로
權을
擔하는 이오
은
하는
로
權에 間
하는 이오 君 는
에 大權을 監하야 國을
462
하는
한 이라….
A fatherland (bukukka) or a state (kukka) comprises of people (inmin) who in turn
sustains the society (sahoe). If people do not obey and fulfill their duties as members of
the state, the state cannot function as a real nation. If people do not come together in their
political association as members and perform their duties of military service and
taxpayers, people cannot be good people. People also have their duties to deliberate
freely and make recommendations for the security of their state. The monarch (kunju) is
the sovereign who oversees all governmental affairs as the highest and most respected
person with sovereignty in legislation and administration. (Author’s translation)
The above declaration emphasized the close relationships between the nation (kukka, 國家), the
people (inmin,

), and the society (sahoe,

) working in harmony for people’s freedom of

speech and assembly, as well as duties of military and taxation so that the sovereign monarch
(kunju, 君

) with the utmost authority can rule the nation for the welfare of his people.

The Manifesto (
enlightened nation (

), in this spirit, declared Japan as the most advanced and most
覺國) that can bring about the ‘peace in Asia’ (東

克

), as

the victor of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. It urged the whole nation of

461
462
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Korea from the Emperor down to the 20 million people (

同

) to unite behind Ilchinhoe

to keep the nation from perishing.463
These declarations of pro-Japanese statements were seen as the “most notorious”
manifestations of Pan-Asianism by Hilary Conroy who viewed Ilchinhoe as “Uchida’s
instrument” of the Black Dragon Society.464 This organization served as Japan’s vehicle to
facilitate the annexation of Korea along with a “changed form of the Tonghak party” founded by
Yi Yonggu, Son Pyongchun, and Son Pyonghui. The founder of the Black Dragon Society,
Uchida Ryohei, acted as Japanese advisor for Ilchinhoe in 1904.465
Yumi Moon, on the other hand, interpreted Ilchinhoe’s reconciliation as a call for
“independence through dependence” by “knowing one’s capability and limitations”—a call for
accepting Japan as a nation capable and advanced to serve as “peacemaker” for East Asia of
which Korea should be a part.466 Yu Kil-choon, another leader of the failed Kapsin Coup of
1884, asserted people’s rights and freedom to elect government officials who make the law.
This notion was advocated by The Independent, a bilingual newspaper published in
English and Korean in 1896-1898. In its April 11, 1896 editorial, The Independent concluded
that the “Korean people, ‘being ignorant, weak, and non-patriotic,’ should never emulate the
enterprise of the French or even ‘dream’ of such a revolution” on their own, and warned the
Tonghaks to refrain from turning into “desperados” with their rebellious acts of violence.467
The Tonghak Movement (東

動), as discussed in the introduction, was a popular

uprising in the late Chosun period, raised in defense of Eastern Learning (東

463

) against Western
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Learning (

)—the “old Eastern virtues against foreigner and foreign-poisoned government”

with the steadfast backing of the Regent Taewongun (大

君), Emperor Gojong’s father.468In

Conroy’s analysis, the “Tonghak Revolution was the Korean version of the Satsuma Rebellion of
Japan, the Boxer Movement in China, the Wahabi in Arabia, and perhaps the Mau Mau in
Kenya.”469 Rather than a progressive uprising, this movement was a “reactionary…effort to
reassert tradition in the face of change.”470 The Tonghak Movement was regarded as “a focal
point of interest” in the modern Korean history by some historians—a catalyst of the SinoJapanese War, Righteous Army risings after the Russo-Japanese War, and the March First
movement in 1919.471
The so-called “converted Tonghaks” had openly pledged their support for Japan in the
Russo-Japanese War and reappeared throughout the peninsula by the spring of 1904.472 By
October, the Tonghaks organized themselves as the Chinbohoe (

, Progressive Society)

and merged with the Ilchinhoe under the latter’s name. With this merger, Ilchinhoe’s
membership grew to more than 100,000, as some claimed, with 500,000 to one million members,
as reported by the Korea Daily News.473 The Japanese military government identified 3,670
Ilchinhoe members, reportedly with 49 leaders, and 117,735 Chinbohoe members of whom 883
were leaders.474
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Japanese scholar Hayashi Yusuke cited 140,715 members just before Ilchinhoe was
dissolved, based on the official Japanese investigation as of August 1910.475 Another Japanese
military survey showed 49,850 Chinbohoe members in the 18 prefectures of Southern Pyongan
and 19,560 in the 12 prefectures of Northern Pyongan province.476 These speculations of
fluctuating counts of membership continued through the 1910s as Ilchinhoe gained and lost its
followings as the Japanese colonial grip tightened.
Even though it is difficult to know exactly how many, registered or unregistered,
members were in Ilchinhoe during this volatile period of Korean history, one may argue that
their voices were heard loudly throughout the country and in transnational diasporas. More than
50 percent of their members were from the northern provinces of Pyongan and Hwanghae, and
many others from Choongchung province in the south where disputes of land distribution had
been ruled “in favor of Ilchinhoe tenants,” noted Moon.477
The 1904 Manifesto clearly expressed that, although the state is made up of people who
form the society, the people have their obligation to obey and fulfill their duties, such as taxation
and military obligation, to help strengthen the state’s administration to maintain the security and
safety of the society.478 And Ilchinhoe founders did not believe the Korean people were ready for
“a popular revolt (minbyon=

) like the French Revolution.”479

Yun Chi-ho echoed the assessment in his diary on May 1, 1902 that:
The public treasury is being shamelessly plundered by His Majesty…. The people are
now squeezed by governors, magistrates, royal inspectors, departmental inspectors,
police and soldiers…. But to whom may we appeal, To the King? No!... the King is a bad
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man utterly incapable of anything, noble or good, the people are ignorant, stupid and
incapable of raising and maintaining respectable and orderly insurrection.”480
This position was based on the belief that Koreans could not accomplish the task of transforming
their state into a “modern polity” on their own, due to the persistent practice of “toadyism” or
“worship of the powerful” or “placing officials above the people (官

).” 481 Only with the

help of the Japanese who had created the New Japan out of the Old Japan through the Meiji
Restoration this task could be achieved in Korea, feared Ilchinhoe leaders. Such a position had
been taken earlier in 1898 in an article of The Independent which ruled out the “possibility of a
democratic revolution in Korea on the grounds that the Korean people were not ready for it” and
“do not deserve” it unless their “knowledge and experience (mun’gyon=

見)” were broadened

through education.482
The editorial in Taehan Maeil Sinbo (大

) on December 2, 1904 reported of

the bloody meeting held on Thursday prior:
[논설]. 일진회. 지나간 목요일에 일진회에서 개회를 하였다가 류혈이
랑자한지경에 이름이 여좌하니, 일진회에서 날마다 모혀 점점 더욱 요란하게
구는고로 대황제폐하게옵서 통촉하옵시고 … 모든 회를 일절 해산케하라고 칙령을
나리셨는데 그 회원들은 일향 취집하는지라 파송하였든병정들은 회원들 모힌
곳에 잇셔셔 온언순시로 간권하며 스스로 헤여지도록 하나 그러하나 종래 쳥죵치
아니함으로 엇지 할수 업시 위력으로 함에 이르러서 회원중에 사오인이
약간상하였는데 맛춤 일본병뎡들이 일진회를 두돈하야 저희한 후 한 한국사관들을
포착하야 갓는지라….483
[Editorial]. Ilchinhoe. Last Thursday Ilchinhoe opened a meeting which turned into a
bloody situation. As they meet every day and become so much more violent in their
actions that the Emperor ordered their meetings to be canceled. The members in disregard
continue with their disrupted meetings despite the efforts of the soldiers to disburse with
kind words and guidance, only to be ignored. Finally, the soldiers resorted to using their
forces to break up the meeting and resulted in the injuries sustained by four or five
480
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members. But the Japanese soldiers sided with Ilchinhoe and arrested Korean officers….
(Author’s translation)
This editorial refuted the extremely violent, blood-letting (ryuhyul i nangja hal jigyung ui)
meeting of the Ilchinhoe members and expressed disappointment toward their disruptive
behaviors, and implored Emperor Gojong to punish and dissolve Ilchinhoe as soon as possible.
On December 5, 1909, another editorial of the same newspaper lamented: “Oh, how sad, are you
Ilchinhoe not the people of Korea? (Sulpuda, nohui Ilchinhoe-ya! Nuhui nun Taehan mingook
inmin i aninga?)”484
Based on several accounts on “Ilchinhoe” recorded in Yijo Sillok (4 in Gojong’s and 2 in
Sunjong’s reigns), one can perceive the controversy around Ilchinhoe, mostly expressed in the
voices of conservative top government officials who rebuked the disruptions caused by and
toward them. Emperor’s response to such criticisms was lukewarm at best and not decisive.
Instead of giving his decision immediately, Emperor replied to an official’s recommendation to
take a strict measure of discipline toward Ilchinhoe by saying, “I will take your recommendation
into advisement” or “I will mull it over during the night” without giving straight answers. When
asked why he did not convey a verdict or a clear answer immediately, Gojong replied:
It is because of neighboring countries around us. In the past, I could condemn a bad act
committed by my people without causing any lingering repercussion among us. But now,
my court feels more like someone else’s, and whatever action taken here gets conveyed
to other countries, causing much disruption. Therefore, I can only give answers in a
round-about way. (Author’s translation)485
Such a predicament clearly shows that the Korean Emperor Gojong did not feel like a sovereign
monarch of his country but was surrounded by ears and eyes of foreign governments. His hands
were tied as a puppet king.
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The Korea Daily News, on December 31, 1904, again reported, “In North Pyeng Yang
Province the Tong Haks (or Righteous Army) are reported to be assembling with the object of
suppressing the Il-chin Hoi agitators. Many officials are said to have joined the movement.”486In
the same issue, the paper reported, “A Japanese newspaper states that some 20 or 30 Russian
soldiers at Kyeng-won are laying waste the country and violating the women…. The Police
Department have a serious complaint to make against the Japanese gendarmes. A body of 6
Korean police were dispatched on the 6th inst., to the meeting place of the Il Chin Hoi to keep
order.”487
On their arrival they were set upon by Japanese gendarmes and after being roughly
handled were disarmed and placed under arrest. They had committed no offence or even
attempted to arrest any of the Il Chin Hoi people—a proceeding to which they would
have been perfectly entitled.
The above two reports illustrated the volatile nature of the conflicts between Ilchinhoe members
and the Righteous Armies as they stood on the opposing sides of the situation: pro-Japanese and
anti-Japanese affiliations of the group—the populous of Korea, split in two camps.
Ilchinhoe made another bombshell proclamation in 1905, shortly prior to the Japanese
Protectorate Treaty was instituted, advocating “dependence in order to preserve independence”
because “Japan was a capable country that was ‘advanced’ and ‘enlightened’ and that had been a
‘peace maker’ in East Asia between 1894 and 1905.”488 Ilchinhoe then criticized Gojong for
having sent his three envoys secretly to the Hague Peace Conference in protest of the Japanese,
forcing him to sign the Ulsa Protectorate Treaty. Although the envoys were not able to gain
entrance to the conference, Gojong’s attempt gained wide publicity internationally and Ilchinhoe
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denounced it as a “betrayal of an ally” and a “disaster for Korea’s security.”489 And Ilchinhoe
sent a letter of apology to Protectorate General Ito Hirobumi on July 16, 1907, re-affirming their
official pro-Japanese stance.
Historian Mark Caprio took the argument one step further and wrote: “Activist groups in
contemporary Japan and Korea see the ‘million-member’ Ilchinhoe either as enlightened—a
group that encouraged Japan’s annexation of Korea; or as traitorous—one that sold out its
country to the Japanese invaders.”490 Yumi Moon came into defense for the Ilchinhoe’s
unfortunate short-sightedness of serving as part of “pro-Japanese elements” which grew “among
Korean anti-status-quo groups” in 1896-1904 in anticipation of Japan’s taking on the role of
reforming Korea.491
To the chagrin of the Ilchinhoe leaders who wanted to help reform Korea, Japanese
Resident General Ito Hirobumi only used them in his strategy to depose Gojong. Those leaders
who were appointed to official positions found themselves “in bed with a colonial regime”—
Japan— which was more interested in maintaining “the local status quo” than helping to reform
the collapsing Korean monarchy.492 Ilchinhoe members’ willingness to sacrifice Korea’s
sovereignty in pursuit of civil rights backfired, given the transnational environment of East Asia
in which the Japanese imperialism was pre-occupied in its own struggles of reconciling with
transnational communities of “fluid identities” and dealing with Manchurian nationalism as
historian Prasenjit Duara suggested.493
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On the rocky path Korea took to modernity as the 500-year old Yi dynasty came to
collapse between 1896 and 1910, ironically, the subalterns—the primary victims of the yangban
society of Korea—grieved violently at the funerals of Kojong and Sunjong, their last two kings
of Korea.494 Emperor Gojong had been forced into abdication by the Japanese who enthroned
Gojong’s Crown Prince as King, not Emperor, Sunjong in July 1907.

(Figure 33: Emperor’s coffin at the funeral procession of Emperor Gojong, March 3, 1919.)495
Historian of Korean philosophy Mark Setton called it “Confucian populism” in which the
“the will of the people” is considered “the will of Heaven” and the ruler has the “authority to
accomplish ‘the welfare of his subjects.’”496 Regardless of whether Gojong with his God-given
authority and responsibility to guard the welfare of his subjects did fulfill that obligation or not,
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his loyal subjects could not stop the tears from flowing down their faces at the loss of their ruler.
Every man and woman came to bid farewell to their fallen monarch in their mourning outfits in
white and straw-woven jipsins on their feet.
Historian Alyssa Park wrote, in such a “collectivist view of the state (kukka=國家)” in
which the “sovereign and people are one body (kunmin ilch’ae (君

),” a nation constituted

“not just the royal family or government, but a collective entity of people, land, and
government”—at least in theory.497 This way of thinking explains how the transnational migrants
who left Korea long ago to settle down abroad in diasporas still adhered to the Korean customs
and lifestyles and were eager to come together in defense of Korea as a sovereign nation. Equally
importantly, the King of Korea lamented at the unfortunate situations his former subjects were in
long after they left the realm of his protection.
A confidential dispatch of a memorandum written by Governor General Marquis Ito
Hirobumi ( 監

藤

) to Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi Dadas ( 菫), dated

May 8, 1907, exists in Chukan Nihon Koshikan Kiroku [the Japanese Legation in Korea
Records=

公

館記錄 (hereafter CNKK)], as shown in Figure 34 below.498
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(Figures 34: Left to right: Ito’s memo p.8 and p.10. in CNKK. 1907.05.08.)
In this memo Ito wrote to Hayashi Dadas ( 菫), recommending the listed Koreans ( 國 官
to be “awarded (
(軍

動其

) for their splendid accomplishments (

ん功

)

) in military actions

年)….”499

) taken in 1904-1905 (

These lists of names of Koreans who were recommended to be awarded for their
participation in various Japanese military actions during the Russo-Japanese War, accompanying
Ito Hirobumi’s memorandum, tabulated below, can also be found in CNKK. Between 1907 and
1909, a total of 18 confidential memoranda with lists of 195 names were dispatched, according
to the CNKK. An example of such lists including the persons’ names, ranks, roles served, and
types of awards recommended are shown below in Figure 35.500
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格(Award type)
8等
8等
8等
8等
8等
8等

Name
金
高
康
龍

(Yi Soon-chang)
(Kim Jung-won)
(Go Un-bong)
(Kang Hi-won)
(Cha Sam-bong)
(Han Yong-rak)

Roles & Ranks
甲 (Secret Agent A)
(Secret Agent B)
(1) (Secret Agent C1)
(2) (Secret Agent C2)
甲의甲 (Secret Agent A+)
甲의 (Secret Agent A-)

8等
(Baik Moo-yo)
甲의 (Secret Agent A-)
8等
(Jeon Byung-chae)
甲의 (Secret Agent A-)
(Figure 35: Names and ranks of Koreans recommended to be awarded)
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(Figures 36: Lists of names with brief descriptions and rankings: left to right and clockwise)
The first page (1358: 14) shows a ‘straightforward list of names of Koreans’ ( 國
) with the recommended types of awards, followed by introductions of the
individuals and their contributions to the Russo-Japanese War activities on behalf of the
Japanese military. Their ranks are also indicated in alphabetic order in the Japanese vernacular as
甲,

,

, and

, equivalent to A, B, C, and D in English language.501

Whereas the above list shows the persons who served as spies or informants for the
Japanese military, another list, containing the names of Park Young-chul (

) and 27 others,

includes the names of high-ranking officials in the Korean court, officers who served in the
Japanese infantry, artillery, equestrian, and engineering units, interpreters, Chief of Korean
Railway Company, railroad inspectors, and county officials, showing people of wide-ranging
occupations that were military-related, directly or indirectly.502
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This list was entitled “1904~5 年
General Ito by Minister Terauchi Masatake [

國
軍大

” and sent to Governor
內

穀] with a stamp of approval

on September 27, 1907. Korean historian Yun Hee Kim, citing these records, provided an
analysis on the status of 195 persons being awarded: 7 policemen, 27 in military, 8 in intelligent
services, 6 central government officials, 37 local magistrates or ajuns, 22 interpreters, 9 technical
engineers, 6 trade union members, 31 Ilchinhoe members, and 42 unspecified. 35 people were
awarded Wookiljang (

) or 140 Subojang (

), i.e. types of honors, with cash awards,

and 20 awarded in cash only.503 These were but a few examples of confidential documents
located in the Japanese archives regarding the Koreans who helped the Japanese military one
way or another, as in the cases below.
In a secret telegram sent to the Russian Command Headquarters on July 14, 1905,
General K. H. Dessino (Десспно) reported that the Japanese Army formed Korean Empire
National Army (大

國軍) with 40,000 soldiers. 25,000 of them were sent to northern Korea

to assist the Japanese Army, wearing the same Japanese military uniform, and the remaining
15,000 were placed in the southern Korea which was already under the Japanese occupation.504
These archival documents of classified materials in the Japanese government provide
crucial evidence not only on the Korean presence but also on their being officially recognized
and awarded by the Japanese Army for their participation during the Russo-Japanese War. This
proves the thesis of this dissertation on the presence of Koreans in Japanese military forces three
decades earlier than in 1930s to 1945, during the World War II, when Korea was under the
Japanese colonial occupation.
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“Stripped of national sovereignty, Koreans had no political authority to form a
transnational entity in East Asia that was separate from Japan,” historian Gi-wook Shin wrote of
the Korean Asianists’ arguments which “not only abetted Japanese plans for the Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere but also ended up justifying Korean collaboration with
colonialists.”505 It is for this reason that these progressive elites, who contributed so much in
Korea’s Independence Movement, such as Ch’oe Nam-sun, and drafted the Declaration of
Independence for the March First Movement in 1919, ended up working with the Japanese and
have been disgraced in the eyes of the postcolonial Korea.
In the next section the Korean participation in the Russian military forces either as
individual soldiers as Tsarist subjects in the RFE or as part of the Righteous Army fighting
alongside the Russian Imperial Army will be examined. In the end, there were Koreans fighting
on both sides of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.
Righteous Armies in Alliance with the Russian Army
Among the Koreans in the RFE and Manchuria, 27,000 newcomers of working-class,
unskilled, cheap labor in Korean villages of transnational diasporas provided “the most fertile
source” for the anti-Japanese resistance militant guerilla movement of Righteous Armies, socalled “Yi Pom-yun’s army” formed during the Russo-Japanese War, wrote historian Igor
Saveliev.506 In 1902 Yi Pom-yun (

) had been dispatched as a royal surveyor (

官) to

assess the situation in Buk-Kando (North Kando) area where a large Korean population of close
to 100,000 had settled but was reportedly being mistreated by the Chinese officials and hassled
by bandits.
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Yi Pom-yun was given the royal assignment by Emperor Gojong with a carte blanche
authority for the protection of Koreans in Kando and was able to organize a core group, called
Choongui-dae (

隊) or Sapodae (

隊) soldiers—“the first partisan detachment” of 1,000

rifles in Manchuria. Yi’s Choongui-dae entered into the RFE in the spring of 1904 at nearly the
same time as Victor Kim’s reconnaissance team for the Shanghai Service was formed, which
will be discussed below.507
Organized and supported initially by Confucian literari of the yangban class, the
Righteous Armies became actively engaged in armed resistance against Japan at the beginning of
the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. During the Russo-Japanese War, while many Korean soldiers,
formerly of Tonghaks, sided with Japan, suspecting Russia’s imperial ambition toward Korea,
militant guerrillas, anywhere between 1,000 to 4,000, led by Yi Pom-yun, joined the Second East
Siberian Infantry Division under the command of Russian General A. Anisimov.508
Yi’s Righteous Army secured the financial support of Choi Jai-hyung (

), a rich

Korean merchant, naturalized as Russian by the Russian name of Piotr Semenovich Tsoi, who
had fled from Korea to Russia at the age of ten, graduated from a Russian school, and became
the chief of a town called Novoyevsk in 1893. Choi financed the recruitment of new fighters of
guerilla detachments led by Yi Pom-yun during and after the Russo-Japanese War.509
Choi was later decorated with a medal from the Russian government for his patriotic
contribution as a Tsarist subject. And he founded Kwonuphoe (勸
President, along with Victor Sergeievich (Hong Bum-do=

507

) and served as its

圖) as Vice President. Hong Bum-
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(1997), 211,

do was well known for his successful collaboration with the Russian military and launching of
anti-Japanese warfare in the RFE.510
By the November 3, 1904 plan, submitted by Baron Korf, the combined forces of three
battalions were created with Yi Pom-yun’s Righteous Armies, mountain rifle fighters, Korean
soldiers from the recently-disbanded northern Chinese Army, and other anti-Japanese militant
volunteers in Hamgyongdo— Bobusangs and tiger hunters of Pyungando as well as former
Korean soldiers in the Japanese Army. These formidable, combined forces on the Russian side
were supported by a corps of secret intelligent agents, trained by Captain Nikolai N. Biriukov,
whose role will be discussed in the next section.511
Korf pointed to several reasons for Koreans harboring antagonism against Japan as good
rationales for their incentive to fight on the Russian side: revenge for the brutal assassination of
Queen Min, mandatory deployment of Koreans in the Russo-Japanese War, disrespectful
treatment of Emperor Gojong, and revenge for the Imjin Waeran (

亂) in 1592-1598 as

discussed in the introduction.512
The number of soldiers in Yi’s Righteous Army sharply increased to 35,000 after the
Protectorate Treaty was signed in 1905 and the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1906. It was
nearly impossible to ascertain an accurate number due to the clandestine nature of Koreans
involved in resistance movements which became even more aggressive in the years of 1906 to
1910.
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By the time the much-anticipated Russo-Japanese War erupted in February 1904, Yi’s
Righteous Army combined with Hong Bum-do’s militias from the RFE and Manchuria, as well
as Bobusang (

) and more tiger hunters from southern Korea, surpassing 6,000 in total,

according to the numerous reports in Record Group 846 in the Russian National Archives of
Military History (РГВИА).513 These combined Righteous Armies joined the East Siberian
Infantry under the command of General A. Anisimov under the banner of the United Forces of
Korean Empire (大

國

隊) or Anti-Japanese Alliance Troop (

軍) from 1903-

1905. On August 7, 1905, Yi’s Army combined with the Russian cavalry, battled against the
Japanese Army, and defeated them at the Chungchun Rock area.514
Bobusangs in Korea consisted of two groups of merchants—Bosangs (
their merchandise in their arms and Busangs (

) who carried

) who carried their goods on their backs—

traveling from town to town where open markets opened every six days in rotation throughout
the country. During the Russo-Japanese War these Bobusangs, 60,000 in membership, made a
considerable contribution with their nationwide network of communication, transportation of
arms, and guerilla warfare. They were once known to be under the command of Taewongun. In
1903 Hansung Panyoon (

), Chief Justice Ki Ryang-soo was in command of the

group.515
Russia’s War Minister General Kuropatkin confessed in his memoir that Russian forces
had never been as mighty and powerful as those that had been assembled in Manchuria in August
of 1905. The combined forces were ready to push forward at the peak of their spirits when the
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news of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty already having been signed came in September 1905. “The
war ended too soon,” lamented Kuropatkin.516
Koreans in the Russian Army and the Shanghai Service of Intelligence
In the increasing atmosphere of Russian nationalism and Pan-Slavism since the 1890s as
discussed in Chapter I, the regional government of the Russian Far East took up repressive
measures to limit the economic and political powers of non-Slavic immigrants, such as Chinese
and Koreans—the ‘yellow labor’.517 Russian nationalists hunted down Chinese whom they
considered “grouse” and Koreans as “white swans” in reference to the former group in colorful
outfits with plump physique and the latter in their traditional white garments, both “unfit” to
become Tsarist subjects.518 Murdering and robbing of Chinese who the Russians thought
“usually carried gold with them” and wealthy Korean immigrants became a lucrative mode of
business to some Russians who felt justified for claiming “Russian resources for Russians,” if
not out of jealousy and hatred.519
Nonetheless, Korean immigrants gained a favorable reputation of “being very strong” and
“better adapted for hard work” and were valued by their employers for their “industrious and
peaceful habits.”520 Koreans were regarded “poleznyi (useful)” in “colonizing a territory that was
so remote from Moscow.”521 The usefulness of Koreans increased during the Russo-Japanese
War since they emerged as a group of Tsarist subjects who were able and eager to fight against
Japan in reconnaissance activities and “guerrilla-style raids” with necessary language skills in
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Korean, Chinese, and Russian and with strong anti-Japanese motivation.522 Historian Dae-Sook
Suh noted that the Japanese were aware of the existence of some 4,000 Korean soldiers in the
Czarist army.523
The new infusion of anti-Japanese nationalists in the RFE—well-educated upper-class
elites in political exile—came from wider geographical areas of Korea. They arrived from the
northern as well as southern provinces, whereas the earlier settlers—the poor peasant farmers in
migration—originated mostly from Hamgyongdo in the northern provinces of Korean Peninsula
in the late 1800s. These newcomers were even more motivated to fight on the Russian side with
the necessary pre-requisite abilities as highly-educated elites, willing to play their parts against
Japan, as they fled from Korea to pursue Korea’s independence from Japan’s colonialism.
At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, both the Russian and the Japanese military
forces recruited soldiers and spies from the Korean communities in the RFE, Manchuria, and
Korea. Both sides had numerous spies, although hard to estimate the approximate number due to
the clandestine nature of the operation. Statistics in 1905 showed approximately 16,500 Koreans
in the RFE had Russian citizenship—the second- or third-generation descendants of earlier
migrants from the late nineteenth century—and were typically Russian speakers who had been
educated in Russian higher education or military academies.524 They considered themselves
Tsarist subjects ready to fight against the Japanese colonial aggression toward not only Russia,
their new home, but also Korea, their old home of the ancestors.525 Even though they showed
some assimilation as Russian citizens, these younger generations of Korean immigrants still
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maintained a strong affinity to Korea—either their homeland or the origins of their parents or
grandparents.
These descendants of early settlers were joined by recently-arrived political exiles and
intellectuals of a high social status who migrated from Korea as the Japanese colonial aggression
intensified and were eager to fight and preserve Korea’s sovereignty. Koreans trusted the
Russian army of the “White Suzerain” as the protectors of Korean sovereignty to help fight the
Japanese from encroachment into Korea and possibly Russia, if the latter lost the war.526 Some
of these pro-Russian ethnic Koreans were recruited to participate in “guerilla-style raids against
the Japanese army” with Righteous Armies, also called Uibyong (

), as well as in

reconnaissance work with the elite Russian intelligence division, such as the Shanghai Service.527
a. Russian Secret Intelligence Agents - Shanghai Service
One of the ways transnational Koreans found to fight against the Japanese colonial regime
was through intelligence and counter-intelligence activities such as the Shanghai Service. The
Shanghai Service was established as a clandestine operation of the Russian secret service based
in Shanghai, China, under the leadership of Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov (А. И. Πавлов, 18601923) in April 1904 within two months of the start of the Russo-Japanese War.528 Pavlov, born to
a “noble military family” and a graduate of the “elite Naval Cadet Corps” in 1882, was a former
diplomat who served as the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Beijing in the mid1890s.529 Recognized for his contribution to the successful conclusion of the Russo-Chinese
Agreement which led to the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula in 1898, Pavlov was promoted to
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Full State Counsellor and appointed to the post of Minister to Seoul in 1903.530 Minister Pavlov
was also instrumental in assisting Emperor Gojong make the Declaration of Neutrality, as
already discussed in this chapter.
The Shanghai Service was founded for the purpose of rectifying the Russian Far-Eastern
reconnaissance’s weakness, as seen in the prewar underestimation of the future enemy and lack
of information about that enemy—Japan. Dmitrii B. Pavlov, Russian historian in Moscow,
stressed the fact that the Shanghai Service was “not to replace the army intelligence, but to
amplify its activities and to some extent revise its information” on the initiative of Viceroy
Admiral E. I. Alekseev (Е. И. Алексеев) who hand-picked Alexander Pavlov to be in charge.531
The Shanghai Service also provided covert guidance to news media in China and Korea, such as
the Korea Daily News (大

), a bilingual newspaper published by Ernest Bethell,

which will be examined in the next section on the anti-Japanese Korean news media.532
Before the Shanghai Service was instituted under Pavlov, Russian military intelligence
(HUMINT) relied on a spy network previously set up in Emperor Gojong’s court after the SinoJapanese War in 1896-1898.533 When Pavlov took on the role of heading the Shanghai Service,
he recruited a network of agents mainly of Koreans, Chinese, and some Europeans from Emperor
Gojong’s close aids and influential Korean dignitaries.
A Korean-Russian citizen, named Matvei Ivanovich Kim (Золотарёв Виктор
Николаевич), also known as Victor or Insu Kim, was hired as a translator and primary contact
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to the “imperial mission” in Seoul as well as at locations in the Yalu region with a mission to set
up reconnaissance in the Korean territory at the end of April 1904.534

(Figure 37: Kim In-su (Matvei Ivanovich Kim))535 (Figure 38 :

(Peter Semeovich)536

However, the АВПРИ record of 1896 shows Victor Kim (aged 20) and two others,
named Pietor Pento Kim (16) and Nikolai Kigohn (37) applying to serve as mercenary soldiers in
Seoul on October 28, were granted permission on February 25, 1897.537 This grant was in
adherence to the requirement for Russian citizens who wish to work in a foreign government,
Korea in this case, to obtain permission from the Russian government. So, it seems that Victor
Kim had been working in Seoul since 1897 when he was recruited to serve on the Shanghai
Service in 1904.
Kim and other volunteers, known as “Biriukov’s ‘alumni’ or “Biriukov’s Korean team,”
were named after retired Captain Nikolai N. Biriukov who took charge of the group.538 The team
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was comprised of nine former students of the Russian language school, attached to the Russian
mission in Seoul, as well as a student from the Kursk Academy (Real’noe Uchilische) and
several graduates of the “Kazan’ theological seminary (Doukhovnaia Seminariia).”539 Also
involved was a lecturer at St. Petersburg University, engaged in composing the “Russian-Korean
pocket phrase-book,” twelve thousand copies of which were printed and distributed in the
RFE.540 Between April and December 1904 alone, over 850 dispatches were sent, received, and
deciphered with about the same number of replies through the Shanghai Service.541

(Figure 39: Secret coded messages exchanged between agents of the Shanghai Service)542
Victor Kim and the Biriukov’s team of the Shanghai Service organized a united RussoKorean detachment of Koreans in the RFE and joined forces with Major General Anisimov on
July 7, 1904, when they were thought to have disappeared into thin air by historians Evgeny
Sergeev and Dmitri Pavlov.543 Along with another unit of 300 Korean guerillas, Kim’s team
committed sabotage and reconnaissance against the Japanese army, forming a cooperative
partnership of Korean guerilla detachments with active Russian troops. On June 19, 1905, Major
General Mardanov of Priamur province “issued the order to set up a national battalion of Korean
irregulars to support the Manchurian armies.”544 Four more Korean partisan detachments were
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set up by the Russian military authorities in the provinces of Posiet, Hunchun, Shkotov and
Nikol’sk in July, intensifying the Russian front after Japan’s occupation of Sakhalin.
In a report sent to an unknown recipient on September 13, 1905, Alexander Pavlov
acknowledged the role of Biriukov in training and overseeing the students. Albeit excellent
intelligence work, his help was no longer deemed necessary since the War has ended.545 In the
same memo, Pavlov requested the students be rewarded for their superb service with continuing
education in military institutions with all expenses paid for by the Russian military government.
This request was granted by Commander Grushetsky via a secret telegram, approving Biriukov
to accompany the students.546 According to the financial reports in the АВПРИ, however, all
expenses including the medical costs paid to “Matvei Kim” in the amount of $91.20, $1,642.60
for Yi Hyun-kun, the former Minister of Military Service, and $630 for Biriukov’s two months’
salary had been paid for by Emperor Gojong’s treasury.547
While some others were sent as translators or secret agents to the Manchurian borders
after the Shanghi Service operation was closed, Victor Kim was sent back to the Russian military
front in Priamur with a mission to continue organizing reconnaissance, thus putting an end to
reconnaissance on the Korean Peninsula.548 The role Kim played has been documented well by
Russian intelligence headquarters, showing him as the central figure in the Korean
reconnaissance operation:
…a Korean, Kim, attached to our diplomatic mission, to establish permanent covert
contacts with local Korean authorities and agents in the middle of April 1904. The latter
might be handpicked both from the retinue of the Korean emperor and from among
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influential Korean dignitaries well disposed towards us. The agents might later be sent on
missions to the Manchurian borders.549
The order cabled from Lieutenant General Vladimir Sakharov, the Chief of Kuropatkin’s Staff
and Quartermaster-General Vladimir Kharkevich, to Major General Zasulich, the Commander of
the Eastern Vanguard Detachment, was specific to Kim’s expected duties:
Kim will be provided with Pavlov’s detailed instructions, concerning the collection of
data which are most important to us in view of operations in the offing, together with a
secret codebook for mail communication with both the Diplomatic Chancellery of the
Viceroy and the Diplomatic Representative at the Supreme Headquarters. Besides, agent
Kim will be obliged to report all reliable and urgent information about the realignments
of Japanese ground forces in adjacent areas to our command personally or through
special orderlies without delay.550
As the Russian military commanders saw disappointing results in battles in late 1904 to spring
1905, they started to question the efficacy of recruiting local inhabitants for intelligence on a
massive scale, which seemed to reduce the quality of the intelligence reports by untrained
personnel.
In June 1905 Major General Anisimov decided to “lessen surveillance of Korea, which
has lost its significance” and move the focus to “keep restraining the Japanese along the Tumen
river line” instead.551 This change of focus and disappointing results steered the Russian military
to eliminate the Korean section in the Shanghai Service. The commanders, such as Aleksandr
Svechin, saw the problem of relying military intelligence on spying by amateurs with insufficient
training, specific skills, or experience. Russian historian Evegeny Sergeev put the overall blame
on the Russian intelligence for lacking a comprehensive plan of operations, based on a “pre-war
analysis of the theatre of operations.”552 Russia’s difficulty in deciphering Asian languages with
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Chinese hieroglyphic characters, coupled with their lack of understanding of the regional culture,
proved to be detrimental to their success in winning the War.
As Sergeev noted, resistance by “poorly equipped people to elite Japanese landing troops
was doomed to failure” as the history has proven through the Russo-Japanese War.553 The
Russian military intelligence had been shoulder-strapped to local groups or field diplomats in
addition to their day-to-day responsibilities, whereas the Japanese ran a system of “total
espionage” under the principles of: “1. Each person can be a spy; 2. Each person must be a spy;
3. There is no such secret that cannot be exposed.”554
Historian Ian Nish observed that “there were communities of Japanese merchants in each
port who doubtless kept their eyes open. But the prime source of information about movements
of naval ships in and out of Port Arthur was the Japanese consulate at Chefoo from which
steamers plied regularly to Port Arthur until the outbreak of war.”555 In comparison, the Russian
military intelligence in the Far East which depended on “a network of spies and scouts recruited
from ruined peasants, illegal tradesmen, former deserters from the Chinese army and other local
villains” was no match to the Japanese counterpart of professional spies, most of whom were
members of the Black Dragon patriotic association.556 The Black Dragon Society, incidentally,
was a rightist organization, organized and led by Uchida Ryohei, with the aim “to dethrone the
Korean monarch Kojong and to expedite the annexation.”557
Japan had established its first college to teach the Russian language in 1892 and select
groups of spies were organized to move ahead of the troops to provide espionage information to
553
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the active army or navy by the end of 1903.558 In contrast, Russian military intelligence “lacked
adequate organization” and “proved unfit…in the hell of modern war.”559 Nevertheless, the
Shanghai Service offered an opportunity for Korean transnationals in the RFE and Manchuria to
collaborate with Koreans back home to engage themselves in anti-Japanese intelligence service
during the Russo-Japanese War.
Conclusion
Korea was indeed the key to Japanese expansion in Asia. By Japan’s victory in the SinoJapanese War, China was removed from the arena in 1895. Now in 1905, Japan’s success in the
Russo-Japanese War “destroyed Russian imperial pretensions in Eastern Asia and solidified
Japanese domination in Korea and Manchuria” as much as any other European nations’ chances
of expansion in Asia.560
Consequently, “Russia’s mettle as both a nation and a global power” of nationalism and
imperialism with a keen interest for expansion in Far Eastern Asia was shattered in 1905.561
Russia’s opportunity to seize the Far Eastern territories into the Outer Manchuria, which offered
“a space to demonstrate” Russia’s “vital national energies and room for independent
accomplishment,” was irrevocably derailed in the Russo-Japanese War—a war of yellow vs.
white at the dawn of the twentieth century.562
In the Western mindset of racial arrogance, an Asian nation was never expected to beat a
white nation of long military and naval strength. It was the “first time in modern history that an
Asian or non-white nation had defeated a major Western power in a major conflict,” declared
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historian Daniel A. Métraux.563As historian John A. Steinberg put it, the Russo-Japanese War
was the first war fought “between an established European power and an emerging Asian
power… in China and Korea or in adjacent waters….”564 Attesting to the transnational
ramifications of the War, Steinberg stated, “When peace was restored in September 1905, it
came neither at Shimonoseki nor in St. Petersburg, but in the American city of Portsmouth, New
Hampshire,” while Europe simply looked on as crucial decisions were being made for Asia,
facilitated by an American President. 565
Russian Emperor Nicholas II’s plans to “annex Manchuria and Korea” with his own
imperialistic dreams clashing against Japan’s suffered “a humiliating defeat” in 1905, according
to the Recollections of the Minister of War A. Kuropatkin [Memorias del General Kuropatkin:
Guerra Russo-Japonesa].566 After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia’s attention was
diverted to Manchuria with Dalny (Dalien) emerging as the main depot of China Eastern
Railway and Harbin as the hub of commerce. This point will be further addressed in Chapter III.
However, the Russian government in St. Petersburg was eager to improve their
diplomatic relations with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War and the two Russo-Japanese
Conventions were signed in 1907 and 1910. In those Conventions, Russia and Japan 1) made a
secret pact to settle their border demarcation in southern and northern Manchuria, 2) Russia
agreed to refrain from any actions of interference in the Japan-Korea relations and, in return,
Japan would honor Russia’s sphere of influence on Korean Peninsula, and 3) Japan would honor
Russia’s priority in concessions in the Outer Mongolia.
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The feeling of reconciliation was mutual between the two countries. Russia reaffirmed
the special interests of Japan in Korea and South Manchuria, as Japan recognized Russia’s in the
northern Manchuria—quid pro quo. Peace between the two belligerent nations was established
for the time-being with Korea and Koreans as the sacrificial lamb.
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, ending the Russo-Japanese War, was signed in November
of 1905, facilitated by the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, who garnered the Nobel Peace
Prize for his role in this diplomatic maneuver. Another quid pro quo was made between the U.S.
and Japan in recognizing the Philippines as the U.S. colony in exchange for Korea as Japan’s
first colony in this affair.
Next came the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty of August 1910, formalizing Japan’s
annexation of Korea as its first imperial colony. All non-Russian Koreans in Russia and nonChinese Koreans in Manchuria became de facto stateless and subjects of the Japanese Empire by
international law. However, many Koreans in the RFE refused to be considered “subjects of
Japan” and chose to be counted in the census as “poddannymi korei or koreiskimi poddannymi”
(both meaning ‘subjects of Korea’) or “net” (‘non-subjects’).”567 Many Koreans in Manchuria
disappeared into the hills in exile. The lives of these transnational Koreans, now stateless, will be
the subject of Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III. KOREAN TRANSNATIONALS AS STATELESS PEOPLE, 1906-1920
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
You are going over the peak of A-ri-rang,
Over yonder is Baik-du-san Mountain,
Full of blossoms in wint’ry cold December.
The third stanza of Arirang portrays Baik-du-san ( 頭

, white peak mountain), the highest

mountain in Korea which stands 9,003 feet tall at the northern-most border of the peninsula in
the pathway to Manchuria. To migrants from Korea, this mountain was what separated their new
home from their old and what separated them from their loved ones. It stood magnificently with
snow-capped peaks, which appeared like beautiful blossoms in their eyes yearning to return
home to Korea.
Baik-du-san was the Arirang gogae (hill) of no return for tens of thousands of Koreans in
the coming decades as Korea ceased to exist as an independent country and left its former
subjects stranded abroad as stateless. Even more Koreans crossed the borders in search of
freedom and independence after the March First Movements in 1919.
Another version of the third stanza went thus:568
Now I am an exile crossing the Yalu River
And the mountains and rivers of three thousand li are also lost.
Ariran, Ariran, Arari O!
Crossing the hills of Ariran[g].
Kim San (金

, pseudonym of Chiang Chi-rak,

) who was known as an underground

Marxist revolutionary, active in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria in the 1930s, shared the verse in an
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interview by Nym Wales (pseudonym of Helen Foster Snow), the ex-wife of American writer
Edgar Snow, in Yen-an, China in 1937.
Kim was born on March 10, 1905, in a town near Pyongyang while his family was
evacuated in the hills nearby during the Russo-Japanese War. Kim reminisced, “I was born on a
mountain in the middle of a battlefield.”569 Kim’s father was a yeoman farmer with a tiny patch
of farm fields. They lived in a typical mud-walled hut of chogajip with a thatched roof. Kim
fondly remembered the warmth of the ondol floor of the one-room hut where he grew up among
his family of eleven people, despite the constant hunger he felt as his hometown was being
ravaged by the Russian and Japanese military as they passed through. Kim left his home at the
age of eleven when his wandering life of a revolutionary began after witnessing the massacre
that followed the March First Demonstrations in 1919.
Kim explained, “There are twelve hills of Ariran,” just as Dante wrote of “twelve
heavens and twelve hills…Abandon all hope ye who enter here.”570 As Kim said, “Korea has
crossed painfully over more than twelve hills of Ariran…. Our little peninsula has always been a
stepping stone from Japan to China and back again, and from Siberia to the south…for hundreds
of years.”571 Indeed, in the years following the Russo-Japanese War and during the Japanese
occupation of Korea as its colony from 1905 to 1945, many Korean political exiles as well as
peasant migrants crossed over the hills of Baik-du-san and the Yalu River to get to the other side
of the border—the promised land with hopes and dreams to recover their lost land of samchon-li
(

, three thousand li). This chapter will cover the continuing struggles of the transnational

diasporas in the RFE and Manchuria in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.
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(Figure. 40: “Korea-Manchuria” border on the Yalu River, photographed by Jack London,
1904)572
Koreans in the Russian Far East and Manchuria struggled not only in their daily lives but
also in their fierce fights to help regain the independence of Korea while maintaining their
loyalty to the newly-adopted homelands. As their new diasporas fell victim to the rapidly
changing geopolitical environment of the early twentieth century in Far East Asia, these Korean
transplants were embroiled in bloody revolutions and the fall of empires: the Russian Revolution
(1905-1907) and the Xin-hai (

) Revolution of China (1911) which toppled the old empires

of the Tzarist Russia and the Qing Dynasty of China respectively—followed by the First World
War (1914-1918) which brought more bloodshed.
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As historian Jon Chang wrote, “RFE Koreans amply displayed their loyalty to the state
during the First World War and the Intervention…yet there were rumors… that linked Koreans
to the forces of Japanese expansion.”573 This statement aptly describe the tenuous predicament in
which Korean transnationals found themselves under suspicion as the authorities could not
distinguish the long-time Russified-Koreans with allegiance to Russia from the newly-exiled
Koreans from China, Japan, or Korea with nationalist political loyalties. The situation in
Manchuria was just as difficult, if not worse, as Koreans were suspected to be Japanese imperial
agents.
Korea as Japan’s Protectorate and Colony
The popular banner of ‘civilization and enlightenment (

改

)’ of the Pan-Asianists and

Ilchinhoe Korean elites facilitated Japanese subjugation of Korea which began upon the second
(and final) Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty, signed on November 17, 1905. This agreement was
based on the first Japan-Korea Treaty of February 23, 1904 and the Taft- Katsura Agreement
made between the U.S. Secretary of State William Howard Taft and the Prime Minister Katsura
Taro of Japan on July 27, 1905. The Treaty was signed by Japanese Plenipotentiary Minister to
Korea Hayashi Gonsuke and Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Che-soon (

) under

the oversight of Japanese Foreign Minister Ito Hirobumi on November 17, 1905.574
This final Protectorate Treaty was also based on Imperial Ordinance No. 267 of 1905.
This policy with its thirty-three articles laid out a clear picture of Japanese absorption of Korean
government affairs from top to bottom:
Article I. The residency-general (tokan-fu) shall be established at Seoul, Korea.
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Article II. A resident-general (tokan) shall be appointed to the residency-general. The
resident-general shall be of the Shin-nin rank.
…
Article VI. The resident-general shall exercise supervision over the Imperial officials and
others in the service of the Korean Government.
…
Article XXXIII. A police force shall be attached to the residency-general and each
residency. The policeman shall be of Hannin rank. The number of policemen shall be
fixed by the resident-general.575
The Ordinance laid out the overall hierarchical structure of the new residency-general over
Korea with Japanese nationals (shinnin) at the top and Korean nationals (hannin) at the bottom
layers of the governing fabric, five years before the establishment of the Korea-Japan
Annexation Treaty (

) of 1910. The Ordinance was carried out with an iron fist

immediately to affect all levels of the Korean government, Korean society, and Korean lives for
the following 35 years during the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. Marquis Ito Hirobumi
( 藤

) took office as the first Resident-General ( 監) of Korea on December 21, 1905 and

ruled with an iron fist until he was assassinated on October 26, 1909.
Ito Hirobumi, who also served as Japan’s first Prime Minister after the Meiji Restoration,
was hailed as the Father of the Meiji Constitution and was recognized as the person who
“symbolizes imperialist Japan’s annexation of Korea.”576 His contemporaries in the Japanese
government found Ito to be lacking in philosophy as a politician but a “skilled strategist”
unpredictable in a “fearsome battleground of clashing powers.” 577 Historians also found Ito
enigmatic, elusive, and ambiguous, but a man of “wit and intelligence” and “flexible
opportunism.”578
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Perhaps it was this last quality, flexible opportunism, with which Ito “co-opted the
Ilchinhoe leadership into the coalition for deposing” Gojong.579 Ito rewarded some of these
Koreans with official positions but ruthlessly abandoned them when their usefulness ran out. To
the chagrin of Ilchinhoe membership, Ito was not interested in promoting “civil rights” for
colonized Koreans, a goal for which Ilchinhoe sacrificed the “sovereignty of the Korean
state.”580
Ito delivered a speech to the local newspaper editors in Seoul on December 20, 1905,
regarding the establishment of a residency-general in Korea and his own appointment as the first
person to fill that position. As interpreted by the U.S. Chargé Huntington Wilson, Ito’s “speech
was calculated to dispel the idea that Korea is to be considered fair prey for the Japanese, and to
persuade the Koreans that although their foreign relations are taken over by Japan, yet the
prestige of their court is upheld…under the direction of the Korean Emperor.”581 However,
Gojong was a monarch only in name after the Japan-Korea Protocol went into effect.
Ito spoke of the “specific tasks before him” having to deal with “the corruption of Korean
administration and the need for its reform, and the poverty of the people.”582 Even Ito who was
put in charge to “undertake the very delicate and onerous labors of the first resident-general at
Seoul” saw the poverty-stricken people as one of his top three challenges in Korea.583 U.S.
representative Wilson regarded Ito as “very conservative, earnest, and sincere” with a “mouth of
the greatest Japanese statesman.”584 Wilson concluded his report sufficiently, but naively
reassured that “American interests in Korea will receive good treatment” under the new
579
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protectorate government of Japan.585 Wilson soon found out otherwise as Japan requested the
U.S. to withdraw its legation in Seoul, sever all direct ties from Korea—diplomatic, commercial,
or religious, as of November 28, 1905.
“It is not with regard to Korea alone, but with regard to the whole problem of the Far
East,” explained Ito in a speech to the press in Seoul on December 20, 1905. “If Japan, puffed up
by her victories in war, should forfeit the sympathy of the powers, she will be laying up for
herself misfortune in the future.” By giving “the most satisfactory assurances along these same
lines” and mainly referring to “the attention he would give to the open-door policy, as to which
the United States, Great Britain, and Japan were in accord,” Ito’s speech reaffirmed Japan’s selfpromotion to the ranks of world’s superpowers as the leader of Pan-Asianism who can bring
peace and prosperity to Asia.586
This type of conviction in Japan’s leadership for Pan-Asianism (

帶

) was

behind the country’s decades-long preparation to become the conqueror of Asia and fulfill its
mission civilatrice, a self-imposed burden to save the “backward peoples” of Asia into
civilization, as seen by historians such as W. G. Beasely and Peter Duus.587 The Japanese also
believed they needed to take on “Britain’s role as a lawgiver” of mission législatrice—
legitimizing colonialism to make the colonized feel rescued from their backwardness towards not
only civilization but also their independence.588 In other words, Japan would not treat Korea as
an independent nation until it became a civilized country according to their standards.
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In fact, historian Alexis Dudden argued that “the most transformative aspects of Japan’s
Meiji era (1868-1912)” were in their “[t]ranslating international law into Japanese and using its
terms in practice.”589 In doing so Japanese rulers enabled themselves to have “a new method of
intercourse” with the Western powers—the white foreigners—using the “vocabulary of power”
which demonstrated that Japan was on a “legal and often legislating mission—mission
législatrice—to Korea.”590 Japan learned to speak in the same language of law as the
international community of imperialist power in whose eyes the Japanese annexation of Korea
would be seen as legal. “Japanese legal missionaries to Korea,” as Dudden called them, started a
massive public relations campaign to publicize their efforts to legalize Korea to the international
and domestic audiences.591 Although Korea had some criminal codes, Japan’s legalists claimed
the codes were “random and exceedingly dangerous” and “worse than no law at all.”592 Such a
promise for legal reform would have been welcome by Korea’s populace. Many had packed up
and moved to the Russian Far East and Manchuria due to the unjust treatment they received from
yangban society.
Koreans in the Russian Far East
Images of Koreans in the Russian news media during the Russo-Japanese War were mostly
based on telegrams and reports often “borrowed from foreign media and news agencies” for lack
of Russia’s own reliable sources, resulting in “sensational” news on what was happening in
Korea at the time.593 On the one hand, Korea was seen as “a potential ally of Russia.” According
to a telegram from Russian Lieutenant-General N.P. Linevich, the acting commander of the
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Manchurian Army, on February 6, 1904, Koreans feel a “special confidence in us, see us as
friends and say that the Russians are stronger than the Japanese.” 594 A large color poster-sized
photo of Koreans welcoming Russian soldiers, seen in Moscow on March 6, 1904, validated
such a sentiment.595
On the other hand, one article in Novoje Vremya [New Time] reported some Koreans
fighting on the Japanese side, describing “Korean soldiers disguised in the Japanese uniforms in
Manchuria.”596 Such commentary shows Koreans on both sides of the war, also validating the
central finding in this dissertation—Koreans in the Japanese and Russian armies during the
Russo-Japanese War.
After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Korean migrants continued their desperate
plights to find new opportunities in the Russian Far East. Despite many success stories of their
survival and accomplishment to prove themselves as worthy subjects of the Tsar and the Soviet
Union in the decades following, their intentions were often misconstrued, resulting in
persecution in the coming decades.
According to historian Zachary Hoffman, “The year 1905 proved a disaster for the tsarist
regime on many fronts.”597 On January 9—Bloody Sunday—while Petersburg languished in a
general strike, Russian troops fired on a peaceful demonstration of people, headed toward the
Winter Palace. This event ignited “a revolution that saw further strikes, popular demands for
representational government and civil rights, and peasant violence in the countryside.”598 This
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event also signified a momentous turn of circumstances for Koreans in the RFE because their
new lives as Tsarist subjects were about to change with the Russian Empire collapsing into the
hands of revolutionaries.
Vladimir Lenin called the Russo-Japanese War “the dress rehearsal” to the Russian
Revolution of 1905, in which “All classes came out in the open” and without which the “victory
of the October Revolution of 1917 would have been impossible.”599 Russia’s defeat in the RussoJapanese War to Japan was being compared to Goliath’s defeat by David’s sling shot and
brought the stunned people onto the streets of St. Petersburg, demanding the Tsar to be held
responsible for the “shameful peace,” inflicted upon Russia.600 The uproar sparked the
revolution.
However, the question of ethnicity and national origins was different from accepting all
classes as worthy participants of the revolution, as will be seen in the following years.
Nationality became “the preeminent and singular marker of identity,” targeting Asians as “unfit”
to be “Russified subjects” despite other markers of identity such as citizenship, language, and
record of personal or public accomplishments.601
Upon signing of the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty in 1905, a large exodus of Korean
elites in the anti-Japanese resistance movement fled to the Russian Far East. The Korean
population in the RFE nearly doubled from 32,410 in 1901-1902 to 59,715 in 1912, owing to the
massive influx from Korea, as validated by various scholars.602 These figures, however, do not
take into account the actual, unofficial number of increase, estimated by 30 percent at 43,452,
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bringing the estimated total of Koreans up to 80- to 100,000 by 1910.603 In 1910, Korean-owned
agricultural properties were estimated at 1,190 desiatina (1,190 hectar) in total with 2 hectars
(6,050 pyong) per household, producing all types of grains as well as corns, potatoes, and
ginseng.604 Also raised by Koreans were cattle stocks for use in farming or for distribution as
beef. Another source estimated 50,000 Koreans living in southern Ussuri district, spread out in
104 Korean villages.605
Documents in the Archives of Foreign Policy of Russian Empire, АВПРИ, show 57,000
Koreans living in the Ussuri Province with 22,000 households (39%) with Russian citizenship.
35,000 households (61%) retained their Korean citizenship in the period between 1906 and
1915.606 This low rate of naturalization suggests that the newer migrants from Korea after
annexation represented political rather than economic migrants and their hopeful wish to return
to Korea and re-establish themselves in their homeland in the near future.
A table of “Naturalized and non-Naturalized Koreans in the RFE” in the Russian
National Historical Archives of the Far East (РИНA FE) shows the ratio of 16,965:17,434
(34,399 in total) in 1906 and 16,263:43,452 (59,715 in total) in 1912, representing a third, 37
percent, of Koreans with Russian citizenship.607 Between 1910, when Japan officially annexed
Korea, and 1920, when Japan started to promote the active settlement of Koreans in Kando,
Manchuria, the Korean population in the Maritime Province of RFE, in reaction, grew to 100,000
by 1917 but only 25 percent of Koreans had acquired Russian citizenship.608
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Most of the newcomers who flocked to Korean villages in the Priamur area could only
find work as “farm laborers (batrak)” or “tenants (arendatory)” under Russian or “fellow”
Korean landlords.609 Hence, the rift between the old immigrants, prosperous Korean landlords
with citizenship from the 1890s, and the new migrants of later arrivals in the 1910s and 1920s
deepened as their political allegiance diverged. The early immigrants were feeling settled as
Russified loyal Russians by now, whereas the later migrants viewed their time in the RFE as
temporary.
Ironically hoping to gain influence in Russia through the early migrants from Korea, the
Japanese colonial government willingly issued Koreans passports and other certificates to
facilitate their travels to the RFE. In 1910 alone, 3,923 new migrants from Korea officially
entered Russia, adding to the 50,965 Koreans who were already settled in 104 villages in the
Southern Ussuri district.610 Including the unofficial entries into the region, historian Ban Byungyul reported an increase from 34,399 to 59,715 (74% increase) during the 1906-1912 period.611
Of these Koreans officially counted, 17,080 (31%) were Russian subjects with 36,996 nonRussian in 1910, staying with the previous rate of one third of Koreans naturalizing.612 This trend
continued according to the census data taken in January 1916, which showed 2,981 Koreans in
Vladivostok with 812 educated professionals (27.2%), 760 skilled laborers and craftsmen
(25.5%), 51 household servants and drivers (1.7%), and 1,357 manual laborers (45.5%).613 Only
one in three Koreans in the RFE were Russian subjects in 1914, maintaining a similar ratio from
1910.
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Historian Ban Byung-yul and Park Chong Hyo attribute this low rate of naturalization of
Koreans to the negative campaign of Russia for Russians by Governor P. F. Unterberger during
his administration in the RFE in 1905-1910. Unterberger targeted his antagonistic campaign
toward Korean migrant population in the RFE, believing they would become the source of a
“wide range of intelligence networks” for Japan or China against Russia during the period of
conflicts.614
This position of Unterberger was also influenced by the sudden surge in the migration of
white Russians into the area by 450 percent due to the completion of Trans-Baikal Railway in
1900 and Eastern China Railway in 1902. In this situation, public opinion was also leaning
toward the protection of Russian farmers and laborers. In November 1907 the conservative
congress, or Duma, where the great majority of the deputies were Russians, promulgated a new
electoral law. This legislation reduced the number of deputies from non-Russian regions, as well
as pushed for and enacted a law restricting the immigration of foreigners in the RFE.615 The
Nationalist members of the Duma “vehemently asserted the necessity of maintaining and
increasing restrictions on the non-Russian nationalities.”616 However, the bill was short-lived and
was reversed by March 23, 1911, due to the opposition of Russian mining companies that were
profiting from the hiring of Korean migrants at low wages.617
A prominent Russian newspaper, Ruskiie Vedomosti (Русские Веломосmu), reported an
article sympathetic to the Koreans on June 20, 1910. The story explained how
Many Koreans, after Japanese occupation of Korea, fled to Russia and settled here as
their newly-found home by working hard to transform the terrible wasteland into fertile
farmlands. Thanks to their hard work, the agricultural production in the RFE was
614
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drastically improved as did the gold mines in the area where 12 percent of the miners are
of Korean origin.618 (Author’s translation)
This editorial was in line with the findings of the Amur Expedition led by Nikolai Gondatti in
1910-1912, which concluded that Russia’s local government failed to recognize the contributions
made by Korean migrants. Russians needed to utilize Korean desires to be productive citizens of
the country. Gondatti, who succeeded Unterberger as the Governor of the RFE in 1911-1917,
implemented more accommodating policies toward Koreans for their hard work and recognized
their additional contribution to the local economy as they spent 80 percent of their earnings in the
area.619
In summary, Koreans in Russia during this post-Russian-Japanese War period were
squeezed harder as Russia, their new homeland was in a period of transitioning from a long
history of Tsarist monarchy to nationalistic Bolshevik government, pushing for Russia for
Russians. At the same time Korean transnationals in the RFE were caught between Japan’s
empire building and Russia’s nation building as both countries strove to find their respective
ways to expand in their sphere of influence in the region.
Continuing Korean Anti-Japanese Resistance in the RFE and Newspaper Influences
a. Anti-Japanese Newspapers in the Diasporas
Anti-Japanese Korean newspapers, published in the RFE and Manchuria, played a crucial
role in reporting news about what was happening in Korea. These publications helped to incite
patriotic nationalism among Koreans in Korea as well as in transnational diasporas abroad
including the RFE, Manchuria, and the United States. Early newspapers and books published in

the Korean language were made possible by missionary publishing outside of Korea in the
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late nineteenth century including Fengtian (

) in Manchuria and Yokohama, Japan, and the

Catholic printing press Sŏngsŏch’ulp’anso (

, Printing Press of Religious Books),

which moved from Nagasaki, Japan, to Seoul in 1886.620
Through the efforts of Christian Literature Society (CLS), with financial support from
domestic and foreign sources, Christian missionaries enjoyed a monopoly in publishing
newspapers and Christian books in Korea such as The Independent, Hyupsung Hoebo and Maeil
Sinmun.621 Protestant missionaries established the Trilingual Press, operated by missionary
Homer Hulbert, in 1888 in Seoul. This organization started publishing the Korean Repository in
1892, followed by The Independent Newspaper in 1896. The Trilingual Press was renamed the
Methodist Publishing House in 1900 “but did not survive into the colonial period.”622
The Independent (독립신문, Tongnip sinmun) was a bilingual newspaper published in
Korean and English from April 7, 1896, until it was closed down on December 4, 1899, first
under the editorship of Soh Jae-Pil (Philip Jaisohn) and later under the leadership of Yun Chi-ho.
The editorial in its first issue on April 7, 1896 explained the paper’s mission to publish both
domestic and foreign news in a language that any Korean, learned or not, noble or base, men or
women, as well as any foreigner, can read and understand what was happening around them:
The time seems to have come for the publication of a periodical in the interests of the
Korean people. By the Korean people we do not mean merely the residents in Seoul and
vicinity nor do we mean the more favored classes alone, but we include the whole people
of every class and grade. To this end ... it shall be written in a character intelligible to the
largest possible number...put in the native character called the ŏn-mun, for the time is
shortly coming, if it is not already here, when Koreans will cease to be ashamed of their
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native character, which for simplicity of construction and phonetic power compares
favorably with the best alphabets in the world.623
Koreans did not have a written language to “express the language of their everyday speech” until
King Sejong assembled a group of scholars to invent a phonetic system comprising an alphabet
of 14 consonants and 10 vowels in 1443.624 The system, called Hangul or Hunmin Chongum
(

=proper sounds to instruct the people), was proclaimed as the national written

language for Koreans by King Sejong in 1446. Until then, only yangbans could learn to read and
write with Chinese characters in private schools, called suh-dang ( 堂). Poor commoners of
Korea who could not afford education in the past were now able to learn or teach themselves to
read and write in the new easy-to-learn 24-alphabet system that works with the spoken language
of Korea. Therefore, this editorial of The Independent indeed was proclaiming the paper being
published as a newspaper for the people, rich or poor, learned or not, of Korea.
The newspaper, reporting in everyday Korean vernacular, was able to communicate to the
general Korean public what was happening in the country and beyond, which had not occurred
until then. The populace of Korea had been kept in the dark by the yangban ruling class because
all official communication had been written in Chinese characters. This birth of print language
for all Koreans offered equal opportunities for learning and acquiring of new knowledge which
had been restricted to the upper class with a “language-of-power” in the past, as historian
Benedict Anderson exemplified.625
The February 26, 1904 issue of The Independent reported that Emperor Gojong had taken
asylum in the Russian Legation in fear of his own safety. The report of King Gojong having fled
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國

) by Edward W. Wagner]

his palace at night for asylum at the Russian legation stirred up the Korean public immediately.
The editorial, as shown in Figure 41 below, informed the public in plain Korean language:

(Figure 41: 독립신문, February 26, 1896.)
The Emperor, feeling threatened of his personal security among the factional divisions in
the court, took a leave from his own palace to seek an asylum in the Russian Legation.
The Russian Minister who was sympathetic to the grave situation, especially after the
unfortunate incident in past August, welcomed and accommodated the Emperor until
which time he could safely return. (Author’s translation)626
This incident, called Agwan-pachon ( 館
(

), refers to the monarch having taken a refuge

) in the Russian Legation ( 館), coordinated by Yi Pom-jin, the Korean Minister to St.

Petersburg, and Russian Minister to Korea Waeber. Agwan-pachon lasted over a year from
February 11, 1896, to February 20, 1897. To Korean people, their monarch hiding from the
Japanese within the Russian legation building for such an extended period was a matter of great
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concern and a national disgrace. It pained them to see their sovereign so powerless and cowardly
in self-committed captivity in a foreign prison a few steps away from his own palace.627
During this period, nonetheless, the King took a few daring measures while in the
comforts of the Russian Legation such as suspending the top-knot rule. Such actions did not
please the Japanese. As Fred Harvey Harrington commented on the incident, “Russia is on top
and Japan is eating crow,” referring to Russia seemingly having an upper hand over Japan in
influencing the affairs of Korean court.628 The situation between the countries of the region was
extremely tense.
On July 18, 1904, the Korea Daily News (大

) published its first issue in

English and Korean under the editorship of an Englishman Ernest Thomas Bethell (

) and

Yang Ki-tak for the welfare and order in Korea. Bethell, formerly with London Daily Chronicle,
enjoyed relative freedom in reporting and carrying “scathing articles” about Japan’s abusive
relationship with Korea, thanks to his extraterritorial status as an English subject based on the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty.629 The Korea Daily News enjoyed the rare exclusion from “prepublication” censorship of 1907 Newspaper Law, imposed by the Japanese colonial government
and continued to publish three daily issues: one in Korean vernacular, one in mixed script, and
another in English.630
Under Bethell’s editorial leadership, the Korea Daily News had “the widest readership”
and a circulation of 13,000 that led the other local newspapers in Seoul to express their “deep
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frustration” of Japan’s “betrayal of the yellow nations’ solidarity.”631 For example, on August 4,
1904, the Korea Daily News carried an editorial on the outlook of the Russo-Japanese War. The
newspaper reported that, in Port Arthur, Manchuria, 40,000 Russians were assembled and ready
to fend off Japanese attacks without much problem.632 After Bethel passed away, however, his
newspaper was shut down on May 20, 1910 and renamed Daily News (

) to serve as

“the official mouthpiece of the colonial authority” until the end of the colonial period.633
Many influential Korean intellectuals overseas were engaged in forming organizations
and publishing newspapers and journals for enlightenment and outreach to regain Korean
sovereignty. They were practicing what historian Benedict Anderson emphasized as the critical
role of print medium in forming “imagined community” of which members across borders may
never meet or hear of each other yet feel such close ties and comradeship with each other.634
These newspapers and journals printed in Korean language and distributed throughout the
diasporas in different regions of the world—the RFE, Manchuria, Hawaii, and California as well
as in Korea—“constructed landscapes of collective asperations” and created a sense of fraternity
with a common purpose.635
b. Anti-Japanese Organizations in the Diasporas
While the heightened uprisings of “seventy-thousand strong” Righteous Armies “who
attacked the Japanese troops from the territory of Manchuria in 1908” were dispersed by the antiguerilla operation of Japanese military, these groups tried to find new bases in the RFE.636 The
Enlightenment Movement (啓

動), formerly organized by Yi Kang of Kookmin Hoe
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(國

, KNA) and the Gongrip Hyuphoe (供

) in San Francisco, moved to the RFE and

Manchuria and was centered in Vladivostok in the fall of 1908.
This decision to relocate the KNA was also based on suspicions of American influence
by the Russian government, who worried about support coming from the U.S.-based
organization. Such a move helped Koreans in the RFE develop anti-Japanese activities through
the organizations of Shinminhoe (
(國

), Yuhakhoe (

), and Kungminhoe

=Korean Nationalist Association). Supported by Korean newspapers published in

Vladivostok, Haejo Sinmun (

) and Taedong Kongbo (大東共

), the Kookmin Hoe

expanded its outreach into the Russian Far East and Manchuria among the transnational
diasporas of Koreans.637
Korean Nationalist Association (KNA) was founded in Hawaii and San Francisco by
Park Yong-man, Syngman Rhee, and An Chang-ho in 1909 to carry out a comprehensive
independence movement.638 As the most active organization, KNA opened its branches in the
Maritime Province, more specifically in “Vladivostok, Nikolsk, Iman, Khabarovsk,
Blagoveschesk, Irkustsk, Tiumen, Krasnoiarsk, Verkhneudinsk (present-day Ulan Ude), China,
and two other Russian cities,” increasing to thirty-three branches by 1914.639
Taedong Sinbo (大同
(大同公

), previously published under the name of Taedong Gongbo

) in San Francisco but folded due to financial hardships, was taken over by Choe Jai-

hyung in Vladivostok under the new name in 1910. When the news of Japan’s annexation of
Korea reached the diasporas, Taedong Sinbo printed an article about the Korea-Japan Treaty of

637

Ban, “Koreans," 163; Alyssa Park, Borderland, 248.
Saveliev, “Militant Diaspora,” 151.
639
Saveliev, “Militant Diaspora,” 151.
638

202

Annexation having been signed on August 22, to be announced to the public on August 29-30,
1910. Governor Unterberger was alleged to have shut down the paper for its agitative report
written in a violent tone in fear of negative reactions from Japan, as Russia was anxious to
maintain an amicable relationship with Japan.640
KNA organized a meeting of Koreans on August 25, 1910, in Vladivostok where 2,324
(or 2,821) participants assembled and signed a declaration which was addressed to “The Minister
of Foreign Affairs at Washington” and “To the great powers of Europe and America, and to
China,” protesting against the annexation of Korea by Japan.641
In the post-Russo-Japanese War period of 1905-1910, Yi Pom-yun brought his Righteous
Army from Kando, Manchuria, to the RFE and formed Dongui-hoe (同

) by joining forces

with Choi Jai-hyung, Yi Wi-jong, An Choong-keun, Um In-sup and Kim Ki-ryong. This group
launched aggressive raids on Japanese police which peaked in the summer of 1908.642 The
dispatching of additional troops from Japan, authorized by the Ministry of Defense, will be
presented further later in this chapter.
After the Newspaper Law (

, Shinbunshi hô) was enacted in 1907, Japanese

censorship restrictions and regulations intensified to crack down on Korean publishing within
Korea. Consequently, Korean-language newspapers abroad took on the media role of critiquing
Japanese colonial rule in Korea.643 At the head of these newspaper attacks were Haejo Ilbo
(

), the first Korean-language newspaper in the RFE, published in Vladivostok from
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February to July 1908 under the direction of Ch’oe Pong-joon, the head of the Korean Mutual
Aid Society ( 國

共

).

Taedong Kongbo (大東共

) was another influential newspaper published in San

Francisco under the editorial leadership of Yi Gang from 1907 to 1910, along with Shinhan
minbo (

) which was published in Los Angeles, California.644 Numerous articles carried

in Shinhan minbo between 1909 and 1944 exemplified the paper’s role in disseminating news
and updates to Koreans at home and abroad.645

(Figure 42: Taedong Kongbo, Thursday, Oct. 3, 1907)
These papers carried general news on the state of affairs in Korea and in diasporas in
California, the RFE, and Manchuria. Also reported were activities of missionaries, such as Dr.
Horace Hulbert, updates on the Righteous Armies causing a havoc in various regions, and
644
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disastrous flooding in Japan as seen in the October 3, 1907 issue of Taedong Kongbo. (Figure
42).
Kwonuphoe (勸

) was an organization established by Choi Jai-hyung in the RFE,

effectively leading the anti-Japanese movement and publishing a Korean-language newspaper,
called Kwonup sinmun (勸

) under the editorial leadership of Shin Chae-ho in 1912. All of

these newspapers served to organize meetings of Koreans, report articles about Korean antiJapanese movements in Russia, and voice their protests against the Japanese annexation of
Korea.646
In summary, the table below shows newspapers and monthly journals that were published
from 1892 to the early 1910s in Korea, California, and in the RFE, as well as in Manchuria in the
1930s.
Newspaper
The Independent
(獨
)
Korean
Repository
(Monthly)
Hwangsung
Sinmun (Capitol
Gazette)
The Korea
Review
(Monthly)
Korea Daily
News
(大
)
Daily News
(
)
Haejo Sinmun
(
)
646

Pub.
Date
18921899
1892,
18951898
18981910

Language

Organization (Place of Pub.)

Editors

Korean/
English
English

Independence Club
(Seoul)
Trilingual Press Methodist
Pub. House (Seoul)

Korean/
Chinese

Independent Association
(Seoul)

Soh, Jae-Pil,
Yun, Chi-ho
Homer
Hulbert, F.
Ohlinger
Namgung
Eok

19011906

English

Methodist Publishing House
(Seoul)

Homer
Hulbert

19041910

Korean/
English

(Seoul)

Ernest
Thomas
Bethell,
Yang Ki-tak

1910-

Korean

Residency-General (Seoul)

Korean

Korean Mutual Aid Society
(Vladivostok)

C. H. Park, [Rosia yonbang], 204; Saveliev, “Militant,” 152-153.

205

Choe, PongJoon

Taedong
Gongbo
(大同公 )
Taedong Sinbo
(大同
)
Shinhan Minbo
(
)
Kwonup Sinmun
(勸
)
Manmong-ilbo
(
)*
Kando Ilbo
(間島
)*
Mansun-ilbo
(
)*

19071910

Korean

New Korean World Wide
(San Francisco)

Yi, Kang

1910-

Korean

(Vladivostok, RFE)

19091944
1912-

Korean

Korean

Taehan Kungnip Hoe
(Los Angeles)
Kwonup Hoe (Vladivostok,
RFE)
(Shenyang, Manchuria)

Choe, Jaihyung
An, Changho
Shin, Chaeho

Korean

(Shenyang, Manchuria)

19331937
19361937
1937-

Korean

Korean

(Shenyang with branches in
Yi, YongSeoul, Tokyo, and other
suk, Yum,
cities in Manchuria)
Sang-sup
(Figure 43: Newspapers published in Korea, the RFE, Manchuria, and the U.S.)
The May 7, 1908 issue of Taehan Maeil Sinbo in Seoul, however, reported the
suspension of Korean newspapers, Haejo Sinmun, Gongnip Sinmun, and Hapsung Sinmun by the
Japanese Residency General on account of the New Newspaper Law of 1907, Article 34. Their
actions were cited as “agitating and hindering of security”—"
as highlighted below in Figure 44.647 Mansun-ilbo (
Kando Ilbo (間島

의

” (chian ui bang hai),

), Manmong-ilbo (

), and

) were the newspapers published in Korean language in Manchuria, as

shown in Figure 43, fueling the independence movement and the rise of Righteous Army’s
activities to its peak in the next several years of the 1930s.
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(Figure 44: Taehan Maeil Sinbo, 1908. 5. 7.)
While most of the newspapers were actively published in California, Seoul, and
Vladivostok from 1892 to 1910, three newspapers were published in Manchuria later in the
1930s. Manmong-ilbo (

) first appeared in August of 1933 in Shenyang ( 京),

formerly called Changchun, after the city was designated as the capitol of Manchukuo (
by Japan in 1932.648 Kando Ilbo (間島

國)

) came to be published in 1936 but was taken over by

Manmong-ilbo by Yi Yong-suk and reintroduced as Mansun-ilbo (

) as of May, 1937,

under the editorship of Yun Sang-sub. Mansun-ilbo became the focal point in the lives of the
Korean transnationals in Manchuria with branches in Seoul, Tokyo, and other major cities. After
Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo, which had been the only newspapers published in Korea during

648

Kim, et al., [Korean Diaspora,] 183.

207

the colonial period, were suspended by the Residency-General in August of 1940, only the Maeil
Sinbo (Daily News) served as the official arm of communication by the Japanese.649
Kwonuphoe was also a significant financial supporter of seventy Korean schools, such as
Kyedong, Syedong, and Sindong, in the RFE, the most famous one being Hanmin School
校) in Shinhanchon (

(

=New Korea Town). With 240 student enrollments, Hanmin

School was the largest in the RFE and offered a wide-ranging curriculum of mathematics,
science, history, music, and physical education as well as Korean and foreign languages. In
addition to bible education, the students were introduced to Korean songs and indoctrinated in
anti-Japanese nationalist spirits.650
By supporting these Korean schools to instill anti-Japanese spirits into the students and
working with the local newspapers such as, Haejo sinmun (
(大東供

) and Taedong gongbo

), Kwonuphoe contributed to promoting the enlightenment of Korean people in the

area by holding educational programs to enrich their businesses and lives to become better
Koreans.651 Many of the influential people in leadership positions, such as Choi Jae-hyung, Choe
Bong-joon, and Kim Hak-man, joined forces with the leaders of Righteous Army, such as Yi
Pom-yun, Yu In-suk, and Hong Bom-do, as well as those involved, such as Yi Sang-sul, Shin
Chae-ho, and Yi Dong-hwi, in the Enlightenment Movement in Korea after their exile in the
RFE.652
By 1914, Kwonuphoe had affiliate offices in over ten cities in the RFE with 7,000
members in January which grew to 10,000 by July of the same year. Kwonup sinmun (勸
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)

with a circulation of 1,400, supported by Kwonuphoe, reached out to the Korean farmers and
laborers with news on job opportunities in an effort to help Koreans for economic achievement
as well as political independence of their homeland, Korea. Kwonup sinmun printed many
articles condemning the Japanese colonial administration, as seen in its editorial carried on
August 18, 1912:
일본인이 한국 13 도를 넓은 교도소로 만들었으며, 그 안에 살고 있는 우리 동포는
다 일본인의 죄수며, 우리나라에서 쓰는 일본의 법률과 정치는 다 우리에 대한
교도소 규칙이며, 우리나라의 일본 군사시설은 다 우리에 대한 큰 형구다.653
Japan has built a large prison out of the 13 provinces of Korea and made all the Korean
people who live in them the prisoners of Japan. All the law and order Japan has
established in Korea serve as the rules of the prison; the Japanese military systems in
Korea serve as the torture chambers for the Koreans. (Author’s translation)
This editorial, in particular, was printed in condemnation of the Japanese torturing incident of
105 Koreans, in which Righteous Army militias and many resistance activists were arrested and
tortured in Korea. The editorial reflects the effects of Japan’s mission législatrice in concurring
Korea and by learning to speak in the same language of law as the international community of
imperialist power in whose eyes the Japanese annexation of Korea would be seen as legal.654One
can see how much the print media, published by patriotic intellectuals and organizations overseas
in diasporas, helped to lead the anti-Japanese resistance movements when the press in Korea was
under the watchful eyes of Japanese colonial administration in this period. Now this dissertation
will examine the Korean transnationals in their efforts to become loyal Tsarists and Soviet
subjects in the changing environment of their new homelands, the RFE, after the Russian
Revolution of 1905-1917.
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c. Koreans as Tsarist and Soviet Subjects
While some Korean newspapers in the RFE demonstrated and cultivated Korean nationalism
and anti-Japanese sentiment in the transnational diaspora, other Russian newspapers also showed
Korean devotion to Russia. For example, Koreans in the RFE “amply displayed their loyalty to
the state” through an open petition carried in Dalny Vostok (Far East), an RFE newspaper on
August 19, 1910. Signatories pledged that the second- and third-generation Koreans would be
“Russified and loyal” to Russia by 1910.
PETITION.
We, the representatives of the Korean associations of the Primore region from
Vladivostok, Nikolsk-Ussuriisky, Khabarovsk, … and other places, numbering sixteen
people, met in the city of Vladivostok on August 19, 1910. We resolved to request that
the Russian Government allow Korean subjects to become Russian subjects….You
should take into account that we, Koreans, have resided for many years on the Russian
territory, and have lost any connections with our former motherland, which has been
replaced by Russia. We would like to be faithful subjects of Russia along with many
other nationalities, populating it with equal rights…and pledge to serve the Russian czar
faithfully…to reinforce the ranks of the Russian army in the Far East….We sign this on
behalf of the associations of the Primore region numbering some 9,780 males of the
population, not including females and children. City of Vladivostok, August 19, 1910.655
Through this petition, a comprehensive declaration of loyalty, including service in the army
along with all other duties, as Russian subjects was pledged in the name of 9,780 men with their
family members. Another article in the same paper, also in 1910, reported that hundreds of
Korean children were entering the Russian school system with many finishing their secondary
education or working among the “general (Russified) populace” to serve Russia as “their new
fatherland.”656
Historian Chong Hyo Park also noted that Koreans who acquired Russian citizenship
started to happily serve in the military by 1909 because they saw this as proof of having equal
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rights as Russian subjects. In 1915 3,000 Koreans residing in Khabarovk, Vladivostok, and
Beliye Sovki applied for citizenship. V.V. Grave recognized the fact that many Koreans had
served in the Russian Army.657 And their children of school age entered schools: 816 boys and
46 girls were attending 20 mission schools run by Russian Orthodox Church, and others attended
three schools run by the Russian government. One of those three schools were opened with funds
from Koreans in Vladivostok under the Superintendent G. V. Podstavin.658
Koreans also showed their loyalty by enthusiastically participating in the “Russian
Revolution of February 1917”—the February Revolution (

)— which overthrew the

Tsar’s regime. Koreans of the RFE assembled at the First General Assembly of Korean Socialist
Rally in Nikolsk-Ussurisk in June 1917.659 Many of the wonhoins (
well as yohoins (

), the early settlers, as

), the newcomers, joined with 96 representatives from various towns in

attendance at the rally. Unfortunately, a division showed during the rally among the participants.
The yohoins, who were mostly engaged in manual labor jobs, were unhappy about the wonhoin
contingents. Some of the earlier migrants with financial means were already Russified,
seemingly pursuing their own interests without any concerns for the patriotic independence
causes of Korea or the ideology of Bolshevism.660
In 1919, four thousand Koreans also returned from the First World War after serving in
the Russian Army. These veterans prodded other Koreans in their diaspora into becoming
“staunch Bolshviks.”661 During the period of Korenizatsiia (indigenization) into the 1920s, a
program was instituted to educate Soviet national minorities and convert them to “fervent Soviet
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cadres”—a “socialist construction” of the Koreans as a Soviet people.662 While the program
succeeded in its outreach to younger generation, it also produced “a generational clash” within
the Korean community on the issues of Russification.
Korean transnationals, old and new, Russified or not, made earnest efforts to show their
support for the new Soviet Russia. Whether out of true sense of allegiance or instinct of pure
survival in the volatile geopolitical environment, they rallied in the Russian Revolution and
served in Russian military in the First World War. The wide-ranging differences in the origins,
family and social backgrounds, education and experiences of those in leadership positions in the
RFE and Manchuria will be presented in the next section.
One case in the contemporary Korea-Russia relations to be noted before moving forward
is the appointment of Yi Bom-jin (

) as the plenipotentiary consular in St. Petersburg by

Emperor Gojong in 1899. As recorded in Yijo Sillok on March 15, 1899:663
미국에 주재한 특명전권공사 (
權公 ) 이범진은 러시아 (
( 蘭 ), 오스트리아 (
國) 세 나라에 주재하도록 하라.

羅

), 프랑스

I am hereby appointing Yi Bom-jin of the U.S. Plenipotentiary Consular to serve as the
Plenipotentiary Consular to Russia, France, and Austria simultaneously. (Author’s
translation.)

By this order, Yi Bom-Jin was reassigned from his previous diplomatic post in the U.S. and
appointed to represent Korea as Plenipotentiary Consular in Russia, France, and Austria
simultaneously. Kim Suk-kyu was appointed to Japan and Min Yong-hwan to the U.S. Yi was a
close confidant and family relation of Emperor Gojong, known to have played an important role
in the Emperor’s asylum in the Russian Legation ( 館
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Yi served in his appointed capacity as Korea’s representative to Russia from 1900
through the Russo-Japanese War. However, the Japanese Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura raised
his objection to having Yi stay in his post in St. Petersburg after the Russo-Japanese War ended.
Komura questioned on May 28, 1904: “Corea has now annulled all her treaties and conventions
with Russia, would it not be better to take steps to have Corean Minister at St. Petersburg
recalled as I hear he is a person of rather pro-Russian character?”664 Komura’s objection clearly
raised a red flag in having Korea’s diplomatic liaison in foreign relations not to mention a proRussian.
After Yi’s position officially ended with no further official recognition or financial
support from the Korean court, Russian Emperor Nicolai II (reigned 1894-1917) who had
become fond of Yi continued to provide a nominal level of financial support for Yi. And Yi,
called “Prince Yi” in the Russian diplomats circle in reverence for his noble composure,
continued to communicate with Gojong by secret correspondence and telegram, until he
committed suicide on January 13, 1911.665 Historian Sergei Kurbanov wrote that there existed
over 100 pages of confidential documents and records, regarding the surveillance on Yi and
other Koreans who frequented the Consulate in St. Petersburg, preserved in Russian archives.666
Yi, born into an upper-class yangban family and in his service to Emperor Gojong as a diplomat,
was one of the transnational Koreans displaced on foreign lands, Russia and the U.S., continuing
to serve his homeland across the borders and to restore its sovereignty after all. In Yi’s own
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words, “I was reduced to the lonely life of a refugee without country, family, or future.”667 The
significance of Yi’s case exemplified how a diplomat of a fallen nation struggled to keep an
“embassy without government” as was experienced by another diplomat in a similar situation,
Dmitrii I. Abrikossow, of the Russian Empire in Japan in 1917.668
The St. Petersburg Gazetta carried the news of the Korea-Japan Treaty having been
signed by the Korean Emperor Gojong in an article, printed on July 9, 1907 under the heading,
“The Arrival of Lawless Era in Korea –Japan Threatening, Emperor Self-abdicating” (Author’s
translation) with a caricature entitled, “Korean Emperor self-abdicating” as shown in Figure 45
below.669 Russian media so noted the sad ending of the autonomous state of Korea.

(Figure 45: “스스로 물러나는 대한제국의 황제 [susuro mulernanun daehan jeguk ui
hwangje= Korean Emperor, signing his self-abdication paper]” A caricature in Petersburg
Gazetta, 1907.7.12, No.188, p.2)670
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d. Diversity of Leadership among the Korean Transnationals in the RFE
It was in the Russian Far East, centered at Shinhanchon (

=New Korean village) in

Vladivostok, where the first group of Korean migrants to the RFE had settled and formed a
Korean diaspora in 1863. This location also served as the central hub of the Korean
independence movement in the 1910s. Many former Koreans joined in and united at the
coordination of Kwonuphoe as the central organization of support.671 This group’s leaders
included Yi Wi-jong, the son of Yi Bom-Jin, former Consular to Russia, who was dispatched to
Hague Peace Convention as Gojong’s envoy; Yi Dong-hui who established the Temporary
Korean Government in Shanghai; Oh Ha-mook who served in the Red Army; and Kim In-su
who served in the White Army. These individuals had to choose among the ideologies of
Marxism, communism, socialism, and partisanship.
Working together with the two prominent leaders of the early settlers, Choi Jai-hyung and
An Choong-keun, was a core resistance group known as Danji dongmaeng (斷

同

). All

thirteen members of this group, of which An was a member, severed their left ring fingers to
pledge allegiance to work together for Korea’s independence, hence the name “danji” which
means cutting fingers. An was arrested for having assassinated the much-hated Governor
General Ito Hirobumi at the Harbin Train Station and has been hailed as a national hero by
Koreans ever since.672
When examining the profiles of the fifty top resistance leaders in the RFE, as presented in
РОССИЙСКИЕ КОРЕЙЦЫ, [Photographic Representation of the Anti-Japanese Independence
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Movement of Koreans in Russia] (Author’s translation), one can see the diversity of their
transnational origins and the ways they made contributions to the movement. Some were born in
Korea and migrated with their families at an young age. Others were born in the RFE. Some
were highly educated elites in Korea, Japan, or Russia, while others were uneducated laborers or
poor farmers. A few including Yi Bom-yun and Yi Yong were born in noble yangban families of
Korea. A few were born to rich merchants in the RFE, while most others were born in poor,
peasant migrant families from various regions of Korea. Some fought in the Russo-Japanese War
on the Russian side, while others went on to fight in the Red Army, White Army, or World War
II as Russians.673
The following table shows an analysis of the 50 leaders presented in the 2019 publication
entitled Anti-Japanese Independence Movement of Russian Koreans Seen by Photographs and
edited by Valentin Valentinovichi Choi (Цой Валентин Валентинович), the grandson of Choi
Jai-hyung.674 Where they were born in Korea or in the RFE, their family and educational
background, status in the Russian Communist Party, Red Army, participation in Righteous Army
or Partisan activities, and whether they or their families were deported in 1937 or executed are
tabulated and presented in Figure 46.
Born in
Korea

Born in the
RFE

31
Red Army
commander
or soldier

Yangban:Poor
Farmer’s
family
5 : 24
Deported in
1937

Korean
Independence
Movement
22
Executed in
1937 or later

Partisan
commander

14
26
High official
Laborer
in
Communist
Party
12
15
13
11
5
(Figure 46: Analysis of the profiles of Korean leaders in the RFE and Manchuria)
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R-J War
participant
3
Educated in
college or
military
schools
18

Most of these leaders were in the Righteous Army, actively involved in independence
movement activities including the March First Demonstrations that were held in the RFE and
Manchuria a few weeks after the news of March First demonstration in Seoul. Some organized or
became active as Bolsheviks and in the partisan movement before getting into the upper echelon
of the Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s. Many were deported to Uzbekistan, executed, or
exiled during Stalin’s terror years in 1937 and after. Some were reinstituted to the Communist
Party and served as top officials while others never regained their former glory as Tsarists or
Soviets.
Most were fluent in Korean, Russian, and Japanese languages. Some were educated in
Korean schools, even in traditional suhdangs, old-fashioned schools as in Korea, in the RFE or
Manchuria. A few were educated in teacher’s colleges in Vladivostok, in the Havarovsk
Leningrad Military Academy, or Waseda University in Japan. Most were also active in the
Russian Revolution and the Communist Party as well as in Righteous Army in the 1900s-1910
and the Korean Independence Movement in the 1920s. Several were either deported, executed or
sent into exile around 1937 during the Great Terror years of Stalin.As these Korean
transnationals were busily working to regain independence for their homeland, Japan’s
aggressive colonial administration tightened their domination of Koreans not only in Korea and
but also reached over to exert their new power of imperialism in the RFE, which will be
examined next.
During the Russian Civil War, 1918-1921, following the Bolshevik-led October
Revolution (1917), the Supreme War Council of the Entente Powers decided to invite the Allies
of World War I to share in Siberia’s wealth of natural resources. Japan was the first nation to
enter the RFE with “55,000 to 120,000 soldiers” in some counts and “73,000 soldiers” in other
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estimates.675 Even using lower estimates, Japanese troops outnumbered other allies with 12,000
Poles, 9,000 Americans, 5,000 Chinese, 4,000 Serbs, 4,000 Romanians, 4,000 Canadians, 2,000
Italians, 1,600 British, and 700 French soldiers. After American forces pulled out of the region
on April 1, 1920, the Japanese took control of “all the railways from the Transbaikal to
Vladivostok (the Ussuri, Amur, and Transbaikal lines)” which they saw as critical in their
“empire building” with rich natural resources, such as timber, oil, natural gas of the region.676
When all Allied Forces cleared out of the RFE, Japanese forces grew in number from
73,000 to 100,000 by joining operations with the White Army from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok.
The Japanese began to raid Korean districts, including Sinhanchon, killing and beating hundreds
of Koreans, closing down Korean schools, and emerging as “de facto rulers” of the RFE.677
During this raid of terror in the evenings of April 4 through 7, 1920, most of the Korean leaders
were killed including Choi Jai-hyung.678
Japanese forces “laid siege to Korean independence armies, decimated villages of Korean
expatriates, and dissolved Korean nationalist and socialist organizations,” wrote Alyssa Park.679
Through this violent siege, the Japanese military firmly established “a non-negotiable state of
martial law, brutalizing not only Chinese and Koreans, but Russians, Cossacks, and Ukrainians”
across the RFE. Japan acted “as an ‘enemy nation’ that did not value the lives of others” and a
self-proclaimed world power that had beaten the Russian Army in 1905.680
In spite of their continuing resistance activities against Japan and show of loyalty to
Russia, the Korean nationalists in the RFE were greatly reduced in their power. Not only Choi
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Jae-hyung was killed in the Japanese raid in April of 1920 but also Yi Bom-yun was arrested and
sent into an exile in 1910. The resistance movement of Koreans in the transnational diasporas
would gain strength by combining their forces in 1905-1908 but suffer a significant loss of their
power in the 1910s, as will be presented later in this chapter.
Koreans in Manchuria
Having examined how Korean transnationals fared in the Russian Far East after the RussoJapanese War ended, this chapter will now investigate how their fellow Koreans in Manchuria
managed. Manchuria appeared to offer a great refuge for various types of Koreans who arrived in
the early twentieth century: working-class poor in need of income either by farming or manual
labor, middle-class commoners without any prospect of social mobility in Korea, and educated
elites in exile to pursue anti-Japanese resistance in independence movements. At this point,
Manchuria was still under the Qing Dynasty on its way to a final collapse in 1912, soon to
become Manchukuo, the puppet nation of Japan in 1932.
With a total population of approximately 29,198,020 in 1920, Manchuria was inhabited
by Manchus, Chinese and in the Kwangtung Peninsula by Japanese.681 The Korean population,
as reported by the Foreign Ministry, was 488,656 in 1920, 513,973 in 1925, and 629,000 in
1931.682 Mongolia was inhabited “chiefly by Mongolian tribes with a large sprinkling of
Chinese…. Besides these, there are some 600,000 Koreans in Mongolia, and more than 100,000
Russians” which is more or less similar to the estimates given by the Foreign Ministry.683The
pattern of labor migration continued: “Every spring from 350,000 to 450,000 coolies migrate
from Shantung to work on the Manchurian farms, and on the railway, and after the harvest
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220,000 to 330,000 return to their homes.”684 Many others stayed in Manchuria and found
permanent employment.
As Charles Walter Young, Technical Counsellor to the Far Eastern Commission of
Enquiry by the League of Nations, reported in 1932, the number of Koreans in Manchuria has
been “variously estimated as totaling between approximately 700,000 and 1,500,000” for several
reasons.685Young attributed such an “extraordinary discrepancy” to various factors: 1) no real
census had ever been taken of Manchurian population, 2) most of the Japanese figures came
from the Consular Service in Manchuria with a tendency to minimize the Korean population,
while the Chinese sources gave “extraordinarily high” counts to claim their allegation of Koreans
in Manchuria being the “vanguard of Japanese penetration and absorption” and 3) Koreans in
Manchuria wanted to “conceal their nationality and identity” and remain unaccounted for, as
many were engaged in clandestine activities of independence movement or militant resistance
such as Righteous Armies.686
Koreans in Manchuria have been categorized into two types in the historiography:
transnational migrants who came in search of better life but with no opportunities open except
for agriculture or manual labor, and patriotic nationalists fighting for Korea’s independence—
“Korea for Koreans”—in opposition to the Japanese imperialist aggression.687 Both groups of
Koreans were wedged between “two opposing forces”—the nationalist Chinese who resented the
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Korean intrusion and the imperialist Japanese who regarded Koreans as the Japanese “medium”
of imperialism.688
Other historians argued there were three types of Koreans in Kando district in the early
1900s: pro-Japanese serving the Japanese kempeitai (
Righteous Army (

), and members of Ilchinhoe (

隊), anti-Japanese guerrillas in

= Advancement in Unity Society).

These three groupings of Koreans in Manchuria brought more divisiveness into their
transnational diaspora as the Russo-Japanese War erupted in 1904 and Korea fell under the
Japanese colonial administrative structure between 1905 and 1910.
Historian Hyun Ok Park described Korean lives in Manchuria as being caught between
Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism as well as Korean desire for land ownership.
Koreans developed a “triangular relationship” or “bedfellow-type relationship” with the Chinese
and Japanese “by turning these rivals against each other.”689 Park further characterized this
phenomenon as the “politics of osmosis” in a strange dual dynamic relationship of “tongsang
imong” [同

] in which two “bedfellows”—the colonizers and the colonized sharing one

bed— are having two different dreams.690
In their attempt to occupy and expand into Manchuria as their next colony, Japan
dispossessed them of their land in Korea to make room for Japanese farmers as part of the
Japanese national plan of imperial expansion into the continent of Asia. The Kando Treaty was
established in 1909 between China and Japan with the latter “acting on the interest of its
protectorate”— Korea.691 The territorial rights of Kando, to which Koreans had migrated and
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cultivated since 1860s, were seceded to China by this Treaty in exchange for the Japanese right
to establish a police presence under the pretext of providing safety for the Japanese consulate and
its residents.
Such politics of osmosis developed prominently in the relationship between Korean
migrants and the Japanese empire in Kando. Between Korean peasants and Japanese power
holders, both dreamt of obtaining land in Manchuria after the Sino- and the Russo-Japanese
Wars. Both ended up empowering the Japanese advancement into Manchuria. Korean migrants
of the early days were preoccupied by their wish to own lands, which they could not do in Korea.
The Korean population grew from 71,000 in 1907 to 356,010 by 1926, while the Hans and Mans
amounted to only 23,500 in 1907 and 86,349 in 1926. As discussed in Chapter I, many of these
Koreans in the Kando area were given rights to own land regardless of their status as Chinese
subjects or not, because China wanted to populate their borderlands with migrant Koreans to
create a buffer zone.
On the other hand, the Japanese government wanted to promote emigration of Japanese
and Koreans to Manchuria for a number of reasons. First of all, after the massive demonstrations
across Korea and in the diasporas in 1919, Japan appeared to relax their aggressive repression of
Koreans. Instead the Japanese government encouraged Koreans to move out of the peninsula to
the outer regions of Manchuria, the RFE, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland.692 Secondly, in view of
the reluctance of Japanese’s emigration to Manchuria, Japan tried to make room for Japanese
nationals in the Korean peninsula where daily life was less harsh and relatively easier.693 With
the establishment of Southern Manchurian Railway Company with a headquarter in Dalien in
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1906 and the Oriental Development Company in 1908, followed by the Kando Treaty, signed in
1909, Japan tried to encourage more Japanese to emigrate to Kando area. However, the Japanese
people preferred to open businesses and settle in Korea where they felt safer and closer to home
in Japan. Although statistics show an increase of the Japanese in Manchuria from 75,219 in 1910
to 228,700 in 1930, the Japanese tended to stay within the confines of Kwandong Chochaji
(關東

) area.694
Overall, the Japanese population in the general areas of Manchuria increased only by a

fraction at best according to the same statistics quoted above, from 13,285 in 1910 to 14,407 in
1930. The report from South Manchurian Railway shows a decrease from 14,399 in 1910 to
13,909 in 1927, whereas Korean population grew from 50,666 in 1910 to 545,833 in 1927, more
than ten-folds, in a striking contrast.695 According to the statistical data of Harbin taken by the
number of residents in 1938, the population of Koreans in Kando, “a new frontier of
impoverished and uneducated peasants,” represented 47 (0.2%) with 31-51 years as early
settlers, 1,978 (19.2%) with 6-30 years, 2,118 (36.7%) with 0-5 years as new arrivals in Kando,
and 1,621 (28.1%) as the second generation born in Manchuria.696 Using these statistics in the
absence of reliable population reports of the late 1800s and the early 1900s, one may deduce the
presence of new arrivals, as well as early settlers and a second generation of Koreans—in almost
equal distribution, taking into account that about a half of the new arrivals returned to Korea.697
Charles Young quoted Kim San-min, one of the Korean employees of the South
Manchurian Railway in Dalien, as saying “Generally speaking, no opportunities are open for the
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Koreans, except in agriculture. Of educated Koreans in Manchuria living in the interior, some 30
percent are paid for by anti-Japanese organizations and the rest are all educated idlers….in places
directly under the jurisdiction of the Japanese consulates, some 30 per cent of the Koreans are
traders in contraband, 10 per cent are merchants and another 10 per cent are engaged in various
trades.”698 What Kim meant by various trades included trading of illegal drugs and smuggling as
noted by Young.
The image below in Figure 47 shows a pattern of distribution of Korean migrant
population in Manchuria in 1929. This information was captured by historian Hoon K. Lee of
Union Christian College in Pyongyang, Korea as part of the studies of “migration and land use in
pioneer belts of the world” sponsored by the American Geographical Society.699 As shown in
Lee’s calculation based on his intensive fieldwork and footwork, extremely heavy concentrations
of Koreans existed right above the Yalu (on the left) and Tumen (on the right) Rivers, densely
clustered in Jilin and Kando regions.

(Figure 47: Koreans in Manchuria, 1929)700
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As another Japanese whom Young quoted wrote: “Of Koreans in Manchuria, about half
of the inhabitants, other than farmers, are without regular employment, or, more exactly, are
secretly engaged in unlawful occupations… smuggling of contraband drugs and other articles ….
Most of the smugglers live in cities in the Chinese Eastern Railway area, notably in Harbin.”701
Both legal and illegal opportunities were open to Korean transnationals in Manuchuria in the
post-war period. Korean lives in Manchuria were deeply affected even as new opportunities
arose for them to serve as Japanese colonials without actually having the same privileges as the
Japanese nationals. Koreans were increasing their status as owners of lands or sizable businesses,
as more of their compadres continued to migrate from Korea to escape the Japanese colonial
administration.
a. The South Manchurian Railway Company
As a statement of self-congratulations for public relations and advertisement in 1922, the
South Manchurian Railway Company claimed that a “great railway system has brought modern
enterprise, education and civilization into the provinces.”702 Historians have recognized South
Manchurian Railway Company as one of the two primary vehicles of the Japanese enterprise of
economic imperialism in the region along with the Oriental Development Company.
Bertram Lenox Simpson, also known as B. L. Putnam Weale, gave insight into the impact
of the South Manchurian Railway Company in the early 1900s. He explained how:
There is to-day a curious and ominous little sign in North-Eastern Korea. During the war
a great deal of light railway material was landed at Gensan, and carried by small steamers
to the northern port of Songching. It now transpires that a light military railway has been
constructed from…Chinch’eng to a village bearing the name of Huailin on the Tiumen
river. This river…marks the Chinese-Russian frontier. The total length of the railway is
given as 112 miles (230 Chinese li, or 75 miles) by road from its terminal point, Hualin,
to the Chinese town of Hungchun on the Kirin-Primorsk frontier.703
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Weale noted the expanding presence of railways throughout Korea as the Japanese were trying to
build a throughway system to connect with ease from Japan to China via various cities of Korea:
Seoul-Gensan, Seoul-Busan, and Seoul-Gunsan then up to the northern borders in Hoeryong,
Hamgyongdo, and up to Hunchun, China.
Such a system would make Japan’s imperial projects in Korea and China infinitely easier
for transporting people and materials in the coming years. Weale suspected that railways for
commercial concessions such as the Tumen River Lumber Concession were being brought into
Chosun by Japan to enable massive transportation of Japanese soldiers into China or Russia
“with the utmost secrecy at a few hours’ notice,” forecasting what was to come in the coming
decades.704 Historian Peter Duus confirmed in 1984 that “there was a strong army interest in
railroad construction” since the railway line to connect “from Fusan through Seoul to Uiju on the
Manchurian border” along with telegraph lines between Seoul, Fusan, and Incheon, served as a
“great thoroughfare across the Asian continent” which served not only the Japanese Military but
also the commercial ventures well in the coming years.705
By way of diplomatic dispatch No. 47 sent from Ambassador Luke E. Wright in Tokyo
on October 15, 1906, the U.S. Secretary of State was informed of the incorporation of the South
Manchurian Railway Company as of August 18, 1906. The Government Order was signed by
Minister of Communications Isaburo Yamagata, Minister of Finance Yoshiro Sabatani, and
Minister for Foreign Affairs Tadasu Hayashi on August 1, 1906. The South Manchurian Railway
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Joint Stock Company was founded by Imperial Ordinance No. 142, signed on June 7, 1906. The
Head office would be located in Tokyo and with a branch office in Tairen (Dalien).706
According to Ambassador Wright’s dispatch, the South Manchurian Railway Company
was established “for the purpose of operating the railways and adjacent mines in southern
Manchuria.”707 The company’s shares were to be held “only by the Governments and subjects of
Japan and China.” The capital of the new company was to be 15,000,000 yen, of which the
Japanese government held “one-half in the shape of its Manchurian railways and mines.”708 The
remaining half of the shares was to be divided among Japanese subjects, the Japanese
government and the subjects of China (to be determined by the Chinese government), ensuring a
majority of the stock would be in Japanese hands.
Wright surmised that it was the Japanese policy to own a controlling interest and to direct
the operations of all railways in Manchuria. One of the sore points of contention in the future, as
laid out in Wright’s memo, was the size of the railroad gauge in the Russian railway of the north
(5 feet wide) being different from the standard 4 feet 8.5-inch gauge of the lines in Korea and
China. This issue of compatibility was resolved by the Japanese replacing the Russian railroad
tracks.
The first president of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), Goto Shimpei (

),

founded the Research Department, which he “considered utterly essential to colonial
management” in April 1907.709 By 1940, the Research Department of the company alone
employed 2,354 employees for 38 years under the master plan developed by Goto. The president
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believed in “military preparedness in civil garb (bunso teki bubi)”—a “cultural invasion with a
Central Laboratory, popular education for the resident populace, and forge other academic and
economic links.”710 In other words, Goto believed the best way to rule the colonials was to
infiltrate their cultural lives through education. As seen in the later years of Japanese colonial
administration of Korea, the government deprivd the colonials of the use of their own national
language, Hangul, in their daily lives, public and private.
Under Goto’s direction, major research projects were launched to 1) study the economy,
society, and cultures of Manchuria to help develop “long-range economic policies” in the region,
2) study the environment, science and technology, “such as physics, chemistry, geology,
agriculture, botany, hygiene, meteorology, and bacteriology,” of the region, as well as 3) connect
the findings of these studies to “business and statistical matters connected with the Company
activities.”711 These research projects were launched and accomplished in the next decades,
producing monumental research reports of 2,250 pages in five volumes on the history and
geography of China and Korea, in cooperation with Tokyo University School of Sinology.712
The next management principle Goto Shimpei applied after taking office as the first
president of the SMR was to push for agricultural immigration of Japanese people into
Manchuria between 1904 and 1906 and facilitate the formation of a Japanese town near the
SMR. However, the Japanese who migrated came under the assumption that Manchuria was a
wide open, mostly uninhabited area, were confronted by many antagonistic Chinese who had
already settled in the area. Majority of the Japanese ended up returning to Japan promptly.713 As
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seen in the table below by H. K. Lee (Figure 48), the total population of Manchuria by
agricultural regions in 1920 was 29,190,020.

(Figure 48: Manchurian Population According to Agricultural Regions)714
From 1895-1910, the impact of the establishment of the South Manchurian Railway in
1906 and the Oriental Development Company in 1908 on the lives of Korean transnationals was
too soon to be measured in full scale. Their lives in Manchuria were impacted more greatly, for
better or worse, after Japan established Manchukuo, the puppet state, in 1932 with a figure head
of Pui as the last Emperor of China.
b. Newer Arrivals from Korea, 1910With the establishment of the Oriental Development Company (東

) by Ito

Hirobumi in 1908, the Japanese Government launched an aggressive acquisition of agricultural

714

H. K. Lee, “Korean Migrants,” 200.

229

lands and cadastral registration of lands in Korea, resulting in “the mounting indebtedness of
Korean landowners and tenants” and “the consequent mortgaging of agricultural lands to loan
associations,” all of which pushed more Korean migrant farmers to cross the borders without
much choice, being deprived of lands to work on at home.715
Mass migration of Koreans to Manchuria surged to 300,000 after the March First
Demonstration in 1919 before decreasing by 90,000 disappointed returnees. The net total of
Koreans was 200,000 by 1926. However, C. Walter Young who had been dispatched to
investigate “Korean problems in Manchuria” by the Commission of Enquiry by the League of
Nations stated that “No doubt there had long been a clandestine seepage of Koreans from their
homeland into Manchuria, especially of those who are political partisans opposed to Japanese
rule in Chosen.”716 The Japanese Government’s official policy toward Korean emigration to
Manchuria vacillated between the terms of Governor General Terauchi who took the position of
restriction and the next Governer General Viscount Saito who stood for encouragement of
emigration . The Japanese never “imposed rigid passport and inspection regulations” at the
border of Koreans migrating to Manchuria.717
Koreans as the colonized became Japanese subjects by legal definition, which placed
Koreans in Manchuria supposedly at the same level as the Japanese nationals and above the
Chinese. However, Koreans were not considered entirely Japanese. Koreans were categorized as
“Bandoin” ( 島

=Peninsula people), which put Koreans in a precarious position in between

the Chinese and the Japanese.718 As of March 1932, Koreans in Manchuria were permitted to
maintain dual citizenships as Japanese and Manchukuo subjects by the Japanese Government in
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their push to promote more Koreans to migrate from Korea to Manchuria as producers of rice, as
well as to “make room for Japanese immigrants” on Korean Peninsula.719
Historian Barbara Brooks asserted that the Japanese colonial administrators, such as
Consul General Hayashi Kyujiro and Consul Ishii Itaro, advocated policies that encouraged
Korean immigration to Manchuria and naturalization as Japanese subjects, which “exacerbated
Chinese abuse of Korean settlers.”720 In an interview characterized as “extremely hostile” by
Brooks, when questioned by a reporter about the dangerous situation of “Chinese authorities
oppressing or harassing Koreans in Manchuria,” Hayashi answered:
Dangerous? Isn’t this inevitable because they are said to be Japanese citizens just like us?
I treat Koreans as citizens of the empire in just the same way I treat Japanese people. The
majority of problems of my job concern ordinary people.721
Hayashi and other Japanese leaders’ so-called policy of inclusion of Koreans as Japanese in
Manchuria further aggravated the Chinese abuse of Koreans whom they regarded as the foremen
of Japanese colonialism.
Among the many reports and documents recorded in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives for the period of 1930-32 on the matters of Koreans in Manchuria is a comprehensive
analysis called “Situation of life of Koreans in Kanto (Jiandao [Chentao], Gando)” with tables,
showing the “ratio of farmer and peasant families to land owners, classification of landowners,
owner farmers, peasants, owner farmers with tenant work in Hunchun region of Kanto in
1930.”722
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Koreans
Chinese
No. Households of Farmers
29,551
3,373
No. Farmers
167,359
19,544
66,586
56,748
Land owned ( )
Landlords
1,630
1,301
Yeomen
9,671
1,178
Tenant Farmers
11,084
507
Small Yoemen Farmers
7,166
387
(Figure 49: Ratio of Farmers between Koreans and Chinese in Kando, 1931)723
The above figures represent predominantly large numbers of farming households and
farmers of Korean descent compared to the Chinese by nearly ten-fold, while the size of the land
owned show very little difference with Korean-owned being slightly larger than Chinese-owned
acreage. This high number of Koreans who owned lands in 1931 might have been due to the
influx of affluent upper-class Koreans exiling to escape the Japanese imperialist aggression. As
for the number of tenant farmers, Koreans were predominantly higher than Chinese, however, it
is not certain whether Korean tenants were working under Korean landlords or Chinese.
When the official inauguration of Manchukuo was about to be announced in February
1932, Yun Chi-ho wrote in his diary on February 22, “As a Korean patriot I would like to see
Japan succeed in its Manchurian policy…the Japanese nation … may be inclined to be somewhat
more generous in its political and economic treatment of the Koreans in Korea…A Japancontrolled Manchuria will have room for employment of a large number of educated
Koreans.”724 Yun hoped that Japanese expansion into Manchuria would bring more opportunities
for Koreans as it did for Japanese who gained jobs and businesses to assist their imperial
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projects. Many Koreans spoke the language and were familiar with the Japanese culture, having
been a colony for two decades by then.
Although Japanese officials and businessmen were “ambivalent about enlarging the scope
of Korean duties and responsibilities,” due to “fear and suspicion” as well as “arrogance and
racism” against Koreans, historian Carter J. Eckert saw some of Yun’s expectations were
fulfilled to a certain extent.725 Eckert cited a Korean businessmen joining in the expansion of the
empire by establishng a ten-million-yen textile subsidiary near Mukden in 1939 as an example.
There were some Koreans such as teachers, technicians, and medical doctors who found their
“professional niches” in Manchukuo, according to Eckert.726
A comparative tabulation on the jobs and businesses run in the city of Bongchun
(Mukden) by nationalities in 1935 shows 16,509 Chinese (including the Mans, the Hans, the
Mongols, and others) occupying 88.5% of the professional job market while only 1,921 (10.3%)
were occupied by 1,921 Japanese (including 201 Koreans as Japanese). The table also reflected a
large number of jobless Chinese (226,202) and Japanese (10,632, of whom were 5,886
Koreans).727 Owen Lattimore found in 1929-1930 the majority of Koreans in Manchuria to be
“revolutionary and anti-Japanese, having for that reason migrated from Korea into Chinese
territory” except for rice farmers who took up 90 percent of Korean migrants in rural villages of
Manchuria.728 That may explain the low representation of Koreans in the city of Bongchun in
terms of employment and business ownership.
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As for business ownership in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railways, 1,634
Japanese owned restaurants, groceries, construction material shops, cafés, obstetrical clinics
among others in that order, with 1,015 Chinese trailing behind with street merchants (728),
groceries (72), and restaurants (58) among the top. 28 Koreans were shown to own small lodging
houses ( 館), street merchants, and miscellaneous small businesses.729
Regarding the living conditions of Koreans in the vicinity of South Manchurian
Railways, more specifically in the Korean town of Sohtap (

) and Bokdo ( 島) sections,

where 80-90 percent of Koreans lived at the time, an article in Mansun Ilbo on September 1,
1940 explained below.
The streets and alleys in these Korean neighborhoods have not changed even a bit since
70 to 80 years ago when people were wearing topknots. Not a speck of asphalt or sewage
can be seen. After one hour’s rain, streets get flooded and dirty waters run through the
gates of homes to the point of not being able to walk without taking off shoes….Less
than ten meters away from the train tracks, the ghettos of Chosun attract my attention to
the miserably gruesome scenery.730 (Author’s translation)
From the rice patches of farmlands to the cities bustling with new opportunities, albeit as part of
the Japanese imperial projects, Korean transnationals’ lives did not seem to fare any better than
their previous lives in Korea.
Historian Kim Young-pil described the Korean migrants’ contradicting views of
Manchuria as the land of stability versus instability, settled versus unsettled, and safety versus
lack of safety. They knew they needed to settle down and make Manchuria their home. But deep
down they kept their hopes of returning to Korea sometime in their lifetime, not trying to patch
up the holes on their roofs, thinking they will be leaving soon to go home.731 Hence, the title of
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Kim’s book—Manchuria Arirang of Korean-Chinese Diaspora—reflects the tragic sentiments
of Korean sojourners in their transnational diaspora in Manchuria. In spite of such a dim outlook
on their personal lives, Korean transnationals in Manchuria kept up with their collective efforts
to restore the sovereignty of their old ancestral homeland in anti-Japanese resistance and
education of their off-springs. They maintained their “homeland orientation” collectively in
solidarity, long after their original dispersement, and “boundary maintenance” by educating their
children in Korean customs and language—typical characteristics of life in transnational
diaporas as scholars such as Rogers Brubaker has categorized.732 These characteristics will be the
focus of examination in the next section.
c. Manchuria as the Hub of Education and Independence Movement
In 1906 a new wave of Koreans migrated to Manchuria after the Japanese intensified their
colonial reach into all aspects of the Korean state as their protectorate—foreign and domestic
affairs as well as private lives. More Korean farmers, such as Kim Shi-soon (金

), migrated

and started wet-rice cultivation in the outskirts of Bongchun and formed a Korean diaspora,
called Oh-ga-hwang-chon ( 家

).733 Many other families followed into the area, as

Bongchun was not only the center of commerce and transportation but also the hub of foreign
legations such as Japanese, American, Russian, and German. This location was convenient for
migrants to conduct business as a dependable source of income.
A family of importance in the history of Korean transnational migration to Manchuria in
this period was led by a matriarch—a widow with three sons and a daughter—in 1913. The Im
( ) family, led by Boeboe Yim under her Christian name, migrated from Hamheung city in
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Hamgyong Namdo (Southern Hamgyong Province) after her husband passed away. She settled
with her family in Yongjung (龍

), not far from Myungdong where Kim Yak-yun’s clan had

settled in 1899 in Kando.
A significant aspect of the Boeboe Yim’s case was her steadfast resolve to migrate to
Kando and raise her three sons and a daughter singlehandedly in a foreign land of transnational
diaspora. Mrs. Yim Boeboe’s third son, Im Gook Jung, was involved in an incident, called “sib o
man won talchui sagun (Robbery of 150,000 won,

件)” in December of 1919,

which will be described more fully in the section on Korean Independence Movement later in
this chapter.734
As the Korean population increased exponentially after 1906 and into the 1910s, a wave
of educational zeal spread among the Korean migrant communities, with members wanting to
teach their young to learn the Korean way and infuse them with nationalist patriotism toward
Korea. North Kando became the center of education, led by members of Shinminhoe
(

=New Peoples’ Association) such as Yi Sang-gu. A new educational institution called

Suhjeon-susook (
Sang-sul (

) was founded in Yongjung (龍

) with 22 students and taught by Yi

). A renowned scholar, Yi paid for all the financial needs of the school

including the teachers’ salaries so that students could attend tuition-free.735 Students came not
just from the adjacent areas of Myungdong, but also from other regions of the Russian Far East
as well as from Hamgyongdo, Korea.
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However, the Suhjeon-susook was short-lived, as Yi Sang-sul was sent to the Second
Hague Peace Convention as one of the Emperor’s three envoys in October 1907. He became
implicated in what was called the Hague Incident, in which the Emperor’s envoys were refused
of admission to enter the convention.736 Gojong’s three envoys, Yi Sang-sul, Yi Joon, and Yi
Wi-jong (the son of Russian Consular Yi Bom-Jin), were supposed to inform the international
community of the forcible signing of the 1905 Ulsa Protectorate Treaty by Japan. Although they
could not gain admission to attend the convention, this incident stirred up the attention of the
international community as well as wide publicity. Yi Joon died of an unknown cause a few days
later and the others returned to Korea.
In the following year of 1908, Kim Yak-yun opened a school, Myongdong-susook
( 東

), to continue with what Sujeon-susook had started to accomplish—education of

Koreans in the transnational diasporas of Manchuria. In 1908 Kim opened another school for
girls to provide equal opportunities for education. Together the two Myongdong Schools lasted
side by side for 25 years, as seen in Figure 50 below of their graduation ceremony in 1926.
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(Figure 50: From left to right – the original Myungdong School built in 1914, rebuilt in 2011
after a fire, the Graduating Class of Girls’ School and Boys’ School on March 26, 1926.
Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)
Myongdong School was built in Korean-style with tiled roofs, using the tiles and support
beams inscribed with images of blossom petal of Rose of Sharon ( 窮
Korea, as well as symbols of the Korean flag with ying-yang (

), the national flower of

) logos and crosses, standing

for Christianity and patriotism. The school building on the top right in Figure 50 was burnt in a
Japanese raid of 1914 and rebuilt in the original form in 2011.
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(Figure 51: The tiles and support beams used in building the Myungdong Susook (School) in
1900. Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)737
Students—boys and girls—seen in the above photo (Figure 50) were wearing traditional
Korean outfits of white shirts and black pants or skirts, as were the teachers. Kim, the founder,
was always seen dressed in Korean fashion, as he preferred, and also to set an example for others
to do the same to preserve Korean customs in Manchuria. However, in the photos below (Figure
52) of the two schools in the 1910s, the students were in western-style school uniforms in black
with shiny gold buttons, reflecting the changing of times and preference for comfort and
convenience over traditionalism by younger generations in the Korean diasporas.

(Figure 52: Taesung School in Pyung Yang and Osan School in Jungjoo. Courtesy of The
Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)
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As seen in the above photos (Figure 52), the school buildings in other towns were also
built in Korean-style with Korean flags in prominent display to show the foundation of
nationalistic patriotism with the belief that education was the key to regaining Korean
independence. The curriculum of these schools consisted of history, geography, law, biology,
hygiene, agriculture, mineralogy, teacher’s education, foreign affairs, Korean and Chinese
classics, language translation, mathematics, singing, physical education, and the New Testament,
reflecting the missionary’s influence of the time. Given the primary motivation of educating
Korean transnationals to instill patriotism and nationalism, the schools’ curricula reflected two
themes: modernization and nationalism. For the former, human virtues, business, citizenship,
law, economics, science, teacher’s education, foreign languages, and Chinese classics were
taught; for the latter, Korean language, Patriotic education, Christianity, and history of modern
Korean independence and modern Asia.738
According to a survey conducted by Japan in 1916, there was a total of 182 Korean
schools in Kando alone—83 established by private foundations and 99 by religious foundations.
Of the theological foundations, 71 were Protestant Christianity, nine were Catholic, one as
Chondo-gyo, and 18 in other religions. There were 70 schools in Yenji with 1,370 students, 66
schools in Hwaryong with 1,219 students, 33 schools in Hoonchoon with 757 students, 13
schools in Hwangchong with 490 students—3,836 students in 182 Korean schools in total.739 It is
difficult to ascertain what percentage of the Korean population went to school, since the
available statistics only counted the number of adults at the time, sometimes only men.
While some of these schools charged nominal fees for tuition, Myongdong School’s
tuition cost a minimal amount of 4 won 80 jeon (4.80 dollars) or small quantities of coal for fuel
738
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(

干). Schools in general were operated with the tuition paid by students, donations from

parents and Christians, and subsidized by the grains and coal brought by the students. The
original five families of the Myongdong Schools discussed in Chapter I (Kim Yak-yun, Kim Hagyu, Moon Jung-ho, Nam Wi-un, and Yoon Jae-ok) continued to provide ten percent of their
annual harvests to the schools to pay for teachers’ salaries and teaching materials, such as
textbooks, as well as room and board for the students.740
Many graduates from these schools served in leadership roles in the future independence
movements as Korea fell more deeply into the colonial grips of Japan in the coming years and
decades. Also believing that knowledge in agriculture (農), engineering (工), and commercialism
( ), which had been ignored if not looked down upon in the old Korean society, would enable
weaker nations to become self-sufficient and self-reliable, the schools put a lot of emphasis on
the above three fields. Some schools ran cooperative farms ( 同農

, hyupdong nongjang)

where students could learn and practice in those fields. By 1919 three Korean middle schools and
1,200 primary schools were reported to have been in Manchuria as well as two military schools,
established by the Korean Independence Army (大

獨

軍) of Yi Bom-yun (Figure 53) and

Hong Bom-do (Figure 54) to train young men how to fight and shoot with guns.741
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(Figure 53: Yi Bom-yun). (Figure 54: Hong Bom-do)742 (Figure 55: Hwang Byung-gil and Yi
Dong-hwi)743
Kim San wrote that these trained young men in Manchuria traveled to Korea in winter to
fight against the Japanese and earn money to buy more guns.744 Myongdong School in Kando
served as military training grounds as well as a site for fundraising to buy guns for the
Independence Army of 2,000 men.745 Kim Yak-yun, the founder of Myongdong School, was
engaged in actively fundraising with the help of military leaders, Hwang Byong-gil and Yi
Dong-hwi (Figure 55). Such a pattern of training young Koreans in Manchuria to travel and fight
against the Japanese in Korea, as well as engaging in fund-raising for the guerilla efforts, crisscrossing the borders between Manchuria, the RFE, and Korea, signifies the main characteristics
of the Korean lives in their transnational diasporas in the 1920s-1930s.
Im Kook-jung ( 國

), Yim Boeboe’s third son, and his compatriots (Figure 57), who

were educated in Korean schools in Yongjung and Myongdong villages, were involved in a 1919
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incident called “

件 (sib o man won talchui sagun=Robbery of 150,000

won)”.746 Im was one of the three principals involved in the incident of apprehending 150,000
won while the money was being transported by a Japanese bank from Hoeryung to Yongjung
one day in December 1919. The money seized was meant for the procurement of Russian rifles
to be used in guerilla warfare for the Korean Independence movement. Although this robbery by
Im’s group was successful, the incident ended tragically as the three principals were reported to
the Japanese police by a Korean informant, leading to their arrests, trial, and execution in
1920.747 The incident is considered one of the landmarks in the history of Korean independence
movement, as the money could have been used to arm two battalions of militias with Russian
rifles.

(Figure 56: Yim Boeboe, the matriarch)748 (Figure 57: Im Gook-jung and Choi Bong-sul)749
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(Figure 58: Family photo of Im Kook-jung of the Incident of Robbery of 150,000 won)750
This Kando region, formed by the early pioneers who migrated in traumatic
circumstances from Hamgyongdo, Korea, and settled down in transnational diaporas in the late
nineteenth century, served the greater needs of its occupants as the center of education,
commerce, and socio-political activities, including the independence movements during and after
the Russo-Japanese War.
d. Keeping Up with Traditional Lifestyle of Korea
In this section, the way in which the transnational migrant population in Manchuria, as well
as in the RFE, not only preserved the traditional lifestyle of Korea but also enhanced their culture
and passed it down to the younger generations will be examined. It was important to these
diasporic Koreans to continue to live by the collectivist view of the state (kukka=國家), even
when the state no longer existed. The people held onto the idea of having the state and a monarch
who looked after his subjects, believing that the country could be restored by their hard work and
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collective efforts poured into the education of their young ones and in pursuit of independence
without losing hope.

(Figure 59: A Korean migrant standing in front of his house of thatched roof in Kando, circa.
1910. Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun [圭 金
記念
])
As was shown in Chapter I, Korean farmers in Manchuria continued to work in wet rice
fields as they did back in Korea. Alongside their rice fields were rows of houses of thatched
roofs and mud walls in which they lived in Korea. Their burial grounds (Figure 60) were also
lined with rows of round domed tombs in traditional Korean style with epitaphs bearing the
names of the dead and their surviving family members as was done in Korea.
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(Figure 60: Cemetery with Korean-style raised graves: one with an epitaph of a famous Korean
poet, Yoon Dong-ju. Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)

(Figure 61: A girl on a Korean-style swing while other girls in Korean school uniforms watch in
Manchuria, circa 1908. Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)
In the above photo (Figure 61), taken around the year of 1908 when Kim Yak-yun
opened the girls’ school, one can see school girls in Myungdong, Manchuria looking on as
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another girl in school uniform was swinging in a Korean-style high swing mounted on a tall tree.
Swinging in high swings, called geune-tagi, was one of the popular forms of games enjoyed by
young girls and ladies in Korea traditionally. The highest one could swing without falling off or
getting tangled up by the twisted swing won the game. These young girls were also wearing
traditional Korean dresses except for the length of skirts and the color of their clothes in black
and white. Shorter skirts and navy blue uniform colors would have allowed for more active
movements and sense of uniformity in the school environment, as was done in Korea.
When Jack London traveled in Korea in 1904, he also captured such scenes with his
camera in Korea. London’s photographs in Figures 62 and 63 portray a see-saw game, called
nul-tuigi, often played in Korea by two people jumping on a long wooden panel laid on top of a
rolled straw mat. The higher one can jump and drop on the board, the rockier her or his opponent
at the other end of the board gets. Eventually one falls off, ending the game.

(Figure 62: See-saw Game, Huntington Library, JLP449, Album11)
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(Figures 63: Nul-tuigi, Huntington Library, JLP449, Album11, No. 14)

(Figure 64: After the field day of Myongdong Christian Young Women’s Association, August
30, 1929. Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim Yak-yun)
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In the above photo (Figure 64), women and girls are shown celebrating the field day event of the
Myongdong Christian Young Women’s Association in 1929 at which the winners of gune-tagi
(high swing game) won large cooking pots as prizes. Some women in the front row were seen
sitting with their prizes proudly. This particular photo demonstrates how Koreans in Manchuria
were still playing the Korean game of high swings about twenty years after their migration. The
prizes given were Korean-style large pots used for cooking Korean food for large family dinners.
All the participating female members of the community, young and old, were also wearing
traditional white Korean dresses.

(Figure 65: The sixtieth and seventieth birthdays being celebrated, wedding ceremonies in
western style, burial and memorial services, Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim
Yak-yun)
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The two photos in the top row of Figure 65 show birthday celebrations of Hoegap
( 甲)—the sixtieth birthday celebration in 1928. The wedding photos show the bride and
bridesmaids in traditional Korean dresses. The groom and other men are in western suits with
short hairdos, signifying the trend toward modernization that Koreans often equated to
westernization, or the adopting of western ways. As the imperial administration of Korea by
Japan was well underway by this time as well as the civilization and enlightenment (

改

)

movement spread across Korea, younger generation of Korea tended to prefer donning
themselves in western fashion which they saw as a sign of modernity.
In contrast, Kim Yak-yun, the leader of the Myungdong-chon village community, is said
to have never worn anything but traditional Korean clothing of white shirts, pants, long coats and
a top knot covered with a tall black hat all through his life, encouraging the rest of the
community to do the same. The bottom two photos were from Kim’s funeral and burial services
in 1942, which were attended by many of his clan people as well as the villagers, dressed in
traditional mourning outfits.
An aspect one might gather from these photos is the possible presence of the hierarchical
stratification that was typical in Korean yangban society within the migrant society in the
diaspora. Not everyone would have been able to celebrate birthday parties with a variety of
Korean foods and delicacies stacked up high, attended by many gleeful well-dressed guests. Not
all Koreans in Manchuria would have as many relatives in mourning outfits and headgears made
of rough unbleached hemps, which were supposed to be won only by close family members
according to Korean custom. Therefore, it is quite possible that lives in the transnational diaspora
thousand li away from home still had all the makings, good or bad, of class distinctions, gender
separations, and demonstrations of wealth or lack-there-of decades later.
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United Righteous Army (

) in Manchuria and the Russian Far East

As examined in Chapter II, during the Russo-Japanese War the Righteous Army under Yi
Pom-yun and Hong Bom-do fought alongside the Russian Army under the command of General
Kuropatkin. After the war ended and the peace treaty was signed between Russia and Japan,
Righteous Army’s base operation was set up in Manchuria and became the center of united
resistance activities, as will be presented in this section.
After the Russo-Japanese War ended, Yi Pom-yun’s Chungui-dae (

隊) soldiers that

had joined forces with the Russian Army were dispersed according to the Portsmouth Treaty on
November 11, 1905. Some of the soldiers followed Yi Pom-yun and Hong Bum-do to the Ussuri
region of the RFE by way of Kando. The group, initially of 200-500 soldiers, grew to 34,399 by
1906 and to 50,965 in 1910.751
In 1908, McKenzie had praised the Korean militia group of "tiger-hunters" in the
Righteous Army who were involved in the Russo-Japanese War as “sons of the hills, ironnerved” and “amongst the boldest sportsmen in the world.”752 They were armed with only an
“old-fashioned percussion gun with a long barrel and a brass trigger” and trained to kill at one
shot because of the time required to load the gun in each attack.753 In the fall of 1906, McKenzie
tracked down these tiger-hunters, mountaineers, young and older men, many of whom were
recently-discharged soldiers from the Korean Army.
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(Figure 66: “A Company of Korean Rebels,” photograph by F. A. McKenzie, 1906)754
As seen in this photograph (Figure 66), the Ui-byong (

), or Righteous Army soldiers were

equipped with old guns and dressed in rag tag outfits. Some wore Korean traditional white pants,
others were in western shirts and pants, and one is seen in a military uniform, possibly of the
now-defunct Korean Army.
In 1905-1906, these Ui-byongs banded themselves into militant groups and gathered in
secluded mountainous regions in Korea and Manchuria to fight against the Japanese
encroachment of Korean independence. When the announcement of the disbanding of the
Korean Army was made by General Hasegawa Yoshimichi, the commander of the Japanese
garrison force, on August 1, 1907, a mutiny was raised by “the smartest and best of the Korean
battalions” that had been under the command of Major Pak Se-han, who killed himself in protest
of the disbandment.755 The mutiny was subdued after 27 officers and over 100 soldiers were
either killed or wounded, and 500 captured. Other battalions across the country were disbanded
between August 3 and December 3 of 1907.
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(Figure 67: “Map 1. The distribution of the Korean army before its disbandment in 1907.
Compiled from Chosen Chusatsugun, Shireibu, frontispiece. Drawn by R. Mize.”)756
The map in Figure 67, showed the “distribution of the Korean army before its disbandment in
1907, compiled from Chosen Chusatsugun, Shireibu.”757 The Korean Army had ten battalions
and twenty companies located at strategic locations throughout the peninsula.
After the Korean Army was completely disbanded, former national guards joined the
Righteous Armies in Kyongsang, Kangwon, Kyonggi, and Hwanghae Provinces in the central
and southern parts of Korea where they remained active but also spread out nationwide within
the peninsula as well as into Manchuria and the Russian Far East. Many of the guerilla units of
Kando in Southern Manchuria even crossed the Tumen River down “to harass Japanese garrisons
in north Korea.”758
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Historian Yi Ki-baek cited “official Japanese statistics” from an unknown source on the
“scale of operations” by Righteous Armies between 1907 and 1910: 44,116 “guerillas under
arms” in 1907, 69,832 in 1908, 25,763 in 1909, and 1,891 in 1910 in a total of 2,819 “clashes
with Japanese forces,” ending with over 17,600 guerilla fighters who died in the struggles.759 Yi
Ki-baek presumed much larger numbers than those given by Japanese sources.

(Figure 68: Tiger hunters in the Righteous Army in Manchuria, circa. 1908)760
Taehan Maeil Sinbo reported on April 19, 1908 the intensity of clashes between
Uibyongs and the Japanese police or military between August 1907 and December 1908—1,772
clashes involving 11,394 Uibyongs, 2,000 Japanese Kempeitai, and Japanese Army of the Sixth
Division and one Infantry Division. The Japanese Army set fire to homes and killed hundreds of
Koreans on suspicion of having provided shelters to Uibyong soldiers all over the country, such
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as in Goryangpo, Kwangju, Namyang, and Gapyung from 1907 to1908. Hundreds of innocent
people were killed, and 775 homes and a temple were burnt to the ground by Japanese military
all over the peninsula. In Gapyung, 200 Japanese soldiers under the command of Lieutenant
Ikura, dressed in Korean clothing, raided and killed 30 some Uibyongs. In response, 6,000
Uibyongs assembled in January 1908, in Pochun (
Yangju (

), 3,000 in Gapyung (加

), and 8,000 in

).761

(Figure 69: Taehan Mail Sinbo, 1909.6.16. Vol. 2, No. 479, “잡보 (Miscellaneous)”)
Reported in the above article in the June 16, 1909 issue of Taehan Maeil Sinbo, sporadic
scrummages between Uibyongs and Japanese police occurred in the southern parts of Korea as
well as in the RFE. Several hundred Uibyongs destroyed the police building in Pochun on June 4,
over 200 Uibyongs battled and killed several Japanese policemen in Chunnam on June 1, and
40+ Uibyongs fought and killed three Japanese policemen at Gomak in Chunnam province on the
same day. It was also reported that more than 30 Chinese were seen hanging around the
Uibyongs at Baekchundong in the Ussuri area, although it is unclear whether the Chinese had
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joined in to fight with the Uibyongs or they were simply loitering around them, perhaps as spies.
Although the leadership of the Righteous Armies, such as Yi Bom-yun and Hong Bom-do, had
strategic plans, their grand plans may not have filtered down to the level of militants who were
filled with resentments and anxiety to fight against the Japanese, hence the sporadic scrummages
occurring.
Two corresponding documents of classified military communication ( 軍
軍

機

大

記) found in the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) show an

urgent request, C0230347400 (M41-2-2), made on May 7, 1908 to dispatch a regiment of
soldiers to Korea to suppress militant rioters ( 國

屯軍

加件) The May 9, 1908 approval for

an immediate dispatch of Infantry Divisions 23 and 27 in C02030347500 by the Ministry of
Defense indicated the urgency felt by the Japanese military to quell the disruption raised by
rioters in Korea. The latter, “Delivering list of personnel to be dispatched to Korea for the
purpose of quelling Korean rioters,” was dated May 9, 1908, as shown below in Figure 71.762
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(Figure 70: C02030347400 requested, 1908.5.7) (Figure 71: C02030347500 approved, 1908.5.9.)
These militant activities of Righteous Army, which the Japanese government called ‘Rebels
( 徒)’ as shown in the above documents, continued in the Ussuri region as well as in Korea,
reaching 898 occurrences and involving 24,783 militias by 1909. The Japanese Military
reinforced their troops to closely monitor the coastal cities up north in the Yalu River basins as
well as in Jeju Island in the south—across the entire Korean Peninsula.763
Despite such efforts, a strong pledge of allegiance by Koreans from 13 provinces, known
as “13 Province Righteous Army’s Declaration (

道

軍

),” was secured in 1910 by

Yi Pom-yun as the Commander of Righteous Army, aided by Yu In-suk and Yi Sang-sul in the
Russian Far East. The Declaration publicly proclaimed a united front of defense for their new
transnational homeland in the name of 9,780 Koreans as shown below in Figure 72. With the
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appointment of Hong Bum-do as the military leader, the group presented an integrated front of
the people from 13 provinces and reached the peak of their resistance efforts in August 1910.

(Figure 72:

道

軍

[Declaration of Ui-gun in 13 Districts], July 28, 1910)

The Righteous Army organized by Yi Bom-yun initially in 1904 in Kando, Manchuria, moved its
base to the RFE at the declaration of the pledge of residents in thirteen districts in 1910. Both
groups of participants of Righteous Army, representing the old and the new-comers, joined and
announced a petition on August 19, 1910 as the news of Japanese annexation of Korea spread:
We, representatives of the Korean associations of the Maritime Province from
Vladivostok…and other places, numbering sixteen persons, met [and] resolved to
demand that the Russian Government allow Korean subjects to acquire Russian
citizenship without any special privileges and advantages and that these Koreans be put
under the protection of Russian laws, as Korea was annexed. You should take into
account that we, Koreans, have resided for many years on the Russian territory and have
lost any relation with our former motherland, which has been replaced by Russia. We
would like to be faithful subjects of Russia along with many other ethnicities, populating
it, with equal rights to them…. We sign this on behalf of the associations of the Maritime
Province, numbered some 9,780 persons of male population, not including females and
children. Vladivostok city, August 19, 1910.764
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This petition was also made in Korean language, signed by Yi Pom-yun as the Commander of
Righteous Army in the Russian Far East, dated August 20, 1910.

(Figure 73: 연해주 의병장 이범윤이 발송한 통문, 4201.8.20. [Declaration by Yi Pom-yun, the
Commander of Righteous Army in the Russian Far East])765
Nevertheless, the long-established, affluent Koreans who owned land in the RFE and
acquired Russian citizenship in the 1890s did not share the same level of nationalistic fervor to
fight for the independence of their old homeland, which they left in despair a long time ago.
Without the financial support of the wealthy Koreans who were ready to serve in the Russian
army, Yi’s insurgent militant group could not sustain long and decreased in numbers soon after
Yi was arrested by Russian police in October 1910.
The Russian government was also extremely concerned about these militant activities of
the Righteous Army in the RFE, as the Japanese Foreign Ministry officially complained about
their rebellious movements being too close to the border in the Ussuri region in 1908. The
diplomatic correspondence between Russia and Japan pointed to Yi’s activities in Shinhanchon
(
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, New Korean town) in Vladivostok, urging Russia to expel Yi from Russia.766
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Moreover, the insurgent group leaders of the Righteous Army in the RFE and Manchuria
were met with the “punitive expedition of Japanese troops and the activities of the pro-Ilchinhoe
members” and could not recruit “more than 1,000 new soldiers.”767 Most of the recent recruits
were Koreans who fled Korea after 1905 and had trouble earning a living in Russia—with arms,
ammunition, and food in short supply, leading to “tensions within the Korean diaspora” and a
scattering of the soldiers in mid-1909. When the news of Japanese annexation of Korea reached
the RFE in 1910, political disagreements intensified among the Koreans “ who were reconciled
with the absorption of Korea” by Japan and “those who wished to continue the struggle of
independence.”768
In spite of all these activities of disputes facing the Righteous Army, called Chang-ui-soh
(

) after 1910, numerous riots erupted all across the RFE, Kando, and in Korea

immediately upon the announcement of Japan’s annexation of Korea. In contrast, when the Ulsa
Treaty of Annexation was made public on August 22, 1910, no apparent opposition was raised
by Russia, the United States, or any other nations in Europe. Echoing the country’s low global
status at the turn of the twentieth century discussed in the introduction, no other country
protested when Korea ceased to exist as an independent nation with all diplomatic ties severed.
Yi Pom-yun and his followers were captured in Nikolayevsk and banished to northern
Irkutsk, Russia, according to the telegram sent by Foreign Minister Sazonov to Russian Minister
to Seoul A.C. Somov on October 26, 1910.769 This decision to banish Yi and his Uibyong
followers instead of returning them to Seoul was due to the concerns that many other Koreans
who fought secretly on the Russian side in the Russo-Japanese War and for Korea’s
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independence against Japan would be exposed in the hands of the Japanese police. Therefore, Yi
Pom-yun who served as the leader of Righteous Armies for decades became the first exile to be
banished to Irkutsk as were other Korean leaders such as Yi Dong-hui who served in the proRussian activities. The Righteous Armies went underground afterwards, continuing to fight
against the Japanese in the hills of Manchuria and Korea in the coming decades.
a. Unified Korean Independence Movement
Moving into the 1910s, Koreans in the RFE and Manchuria combined their forces to raise a
united front for the Korean Independence Movement across their transnational diasporas in vast
geographical areas. Their activities supported by various organizations and newspapers in their
regions will be the subject of this section.
Officially accredited by the Russian Government on December 17, 1911, Kwonuphoe, as
introduced in the earlier section in this chapter, kicked off a Korean language newspaper,
Kwonup Sinmun (勸

), opened a Korean school, helped Koreans to acquire Russian

citizenship, and engaged in community relations to foster cooperation among Koreans in the
area. In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the first Korean settlement in 1863,
Kwonuphoe also organized ceremonial programs to celebrate the historic occasion. The
newspaper, Kwonup Sinmun, which began its publication on May 4, 1912, was distributed across
the RFE, Manchuria, Korea, China, Japan, Hawaii, and California, serving and being recognized
as one of the three most influential anti-Japanese nationalist newspapers of Korea, along with
Sinhan Minbo (

) and Sinhan Kookbo (
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In 1913, Koreans in the RFE started to organize the Korean Independence Army
(大

光

軍) in time to mark the tenth anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. But the

Russian Government, in adherence to the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and to appease the
Japanese Government, ordered Kwonuphoe and Kwonup Sinmun to be discontinued, arresting or
expelling Korean migrants from Russia. As the First World War erupted in 1913, all activities
for Korea’s independence were put on hold. Approximately 4,000 naturalized and registered
Koreans were reported to have fought in the Russian army during World War I with 150 as
officers.771
After World War I ended and the news of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson taking
leadership of post-war peace at the Versailles Peace Conference on January 8, 1918 spread,
Korean nationalists in exile in Hawaii and California rallied to plead to the world for Korea’s
independence. Most of all, Wilson’s speech “to provide for the freedom of small nations, to
prevent the domination of small nations by big ones” with the Fourteen Points to promote the
enduring world peace was received by Koreans as “the clarion call to Korea.”772
Korean leaders attempted to send Syngman Rhee (
National Association (大

國

), backed by the Korean

) in Hawaii, to Versailles but failed because Rhee could not

get his passport issued by the Japanese government as a colonial subject. The New Korean
Young Men’s Association (

年黨) in Shanghai managed to send Kim Kyu-sik to Paris

with a plan to inform the world of Korea’s plight and lobby for the country’s independence. But
Kim Kyu-sik was refused of admission or attendance at the Paris Conference. Korean students in
Japan then formed the Korean Youth Independence Corps (
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年獨

團) and held a
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conference in Tokyo where over 600 Korean students attended and passed a declaration which
was authored by a famous Korean writer Yi Kwang-su on February 8, 1919.773
With the sudden passing of Emperor Gojong on January 22, 1919 and his funeral service
scheduled for March 3 in Seoul, Koreans made a secret plan to use the occasion to rally
nationwide on March 1. “To avoid police discovery” and outwit the police, student organizers of
the March First Movement planned the rally just a few days before the launch date of March 1,
1919.774
On March 1 the Declaration of Independence was dispatched to the Governor-General.
The protestors also announced their intention to make a peaceful demonstration at Pagoda Park
in Seoul to the police. Over a million people, male and female, wearing straw-woven jipsins, the
proper attire for mourning for the nation’s father, gathered from all across the country and
participated in the demonstration. They shouted “Taehan tongnip manse (大

獨

=long

live an independent Korea)! Manse! Manse! Manse!”775 This triple chanting of Manse
(

) was echoed throughout the Korean Peninsula.
Instructions for the demonstration, planned as a peaceful one by the organizers, were

distributed nationwide:776
Whatever you do
Do not insult the Japanese
Do not throw stones
Do not hit with your fists
For these are the acts of barbarians.
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Such instructions showed not only their peaceful intentions but also the fact that these Koreans
did not have any weapons other than their bare hands to express their opposition to Japanese
aggression.
Caught by complete surprise, Japanese police cracked down on demonstrators with
brutality, leading to “533 killed, 1,409 injured, and 12,522 arrests made” on that day. In the
following months an estimated toll of “7,500 deaths, roughly 15,000 injured, and some 45,000
arrests” occurred nationwide.777 Despite the Korean traditional custom of separating the populace
from the yangbans, women from men, the young from the old, McKenzie observed a unified
Korea in this movement, which was meant to be peaceful. “But now all were one,” reported
McKenzie on the unified nature of the demonstrations of the Koreans and wrote “The weak
things had set themselves up to confound the strong.”778
As the news of the March First “Manse” Movement (

動) demonstrations in

Korea reached the Korean transnationals in Kando, Manchuria, another peaceful demonstration
was planned and held on March 13, 1919. Thousands of Koreans gathered, waving flags with
taeguk ( 極) symbols and a banner of ‘righteousness (
field of Sohjeon Daeya (

大

) and humanity ( 道)’ in the open

) in Kando as shown in Figure 74 below.779
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(Figure.74: Declaration of Independence in Buk-Kando on 1919.3.13.)
Historians acknowledged but lamented that while these demonstrations by Koreans at
home and abroad did not succeed in getting rid of Japanese rule over Korea or arousing any
interests of “the world powers” who looked on “with indifference,” the movement served as “a
catalyst for the expansion of the nationalist movement as a whole” and united Koreans at home
and abroad in coordinated efforts to assert “Korean national identity.”780
Koreans in the RFE held another demonstration, organized by the Great Korean People’s
Congress (大

國

), at Shinhanchon in Vladivostok on March 17, and delivered copies of

the Declaration of Independence to all foreign embassies in town as well as to the Russian
government and the Japanese Legation. All kinds of Koreans, Russified or not, wonhoin or
yeohoin, were reported to have attended the demonstration. Japanese immediately demanded all
Korean flags to be taken down and stop the demonstrations. However, the protests quickly
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spread to other towns in the RFE from Ussuri to Nikol’sk-Ussuri, Suifun, Suchan, and Spassak,
as far north as to the Korean town in Blagoslovenno.781
Russian onlookers saw the leaflets entitled “Declaration of Independence of Korea” and
waved by the demonstrators throughout the city of Vladivostok. As the demonstration moved
from the Korean town of Shinhanchon throughout Vladivostok, which was covered with Korean
national flags and red flags, some Russians noted the “Red flower of the awakening Korea” and
joined in the demonstration.782 A. N. Yaremenko wrote in his Diary of a Communist that “The
single-heartedness of the Koreans is manifested with great strength.”783 Korean patriotism was
expressed openly throughout the RFE in the aftermath of the March First Movement, as it did in
Manchuria and in Korea.
Historian Hamish Ion speculated that the Hunchun branch of the Great Korean Peoples’
Congress was supported by 20,000 Koreans, following the March First Movement, which was
coordinated between Korea, Chientao (Kando), Vladivostok, and Shanghai.784 By August 1920,
Ion wrote that the Hunchun branch was also supporting 450 guerrillas and about 2,600 partisans
operating in North Kando area.785
As for the reasons why the independence movement failed despite such a high level of
strength garnered after the demonstrations of April 1, 1919, historians have attributed two
factors: the movement became increasingly radical and militant and caused the factionalism
within the Provisional Government of Korea, formed in summer of 1919. The opposing factions
between the Korean ex-patriates, led by Syngman Rhee, in the United States advocating
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diplomatic means, and the socialists and nationalists in the RFE and Kando, led by Yi Dong-hwi,
advocating “armed struggle,” could not be reconciled.786
On the other hand, the Japanese intelligence activities to crack down the Korean
nationalists in the RFE and Manchuria escalated, employing many Korean residents in the
Novoyevsk and Vladivostok in their service, leading to the arrest of 42 Koreans, including Yu
In-suk and Yi Kang, the editor of Taedong Kongbo, who were later released at the discretion of
Governor Gondatti.787
All the leaders who participated in counter-intelligence activities in the Shanghai Service,
Righteous Armies, as soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War on the Russian side, joined in the
rallies across the RFE and Manchuria to raise their voices in unison with their comrades in Korea
and in the U.S. across the hills of Arirang—the transnational diasporas of Koreans.
Conclusion
During the decade after the Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905 and the Japanese annexation
began in full force in 1910, culminating at the March First “Mansei” Movement in 1919,
Koreans at home as well as in transnational diasporas in the RFE and Manchuria were caught in
an extremely volatile period of history. In such a politically-charged environment, many Koreans
lived in wretched conditions. Koreans yearned to build “a healthy and stable society that would
allow the unfolding of a heavenly kingdom on the peninsula (chisang ch’onguk)”—(
meaning “heaven on earth,” as historian Albert Park has explained.788
This chapter began with the description of the transnational process by which Yijo
Dynasty of Korea collapsed as a colony of Japanese imperialism at the end of the Russo-
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Japanese War and the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan at the
coordination by the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. The war was started, fought, and ended
by foreigners on Korean soil, negotiated by foreigners, and peace was declared by foreigners
without any sort of input from any member of the Korean populace, many of whom were
dispersed in transnational diasporas.
Korean transnationals continued their struggles in their new-found homes in the RFE and
Manchuria. Despite coming from diverse social origins, educational backgrounds, and
upbringings, the Korean migrants of early or later arrivals fought for their old and new
homelands together. Many hoped to return to their old homeland as proud citizens of Korea
sometime in their lives or those of their children over the Arirang gogae.
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CONCLUSION
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
Now I am an exile across the Yalu River
And the hills and rivers of three thousand li are also lost
A-ri-rang A-ri-rang A-ra-rio,
Crossing the hills of Arirang 789
This Conclusion will discuss the lives of Koreans in transnational diasporas in the RFE and
Manchuria after 1920. How the Russified Koreans, by then called Goryo-in, were eliminated by
mass deportation or execution in 1937 in spite of their decades-long dedication to serve as Soviet
citizens will be reviewed. How the Korean transnationals in Manchuria endured the Chinese
persecution of Koreans (1905-1945), being regarded as the vehicle of Japanese imperial projects,
and suffered through the more tumultuous period of the Chinese Communist Revolution (19211927) and the Korean War (1950-1953) will be examined. Many Korean transnationals in China
were deployed to fight against their own people of Korea. The conclusion will wrap up with a
brief assessment of where the Korean transnationals are in terms of their journey over the
Arirang hills in more contemporary times.
As of 1924, Goryo-ins (高

, Корё-сарам), Koreans living in the Soviet Union, were

reported to be approximately 150,000 in total: 147,000 in the Russian Republic, of whom
140,000 were first-generation migrants living in the RFE, as reported in ГАРФ (Russian Archive
of National Documents) by the Russian Far Eastern office in September 1924.790 The report also
mentioned that more Koreans were known to be living in various regions, such as Uzbekistan,
Kazakstan, and Estonia in the Soviet Union, although their exact number could not be
ascertained at the time of reporting. Additionally, the Korean labor unions, with 12 registered
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members and 18 affiliate members of the Communist Party, were not recognized officially by the
Second Convention in December of 1923, making it difficult to get an accurate number of
Goryo-ins living in Ukraina and White Russia.791
In 1936 John Benjamin Powell, an “influential newspaperman in Asia” who helped start
the China Weekly Review in Shanghai in 1917 and served as its Managing Editor until 1941,
made a trip to the RFE in the capacity of Correspondent for The Chicago Tribune.792 The
observations he made during his trip to Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in 1936 were submitted as
“U.S. Intelligence Report Regarding Khan Chan Gol (OGPU) and the Koreans in the OKDVA
(Red Army of the RFE)” to Vice Consul John M. Allison in the State Department. Khan Chan
Gol was one of Stalin’s close confidants who later got executed in 1937 around the time of mass
deportation of Korean migrants in the RFE. Powell also authored a book, My Twenty-Five Years
in China, and revealed his perceptions of Korean lives in the RFE in 1936, one year before they
were subjected to a mass deportation and execution.
In his book, Powell described a visit he made to a Korean university in Vladivostok
where he saw the Korean language being taught despite the fact that speaking at home or in
public, let alone teaching the Korean language, was outlawed by the Japanese Governor-General
in Korea in the 1930s. During the latter part of Japanese colonization of Korea, the wartime years
of 1931-1945, Japan instituted the “most demeaning policies—name changes, efforts to eradicate
the Korean language, forced labor, and sex slavery….”793 There at the university in
Vladivostok,Powell witnessed “some fifty students…translating articles and pamphlets into the
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Korean language” which were to be “smuggled into Korea.”794 Powell also reported to the U.S.
State Department that Korean newspapers, magazines, and “thousands of books in the Korean
language,” were being published in Vladivostok and smuggled into Korea.795
As Powell asserted emphatically, “The Japanese are killing the language, while the
Russians are keeping it alive.”796 Historian John J. Stephan also noted this phenomenon: “Korean
nationalists were neither extradited nor prevented from publishing vernacular newspapers” by
the Russian government in St. Petersburg despite the heavy Japanese pressure to crack down on
Korean expatriates who continued to publish Korean newspapers in Vladivostok—Haejo
sinmun, Taedong kongbo, and Kwonop sinmun—until 1908, long after the Korean newspapers in
Korea were suspended.797
Powell observed that “at least ten per cent” of the Russian Far Eastern Army was “made
up of Orientals: Chinese, Koreans, and Mongols” with heads of some of the units Chinese.798
There were “over 100,000 Koreans, many of them in the army” between Vladivostok and
Khabarovsk where he “saw a unit of two hundred Red soldiers…every one of the two hundred
was Korean,” teaching the villagers how anti-aircraft defense worked.799
In his Report to the State Department, Powell wrote, “The Russians make no secret of the
fact that they are building up the nucleus of a Korean Revolutionary Army in this territory…. At
Vladivostok, there is a whole system of Korean schools extending from primary school up to a
university which they claim has 700 students.”800 Powell witnessed “a regiment of Korean
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troops, drilling and maneuvering under Soviet officers” as part of the Soviet border-defense
force. In Lake Baikal area, he saw even larger group of “Oriental troops” in Soviet Army
uniform.801
Earlier, five “Russified Koreans” from the Kazan Seminary along with graduates from
the Far Eastern Institute of Vladivostok were among those sent to Manchuria and involved in
translating intelligence documents in 1904. One of those five, Andrei Abramovich Khan Myon
She, who had served as the “most fervent Bolshevik of all Soviet Korean leaders,” was arrested
on charges of Japanese espionage in Leningrad and executed on December 10, 1937802. So was
the fate of Grigorii Khan Chan Gol, a Korean NKVD commander of Third Division, about
whom Powell had written to the State Department in 1936, along with 2,500 Soviet Korean
elites, many of whom served in important positions in the Soviet Red Army. They were all
executed from 1937 to 1938 despite their leadership in anti-Japanese activities among the Soviet
Koreans.803 Stalin suspected the presence of “fifth columnists among the Soviet diaspora
peoples” and harbored pathological distrust of foreigners.804 Historian Hyun Gwi Park lamented
the “irony” of the Koreans in the RFE becoming the “most powerful agent of the ‘Slavicization
of the RFE’” and then falling as its “victims in the most ‘passive’ way” of mass deportation and
exclusion during the Great Terror of Stalin in 1936-1938.805
Mass Deportation of Koreans from the RFE, 1937
Shortly after Powell’s visit to Vladivostok, the Korean university was shut down and the
entire Korean population from the RFE was forcibly relocated to Central Asia in 1937. The next
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ordeal awaiting Koreans in the RFE was the mass deportation of 1937. Joseph Stalin, after
removing all of his opposition within the VKP (All-Union Communist Party) by execution from
power, embarked on “repressive purges” in the Great Terror of 1936-1938.806 These purges, led
by Stalin and Nikolai Ezhov, the head of NKVD, were carried out against “elites/Old
Bolsheviks, anti-Soviet elements (social groups).”807 Historian Jon Chang claimed the Korean
deportation was the “first total deportation of a Soviet nationality,” to be followed by other
nationalities such as “Poles, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Kharbintsy,
Chinese, and Romanians” through 1950.808
Resolution 1425-3266ss, entitled “On the Exile of the Korean Population from the Border
Regions of the Russian Far Eastern Region,” was signed by General Secretary, Joseph Stalin,
and the Chairman of the Ministry of People’s Commissars, V. Molotov, on August 21, 1937.809
Assisted by Ezhov, Stalin carried out massive purges and deportation of non-Russian social
groups and nationalities “to weed out potential enemies and prepare Soviet society for an
impending war”—the Second World War.810 Thus unfolded the Great Terror of 1936-1938 in
which a massive number of Korean-Russians were deported from the Russian Far East to
Southern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Aral Sea, and the Lake Balkhash regions.811
Between September and November of 1937, 171,781 Koreans of 16,272 families
received but a few days’ notice to pack up and were taken to unknown places in Central Asia.
Packed into 124 cargo or cattle trains, 95,246 people in 20,170 households were transported to
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Kazakhstan and 76,525 in 16,272 households to Uzbekistan.812 Many Koreans who were elderly,
young, pregnant, or already sick, perished during the month-long trip due to starvation and
spread of diseases.
The Korean population had been projected to grow to 204,600 by 1937 in the 1927
census. But due to “collectivization and dekulakization” in 1928-1932, only 172,597 were left to
be deported in 1937.813 Historian Jon Chang estimated that about 50,000 Koreans had to leave
the RFE for Manchuria and Korea “due to collectivization and dekulakization” during 19281932, making the number of deportees to Central Asia in 1937 lower than what could have
been.814
The mass deportation of Koreans in the RFE with a few days’ notice signified a marked
difference from their initial migration into RFE. Voluntary migration includes the process of
preparation which is denied in this type of forced deportation. This is how Russia “kicked out all
the Koreans [vydvoriali vsekh koreitsev]” to unspecified regions of the Middle East: Southern
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Aral Sea administrative regions, and the Lake Balkhash region.815 A
report of November 3, 1937, signed by NKVD agent Meer and chief Lushkov, read: “On
October 30, from the city of Vladivostok’s station was sent the last assembled echelon 501
ordinal 125/62 with the suspicious Koreans.”816 Regardless of how hard Korean transnationals
served their new homelands, be it Tsarist or Soviet Russia, they were under suspicion as the
people of other echnicity.
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Even before they were able to settle in their new surroundings, 60 percent of the Koreans,
who survived the arduous trip of deportation, were moved again in the next spring (1938) to yet
other unknown areas, with no reasons or explanations given as to why, where the transnational
Korean migrants had to settle into yet another diaspora. They received no compensation for their
lost properties or resettlement, which was promised to them by the Russian government.817
Their deportation was carried out in inhumane conditions without access to bathrooms or
cooking facilities on a journey which took thirty to forty-five days. The former Tsarist subjects
and loyal Soviet Koreans “suffered a mortality rate of 16.3 percent” wrote Chang, due to illness
and injuries.818 The transnational Korean migrants had to settle into yet another diaspora. They
received no compensation for their lost properties or resettlement, which was promised to them
by the Russian government.819
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(Figure 75: Koreans being deported from the RFE by cargo trains to unknown areas of
Central Asia in 1937)820
In the oral interviews that Chang conducted for six years from 2008 to 2014 with former
Soviet Koreans who had been deported to Central Asia, mostly elderly by then, the deep sorrows
of transnational diasporic people can be heard. Maia Kim talked about her parents who did not
want to go anywhere else because “They grew up there [RFE], their children were born there.
They put down their roots there.”821 Just as the poor peasants packed up and crossed the northern
Korean border to escape poverty and discrimination, the same people were yanked out of their
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transnational diasporas and forced to make a home in another unknown region clear across the
globe.
Vladimir Li, eight years old at the time of deportation in 1937, was living happily in a
village on the Pacific coast near Ternei. Li thought he was going on a trip where he would have
fun with no homework from school. Some tried to run away and hide in remote areas only to be
captured and “shot on the spot” for resisting deportation, while others gave away their cows,
chickens, and pigs to neighbors.822
Koreans as Japanese Subjects in Manchuria
For those who had taken the path northwest to Manchuria, all was not well either. Koreans in
Manchuria had to endure the Japanese colonial administration in China as Bandoin, ( 島

,

meaning the Peninsula people), the second-class Japanese subjects, caught in struggles between
the Chinese and the Japanese. The Chinese regarded Koreans in Manchuria as the vanguards of
the Japanese colonial regime not to be trusted and to watch out against in the “colonial
architecture”— between the colonizer and the colonized.823 The Japanese regarded the Koreans
in Manchuria rebellious, on the other hand, as obstacles to Japanese colonization of the continent
and further tightened their grips on Koreans.
In the 1920s and 1930s Manchuria was also inundated with an influx of migrants from
other parts of China as well as ethnic minorities: Muslims, Uygurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians.824
The Ainus, ethnic minorities, from northern Japan due to discrimination by the Japanese on the
mainland migrated from Japan to Manchuria. White Russians, during the Russian Revolution,
also migrated to Manchuria, further attributing to this region’s status as a land of diasporas for
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many different ethnicities. In 1930, the Korean population in Yenbian reached 388,600,
occupying 76.4% of the total population of 508,613.825
In the meantime, a bomb explosion mistakenly caused by troops in the Japanese
Independent Garrison Unit, but misconstrued as the “work of Chinese saboteurs,” triggered a
massive siege by the Japanese Kwantung Army on September 13, 1931.826 This incident, called
the Manchurian Incident (also known as the Mukden Incident), led to the Japanese occupation of
southern Manchuria and Japan’s active promotion to populate the area with Korean immigrants
to help secure Japan’s control over the continent.
During the Manchurian Incident, with several uprisings in 1931, the Korean Communists
in Manchuria collaborated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to stage “carefully planned,
destructive riots” in Yongjung area of Kando.827 The Manchurian Provincial Committee (MPC)
of the CCP with its headquarters in Mukden urged Koreans in Manchuria to “rise against the
Japanese troops.”828 This was reflected in the slogans of the Korean Communist Party as the first
item among the 17 slogans in April 1925: “Complete overthrow of the Japanese imperialist rule
and complete independence of Korea.”829 While lacking “a proper understanding of the
theoretical principles of communism,” as historian Dae-sook Suh noted, some Koreans in
Manchuria accepted communism as a “revolutionary mission” to liberate Korea and its people
from Japanese exploitation.830 But Korean communists in Manchuria with their ruthless
disturbances, 961 times with 3,872 men, causing damage to Korean properties as well as the
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Japanese police, clashed with Korean Nationalists and Christian organizations.831 The Korean
Communists in Manchuria ended up exhausting their strength and retreated to Siberia. Many
were arrested and jailed by the end of 1930.
Kim San, who was introduced in Chapter III as Chiang Chi-rak, an active revolutionary
and organizer of Communist Party in China in the 1920s and 1930s, was captured, suspected as a
Japanese secret agent, and killed in Yunan, China, in 1938.832 Kim, who lived in Japan and
Manchuria after leaving home at the age of eleven, was one of the active members of the
Communist Party in China, also actively seeking the independence of Korea from the Japanese
occupation until his death, alleged of being an agent of Japan—the country that he hated.
In the photo below (Figure 76), Kim San was photographed with a banner on his chest
which said, “Chang Chi-rak, aged 27, originally from Yong-chun, Pyongando in Korea, is hereby
forbidden to stay in China by order of the Japanese Consulate in Tsenjin, China.”833 This
portrays a classic example of many Korean transnationals in Manchuria who struggled to live in
exile during the tumultuous era of Korean history, only to be banished and eliminated in the end.
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(Figure 76: Kim San at the age of 27)834
Of the Koreans in Manchuria who survived the process of communist revolution of China
over 80,000 were dispatched to Korea during the Korean War of 1950-1953: 55,000 – 60,000 of
them joined the North Korean Army of Inmingun (
People’s Army ( 國

軍), and 20,000 joined the Chinese

軍) to fight against the South Korean Army supported by the

United Nations Allied Forces.835 From Yanbian Province alone, historian Chae-jin Lee claimed,
more than 5,000 Koreans were sent to fight in the Chinese People’s Volunteers ( 共

軍)

along with another 5,740 support personnel, such as “1,773 army operators, 2,163 translators,
898 nurses, 330 transportation workers, 433 stretch-bearers, and 140 truck drivers.”836 Lee
conjectured that almost “all of the 6,981 persons from Yanbian who died in Korea were
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Koreans.”837 The phenomenon of Koreans fighting on both sides of a war, as this dissertation
revealed during the Russo-Japanese War, happened again about fifty years later.
Koreans in the RFE and Manchuria in the Twenty-First century
Upon arrival in Yenji Airport today, visitors are welcomed with bilingual street signs and
advertisements which present the contents in the Korean language on top of the Chinese
displays, signifying the majority rule of the province. Yenbian, the capitol of Jilin Province,
densely populated by Koreans who are called Chosunjok (

), has been designated as the

administrative seat of Chosunjok Autonomous Government (
Autonomous State of Chosunjok (

都)—the

) since 1952. The City of Yenbian reported a

Chosunjok (Korean) population of approximately 530,000 in 2003.838
The Cultural Revolution of Red China in 1966-1967, which swept through China as a
whole nation, did not succeed to wipe out the Korean cultures and customs onto which the
transnational Koreans in Manchuria held tightly. Neither did the Bolshevik Revolution and the
formation of the Soviet Union completely destroy the Korean diaspora in that region. Korean
transnationals who had been deported thousands of miles away to Central Asia by Stalin in 1937
are still holding onto their Korean way of living, eating, sharing, and enjoying their lives in their
new diaspora while some others returned to the RFE.
The only visible difference between the Korean transnational migrants currently living in
the RFE and those in Manchuria is their form of appellation: Goryoin (高
of the former and Chosunjok (

) or Goryo saram

) of the latter. Both are still “discriminated against as
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‘other’” and discriminated as second-class citizens in their respective countries of transnational
diasporas in the twenty-first century.839

(Figure 77: Koreans celebrating the “8.15 Independence Day” in Volvograd, Russia.
Photographed by Kim Ji-youn)840
(Figure 78: Father and son of Goryoin farmers in Priamur, 2001)841
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(Figure 79: Young Korean fourth-generation girls performing Fan Dance, a traditional Korean
dancing, dressed in colorful Korean dresses, during the 8.15 Independence Day Celebration)
The above three photos (Figures. 77, 78, and 79) show the Goryoins (高

) who had

been deported to Uzbekistan during Stalin’s Terror in 1937 and have returned to Russia in the
1990s. These third- and fourth-generation Koreans have made a large settlement in Volgograd by
the Volga River, formerly called Stalingrad which served as a front of the Soviet Union’s Red
Army during the World War II. Due to the language barrier as Russian speakers, the Goryoins
had much difficulty adjusting to their new lives in Uzbekistan and migrated back to Russia when
the Russian government declared the freedom of ethnic minorities in 1990.
The primary occupation of Goryoins continues to be farming, using the old Korean
methods of seasonal farming as they migrate and rotate from place to place, planting and
harvesting year around. A father (third-generation) and son (fourth-generation) team of Korean
transnational farmers, seen in the picture taken in 2001, farm together in the Priamur region of
the RFE. Although their living is still tough with barely enough proceeds to make ends meet
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despite the hard labor they must endure, the father is beaming at the joy of working with his son
side by side. The young son flaunts a Nike shirt, sitting next to his father in western-style plaid
shirts. No more Korean way of dressing but still very much Korean in many other ways.
Revisiting the Myungdong-chon Korean village formed by the Kim Yak-yun group in
1899 (Figure 80) and taking a glimpse into the lives in Korean transnational diaspora in
Manchuria today (2011), one can see the community the Korean migrants have created in
Manchuria, still standing and prospering today. Yenbian State of Autonomy in Jilin Province,
Manchuria, where Myungdong-chon stands today, reported a population of 2,177,126 of whom
1,092,343 are women in 2004.842 A remarkable change from the earlier days when women were
not even counted as part of population statistics, although they suffered the same hard work of
farming, feeding, and clothing their families. The contribution made by women in the
transnational diasporas in Manchuria, as well as in the RFE, needs to be better documented and
researched for their role played not only in the diaspora building and maintenance but also in
other political activities, such as independence movements in future studies.
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(Figure 80: Myungdong-chon, May 2011, Courtesy of The Memorial Center of Kyu-Am Kim
Yak-yun)
Initially, this dissertation delved into the general history of Korea to investigate the
deployment of Koreans in the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905,
based on the clues left by Jack London and other media reports. The investigation revealed a
complex web of findings and evidence which supported the deployment of Koreans not only in
the Japanese military forces and intelligence activities but also in the Russian military and
intelligence activities concurrently in the period of the study—1904-1905.
Furthermore, the current investigation revealed that the Japanese engagement of Koreans
in the reconnaissance endeavors occurred much earlier in the nineteenth century, before the SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895—as early as in 1876 when a “Russian national and a former Korean
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national Kim Rin-sung” was hired on July 13, 1875.843 Kim In-sung, a native of Hamheung
(

), Hamgyongdo Province in Korea, a product of the early transnational migrant diaspora in

the RFE, was hired to help the Japanese military in its exploratory and mapping expeditions of
the Korean peninsula and Manchuria, prior to the establishment of the Kanghwa Treaty between
Korea and Japan—the first treaty signed to open the doors of Korea in 1876.
In conclusion this dissertation is a study of transnational diasporic communities of
Koreans in Russia and China, more specifically the Russian Far East and Manchuria. Their
desire for better lives and their struggle for survival during a time of natural disasters, political
conflicts, and societal discrimination at the end of the Yi Dynasty of Korea helps us understand
why and how Koreans became involved in someone else’s war—the Russo-Japanese War. The
transnational aspects of their lives in various regions of Far East Asia must be taken into
consideration as the core reasons.
As for the transnational migrants from Korea who settled in the RFE, their true allegiance
could have been for the Russians to win the war so that their homeland of Korea would not fall
into the Japanese colonial grip, wishing to return home to Korea sometime in their lifetime or
their children’s. Russified Koreans were motivated as well as endowed to contribute to the war
efforts on the Russian side, having already acquired necessary language skills and financial
means to help out.
For those who sided with Japan in Manchuria and the RFE, however, the issues got
complicated by the question of collaboration or survival. As historian Yumi Moon raised the
question of collaboration, one must consider what it would have meant for the colonized to be
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collaborative in the colonial period.844 The colonized are given little choice to collaborate or not
in their given circumstances in order to survive. Another historian Andre Schmid suggested, “the
enlightened leaders” of Korea created “structural dilemmas within Korean nationalist discourses
and reform ideas” by using the “language of ‘civilization and enlightenment’” as it helped bring
Korea into submission to Japan in their attempts for the country’s progress.845 The populace of
Korea at home and in diasporas were caught in this dilemma, having had to choose sides.
Historian Mark E. Caprio and Yu Jia wrote of the excitement and jubilation that sent
Koreans “throughout the empire into the streets in celebration” at the news of “unconditional
surrender” by the Japanese Emperor Hirohito on August 15, 1945.846
For the first time in decades they could freely associate with their fellow countrymen,
communicate in their language, and wave their national flag [taegukgi] as Koreans
without fear of punishment. The United States estimated that three to four million
Koreans resided overseas at this time…. Throughout the eastern part of the Asian
continent (including the Russian Far East), as well as in other parts of the Japanese
Empire including the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong, the Philippines, the South Pacific,
and Taiwan.
To all these Koreans in their transnational diasporas—“1.45 million Koreans in Japan and 1,475
in Manchuria” as well as many others in Sakhalin, Australia, Hawai’i and the United States—
their days of living in fear and guilt, caught between the sense of collaboration or noncollaboration, of which they had no choice as the colonized people, were over at the news of
Korea’s independence.847 The population of South Korea increased “by an estimated 22 percent,
or slightly fewer than 3.5 million” within a year as the repatriated Koreans came home to
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Korea.848 While some of these transnational migrants of Korea were able to cross over the
Arirang road and come back home, many others still have not.
This dissertation concludes with the idea, shared by historian Madeline Y. Hsu about
living in transnational diaspora. The “unidirectional shift” of uprooting is sustained by
“continuing loyalty” which can bring Koreans at home and abroad together in unity regardless of
where they may be situated at the moment, sustained by the idea and undying hope of “Heroic
Returns” of crossing the hills of Arirang someday.849
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